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CASE NO. CV-2007-0000266 
DECISION ON APPEAL 
The trial court's "Order Granting Petition to Compel Sale of Home and 
Payment to Department" is vacated and the matter is remanded for the trial court 
to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issues it decided. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Melvin Peterson was born on  and died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007. 
Melvin owned real property in Moyie Springs, Idaho. On December 6, 2001, he conveyed the 
real property to his daughter, Cathie Peterson, and retained a life estate interest. Before his 
death, but after reaching the age of 55, Mr. Peterson applied for and received state medical 
assistance (Medicaid) benefits in the amount of $171 ,386.94. 
Cathie Peterson was appointed Personal Representative of Melvin Peterson's estate on 
July 26, 2007. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereafter, "the Department") filed 
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' ' a "Claim Against Estate" and an "Amended Claim Against Estate," each of which was 
disallowed by the Personal Representative. The Department petitioned the court to allow the 
claim. At the hearing on the petition, the court minutes reflect that counsel for the Personal 
Representative agreed that the Department's claim should be allowed. As a result, the court 
entered an order on April 14, 2008, allowing the claim, stating: "subject to the availability of 
estate funds as may be determined at a later time by the Court, the Personal Representative shall 
allow said claim in the amount of $171,386.94." 
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a "Petition to Require Payment of Claim," which 
asked the court to order the Personal Representative to promptly pay the $171,386.94 claim 
against the estate. On May 28, 2008, the Personal Representative filed an objection to the 
Department's petition to require the payment of the claim. A hearing was held on June 3, 2008. 
On June 12, 2008, the trial court entered an "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim," 
granting the Department's petition, and ordering that the life estate interest Mr. Peterson held in 
the real property at the time of his death be deemed an asset of the estate for the limited purpose 
of Medicaid estate recovery by the Department. The court also ordered that the Personal 
Representative pay the Department's claim to the extent of available assets in the estate. 
On August 6, 2008, the Personal Representative filed a "Motion to Hire Appraiser." 
After a hearing, the trial court entered an order approving the hiring of an appraiser on 
September 23, 2008. The appraisal, showing a total value of the real property of $139,000 at the 
time of Mr. Peterson's death, was filed with the trial court on July 15, 2009. On the same date, 
the Department filed a "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department." A 
hearing was held on this petition on July 28, 2009. On August 11, 2009, the trial court entered 
an "Order Granting Petition to Compel." 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
On August 20, 2009, Cathie Peterson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin 
Peterson, filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's August 11, 2009, Order granting the 
Department's petition to compel the sale of Melvin Peterson's home. On November 13, 2009, 
Cathie Peterson filed an Appellant's Brief in which she presented the following issues on appeal: 
(I) The Magistrate erred as no evidence was ever taken and no findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were ever made; 
(2) The Magistrate misapplied Idaho Code § 56-218 in determining that a life estate 
interest in the estate existed; 
(3) The Magistrate misapplied Idaho Administrative Code provisions 16.03.05.833, 
.837, and .841 in determining the value of the life estate interest; 
(4) The Magistrate does not have jurisdiction over real property vested in a person 
who is not a party to the proceeding, and does not have jurisdiction over real 
property not vested in the estate; 
(5) The Magistrate erred in purportedly concluding that the decedent had an interest 
at the time of his death (or alternatively, in determining the extent of such 
interest) in the real property; and 
(6) The estate is entitled to recover attorney's fees on appeal to the district court. 
The Department maintains that the issues raised by the Personal Representative are 
inapplicable because the appellant did not appeal the applicable decision made by the trial court. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)(l) sets forth the standard of review for appeals to the 
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows: 
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Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a 
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine 
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards 
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the 
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained 
the import of Rule 83(u)(l ): 
We read [I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)] as saying that a district court, in making an 
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same 
manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district 
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should 
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott 
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); lsaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96 
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the 
district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the 
factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new 
trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the 
trial court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a 
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what 
findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment. 
Frederickson v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 5B C.J.S. 
Appeal and Error § 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new 
findings, or, alternatively, act under LC. § 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and 
conduct a partial or whole trial de novo. 
Id at 788-789, 589 P.2d at 535-536. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52( a) requires that a trial court, sitting without a jury, enter 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 
Idaho 316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained this requirement: 
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P., requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." The rule also 
provides that "[i]f an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein." 
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the district court on appeal from a 
magistrate, we must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether 
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substantial evidence supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those 
findings support the magistrate's conclusions of law. Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 
559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the 
district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id Only 
where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning 
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. 
See Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982); In re 
Estate o/Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974). 
Id at 320, 678 P.2d at 112. 
In the case of In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974), the Idaho 
Supreme Court was presented with a district court's affirmance of a magistrate's refusal to admit 
a will to probate. The magistrate's decision was rendered by memorandum opinion, without the 
entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id at 163. Reversing the district court, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
Even though IRCP 52(a) recognizes that findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be embodied in a memorandum opinion, still both the 
findings and conclusions must be specially stated if they are to fulfil their 
designed purpose. This court has held that the absence of findings of fact 
may be disregarded by the appellate court if the record is so clear that the 
court does not need their aid for a complete understanding of the issues. 
(citation omitted). However, in this case the record is not that clear. The 
assignments of error are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
magistrate's decision. It cannot be determined upon what facts the magistrate 
based his decision. 
*** 
When the district judge was considering the appeal in this case, explicit 
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law by the magistrate would have 
clearly reflected the basis of the magistrate's decision, and then the district court 
more readily could have determined whether facts sustained the magistrate's 
decision and whether he had correctly applied the appropriate principles of law. 
Moreover, with such findings of fact, the district court could have properly 
determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de novo before 
the district court. LC.§ 1-2213. 
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Id at 164, 525 P.2d at 359. (Emphasis supplied). 
IV. PERTINENT ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether findings of fact and conclusions of law must 
be set forth in regard to the August 11, 2009, Order, as well as in the June 12, 2008, Order, in 
accord with l.R.C.P. 52(a). Before that issue is addressed, however, a decision must be made as 
to whether the August 11, 2009, Order or the earlier June 12, 2008, Order is the final, appealable 
order. The parties present the following arguments which will be addressed in the "Discussion" 
portion of this decision. 
A. Which Order Is Final And Appealable? 
1. The Department's Position 
The Department claims that the June 12, 2008, "Order on Petition to Require Payment of 
Claim" decided all of the important issues in this matter and was appealable under Idaho Code 
§ 17-201(4), (5), and (7). Specifically, the Department asserts that the June 12, 2008, Order 
made two important decisions which were appealable within forty-two (42) days after entry of 
the order. Part of the order required that the estate pay the Department's claim; thus, according 
to the Department, the order was appealable under LC.§ 17-201(4). The second portion of the 
order found that the life estate interest is an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid estate 
recovery, which effectively mandated that the real property be partitioned to pay the 
Department's claim. Thus, according to the Department, the order was appealable under Idaho 
Code§ 17-201(4), (5), and (7). The Personal Representative, however, did not appeal the June 
12, 2008, Order. 
From the Department's perspective, the Personal Representative, with the present appeal 
of the August 11, 2009, "Order Granting Petition to Compel," attempts to challenge the decisions 
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made in the June 12, 2008, Order. Because the earlier order was not appealed within the 
statutory time period, the Department contends that the order became final forty-two ( 42) days 
after entry. 
The Department also asserts that it was the Personal Representative's refusal to comply 
with the June 12, 2008, Order which necessitated the Department's filing of its "Petition to 
Compel Sale of Home and Payment," which asked the court to order the Personal Representative 
to sell the real property in order to pay the Department's claim. The Department argues that the 
Personal Representative cannot reach the issues decided in the June 12, 2008, Order by refusing 
to comply with that order, and thus, force another proceeding and a subsequent order to compel 
compliance. The Department claims that the order requiring compliance, entered on August 11, 
2009, does not revisit the issues decided by the earlier order. Thus, the only issues the Personal 
Representative may raise on appeal are those stemming from the order to compel. The 
Department believes those issues consist of: (1) the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of 
law; and (2) the allegation that the trial court misapplied the provisions of the Idaho 
Administrative Code to determine the value of the life estate interest. 
2. The Personal Representative's Stance 
The Personal Representative takes issue with the Department's characterization of the 
June 12, 2008, Order. The Personal Representative asserts that Idaho Code § 17-201, 
specifically, subsections 4, 5, and 7, do not make the June 12, 2008, Order appealable, as that 
order did not, according to subsection (4), set apart property; or, according to subsection (5), 
direct partition ofreal property; or, according to subsection (7), partition any part of the estate. 
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B. The Requirement of Findings Of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
The Personal Representative maintains that the trial court erred by failing to make 
findings of fact upon which to base its conclusions. Thus, according to Cathie Peterson, by 
failing to make a record and provide an understanding of the basis for its reasoning in the two 
orders, this matter should be remanded. Cathie Peterson also argues that the trial court failed to 
admit any evidence, or take testimony, or set forth findings and conclusions as to the 
applicability of Idaho Code § 56-218. She also argues that the trial court failed to properly 
consider the applicable statutes, rules, and common law principles and their effect at the time the 
court's decisions were made. 
The Department counters by arguing that findings of fact were not required because there 
was no trial of any issue of fact. According to the Department, the underlying facts were 
presented to the trial court in the form of sworn statements, and no factual issue was ever raised. 
The Department contends that the issues presented in the Appellant's Brief are all issues of law, 
not fact. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. The June 12, 2008, Order Was Interlocutory And Not Appealable 
In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Absent a statutory basis for appeal, there is no right to appeal. Wilson v. 
DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562, 494 P.2d 566 (1972); Miller v. Gooding Highway 
District, 54 Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934) .... Such a basis, if any exists, must be 
found in LC. § 17-201, or LC. § 1-2213, as modified by LR.C.P. 83(a), for 
appeals from the magistrate division to the district court. 
Id at 318, 678 P.2d at 110. 
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Idaho Code § 17-201 provides a statutory basis for appeals in probate matters. Section 
17-201 provides in relevant part: 
An appeal may be taken to the district court of the county from a judgment, or 
order of the magistrates division of the district court in probate matters: 
4. Against or in favor of setting apart property, or making an allowance for a 
widow or child. 
5. Against or in favor of directing the partition, lease, mortgage, sale or 
conveyance of real property. 
7. Refusing, allowing or directing the distribution or partition of an estate, or 
any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share. 
Idaho Code§ 17-201(4), (5) and (7) 
In the June 12, 2008, Order, the court concluded that (1) Idaho Code § 56-218(4) 
provides for the inclusion of the value of the life estate interest Mr. Peterson held in real property 
at the time of his death as an asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate 
recovery by the Department; and (2) the Personal Representative must amend the Inventory to 
include the life estate interest and assign to that interest an appropriate value. The trial court did 
not determine any value, nor distribute, nor set aside, nor partition the life estate in the order 
itself Accordingly, no basis for appeal of the June 12, 2008, Order exists pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 17-201(4), (5), and/or (7). Therefore, that order is interlocutory, not final, and thus, not 
appealable. The August 11, 2009, Order, however, is final and appealable, as it sets the value of 
the life estate interest at $53,712, less the decedent's proportionate share of closing or settlement 
charges incurred, and it orders that the Personal Representative pay the Department's claim. 
In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated that "the review of a final judgment allows the review of all interlocutory orders to which 
an objection (which preserves the issue for review) has been raised." 106 Idaho at 319, 678 P.2d 
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at 111 (citations omitted). In this case, the Personal Representative filed an objection to the 
Department's petition to require the payment of its claim, and the trial court effectively overruled 
those objections by entering the June 12, 2008, Order. Therefore, the review of the final order 
entered on August 11, 2009, allows the review of the interlocutory June 12, 2008, Order, to the 
extent that certain issues in this appeal relate to those earlier proceedings. 
B. The Failure To Set Forth Findings Of Fact Is Cause For Remand 
The Idaho Supreme Court decided that "the absence of findings of fact may be 
disregarded by the appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid 
for a complete understanding of the issues." In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 164, 525 P .2d 
357, 359 (1974). In this case, no findings of fact or conclusions oflaw were contained within the 
August 11, 2009, Order. Further, a review of the Transcript of the July 28, 2009, hearing on the 
Department's "Petition to Compel Sale of Real Property and Payment to Department," as well as 
the Transcript of the June 3, 2008, hearing on the "Petition to Require Payment of Claim," 
reveals that no findings of fact or conclusions of law were announced in open court on the 
record. 
At the June 3, 2008, and July 28, 2009, hearings, the court heard oral argument from the 
parties on several issues, including the applicability of Idaho Code § 56-218 in determining 
whether the life estate interest should be included as an asset in the estate, as well as the 
applicability of Idaho Administrative Code provisions 16.03.05.833, .837, and .841 in 
determining the value of the life estate interest. In addition, the trial court must have concluded 
that it had jurisdiction over real property which is vested in a person who is not a party to the 
proceeding, as well as the real property itself which may or may not be vested in the estate. No 
explanation was provided as to how these conclusions were reached. The Personal 
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Representative has assigned as errors the court's rulings on these and other issues. Because these 
assignments of error are directed to the necessity and/or sufficiency of the evidence considered to 
reach these conclusions, where no findings of fact have been set forth, it cannot be determined 
upon what facts the trial court based its decision. See In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 164, 
525 P.2d 357, 359 (1974). 
The Idaho Supreme Court also held: 
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning 
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. 
In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 P.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Because there were no findings of fact made, this results in a lack of clarity and understanding on 
the part of the appellate court as to the basis for the trial court's reasoning on the material issues. 
Remand of this case is necessary in order for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be set 
forth. 
C. Attorney's Fees on Appeal Are Denied 
The Personal Representative requests an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-117. This code provision states that the court "shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the 
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Because the nonprevailing 
party in this case, the Department, did act with a reasonable basis in fact or law, the request for 
attorney's fees on appeal is denied. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's August 11, 2009, "Order Granting Petition to 
Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department" is vacated and the matter is remanded so that 
findings of facts and conclusions of law can be established. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this 2..5 day of May, 2010 
~~ .,, Steve Verby 
District J:ge 
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Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
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John A. Finney 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
AMENDED PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY 
COMES NOW CATHIE L. PETERSON, Personal Representative of the 
Estate, by and through her attorney, JOHN A. FINNEY, and files 
this Amended Inventory of the Estate, pursuant to the Order On 
Petition To Require Payment Of Claim entered June 12, 2008 and 
following the Decision On Appeal dated May 25, 2010, as follows: 
1. The Decedent died March 3, 2007, intestate. CATHIE L. 
PETERSON is the Court appointed Personal Representative of the 
Estate. 
2. The Amended Estate Beginning Inventory as of the date 
of death, March 3, 2007, consisted of the following: 
A. Real Estate 
** Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion Only** 





Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two 
(2), Moyie Springs Townsite and described as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot 
Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs 
Townsite; thence West along the North Line of 
Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 feet to a 
point; thence Southwesterly along Moyie 
Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; 
thence South 63 feet to a point; thence East 
95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5; 
thence North 125 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Stocks, Bonds & Certificates of Deposit 
None 
Mortgages, Notes & Cash 
(1) Mountain West Bank Acct# ****2078 




(2) First American Title Escrow 
Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest) as 
of 03/02/07 
(3) Boundary Community Hospital Refund 
11,344.35 
2,163.74 
Other Miscellaneous property 
Miscellaneous Furniture, & clothes 
Approved or Allowed Claims 
(1) Principal Financial Group 
RPS No.XXXXX4185 
(2) Boundary Community Hospital 
- Withdrawn 
(3) State of Idaho, Department of 





3. The Estate has incurred significant cost and expense in 
attorney fees and costs and will incur additional costs of 
administration. 
4. The Estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy 
all claims. 
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DATED this i:zf'~y of June, 2010. 
HN A. FINNEY 
ttorney for CATHIE L. 
PETERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of MELVIN PETERSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing AMENDED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY was served 
by deposit in First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this z;z,,,,.,,c:/ 
day of June, 2010 and was addressed to: 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Buman Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Boundary Community Hospital 
Attn: Suzi Bishop 
6640 Kaniksu Street 
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805 
Carl Peterson 
1016 South Whitman # 105 
Tacoma, WA 98465 
Provincial Financial Group 
Principal Life Insurance 
Company 
Repetitive Payment Services 
P.O. Box 4926 
Grand Island, NE 68802-4926 
By~-3:~ 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
(cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov) 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
PETITION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Depai1ment"), through undersigned counsel, and petitions this court for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, in accordance with the Decision on Appeal signed by District Judge Steve 
Verby on May 25, 20 I 01 as follows: 
I. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
I. Melvin Peterson was born and died at the age of 83 on March 3, 
2007. 
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2. Prior to his death, and after the age of 55, the Department paid Medicaid benefits 
on Melvin Peterson's behalf in the sum of at least $171,386.94. 
3. The Department file.cl an Amended Claim Against estate in the amount of 
$171,386.94 on December IO, 2007. 
4. By order dated April 4, 2008, the court orderoo the Department1s claim allowed. 
Said order was not appealed and is now final. 
5. Melvin Peterson owned real property in Moyie Springs which, on December 5) 
2001, he conveyed to his daughter Cathie Peterson, retaining a life estate. 
6. Melvin Peterson possessed this life estate interest at the time of his death. 
7. On June 12, 2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of 
CJaim. Said order, (I) Ordered payment of the Department's claim to the extent of available 
estate assets, (2) Required that the life estate held by Melvin Peterson prior to his death be an 
asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, (3) Required the personal 
representative to include the life estate as an asset of the estate in the estate inventory, and (4) 
Required the personal representative to assign an appropriate value to the life estate based on its 
value at the time of Melvin Peterson's death. 
8. On September 23, 2008, the court entered its Order Approving Hiring of 
Appraiser, to detennine the fee simple value of the real property subject to Melvin Peterson's life 
estate. 
9. Subsequently, an appraisal was produced estimating the fee simple value of the 
real property at the time of Melvin Peterson's death at $139,000. 
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10. On August 11, 2009, the court entered its Order Granting Petition to Compel. 
Said order required the personal representative to (1) List the real property for sale at its current 
fair market value, (2) Accept the first reasonable offer from a qualified buyer, (3) Share seller 
closing costs between the personal representative and the estate in proportion to the life estate 
value, (4) Pay $53,712 of proceeds to the estate, less proportionate costs, to the estate, and (5) 
Close the estate and pay the Department's claim. The order further provided that if the personal 
representative failed to carry out the court's order, she would be subject to removal as personal 
representative. 
11. The personal representative appealed the court's August 11, 2009, Order Granting 
Petition to Compel! and also appealed issues from the court's June 12, 2008, Order on Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim. 
12. The District Court has now issued its Decision on Appeal, vacating the August 11, 
2009, Order, and remanded the matter "so that findings of facts and conclusions of law can be 
established." 
II. 
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Department allegesi avers, and requests findings of fact as follows: 
13. On December 5, 2001, the decedenti Melvin Peterson, conveyed bis real property 
in Moyie Springs to Cathie Peterson. by Gift Deed, retaining a life estate. A true and correct 
copy of said Gift Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "Ai'' and incorporated herein by reference. 
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14. Melvin Peterson was in possession of this life estate at the time of his death) 
March 3, 2007, at which time he was 83 years of age. 
15. The Department has an allowed claim for Medicaid recovery pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 56-218, against the estate of Melvin Peterson, in the sum of $171,386.94. 
16. Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative for this estate on July 26, 
2007, and is in possession of the real property described in Exhibit "A." 
17. Pursuant to an appraisal obtained by and at the request of the personal 
representative, the real property was worth $139,000 at the time of the decedent's death. A true 
and correct copy of the appraisal is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
Ill. 
REQUESTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Department requests conclusions ofJaw as follows: 
18. This is a probate proceeding governed by the Idaho Probate Code and Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, and the court has in rem jurisdiction over the property of the estate and, pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 15-3~ 105j has exclusive jurisdiction of fonnal proceedings to determine how 
decedents' estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended and 
distributed. 
19. The court has personal jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 15-3-401and15-3-602. 
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20. The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin Peterson. is an 
asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 56-218(4). 
2 I. Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson the moment 
before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been detennined pursuant to 
IDAPA 16.03.05.837. which is .38642 of the fair market value, or $53,712.38. The life estate 
factor of .38642 of the fair market value of the real property is the appropriate valuation of the 
estate's interest in the real property gifted to Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 
2001. 
22. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). the estate is the owner of a 38.642% 
undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A. n 
23. The personal representative is unde1· a duty to settle and distribute this estate as 
expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate, and must use the 
authority conferred upon her by the probate code to do so. 
24. The personal representative has authority to bring an action to partition real 
property in which the estate has an interest, including the undivided interest in the real property 
described in Exhibit "A," pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-703 and 15-3-715(6) and (8). 
25. Pursuant to Idaho Code § l 5-3- I 05, the court has authority to require the personal 
representative to take such actions as she is otherwise authorized by law to take. 
26. The court has authority to require the personal representative to pay the 
Department's claim, and if necessary. to partition the real property by selJing the real property, to 
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pay the Department's claim, or if she is unwilling to do so, to replace the personal representative 
so that a successor personal representative may bring an action for partition against Cathie 
Peterson. 
WHEREFORE, the Department requests as follows: 
1. That the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this 
petition; 
2. That the court enter its Order upon said findings and conclusions as follows: 
a. That the personal representative shall immediately pay the Department's 
claim in fulJ; 
b. Ifthere are insufficient assets of the estate to pay the Department's claim, 
she shall liquidate sufficient assets of the estate, up to all of the assets of the estate, to pay 
the Department's claim, or so much of the claim as the proceeds of the assets of the estate 
may pennit, which liquidation shall include the following: 
i. That the Personal Representative shall use all due diligence and 
vigor to forthwith prepare and list for sale the home located at P .0. Box 442 
(Roosevelt), Moyie Springs, Idaho; 
ii. That the listing price shall be reasonable and reflect fair market 
value for the home and area; 
iii. That the Personal Representative shaJJ accept the first reasonable 
offer received from a qualified buyer; 
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iv. That any closing or settlement charges for such items as realtor 
commissions, title insurance and related items, shall be shared, the estate's share 
being .38642 of said costs; 
v. That the decedent's estate shall be entitled to receive the life estate 
value of .38642 of the net proceeds, less the estate1s proportionate share of closing 
or settlement charges incurred as set forth, above; 
vi. That upon receipt of net sale proceeds by the estate, the Personal 
Representative shall timely prepare and file all necessary papers to close this 
estate and pay the Department the monetary value of all assets contained in the 
estate, less reasonable costs of estate administration as may be determined by the 
Court, if necessary. 
c. That upon the failure of the Personal Representative to comply with this 
Order, she may be removed as personal i·epresentative and a successor personal 
representative may be appointed in her place and stead, or such other judicial remedy as 
may be appropriate; 
d. That if the personal representative is removed she shall remain subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court for any necessary orders surcharging her for any breach of her 
fiduciary duty which the court may detennine has resulted in loss or damage to the estate. 
3. For such other and further relief as may be appropriate herein. 
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DATED this 30th day of June, 2010, 
t)~~ 
W. C \T CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the foJlowing: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEYt P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
DATED this 3Q day of June, 2010. 
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GIFT DEED 204218 
IN CONSIDBRATlON of Jove and aflktioJ1, end in addkk\n, irt comtderation ofthtl aid 
and assistance grantee has givo grantor in the: cme QllcJ mo.lnteJ13llQe o! gnurt.or 8ltd 1be property 
hereinaft()( deS<m'bed wifhout thought or teqllNl fot tem\ll1Cnltlon of any type or kind 
w1iatsoover
1 
MELVIN PETERSON. a llngle peno11, gramo.t, does hereby give, grant, alicl\ 
convey and con1inn mito CATHIE ~N, • ringlc ptnon, grantee, whose ad.dress Is 
f-0. f?:-0'1. ~a, ' mo~\.t... Spr; •· ~t••2'/he property described IS fullows: 
Tax HS, bolng part of Lot Fi\16 (5), Blook Two '2)1 Moylt SJ)tlnwi Townata and cfESCrlbCd 8J 
toltows; 
Cmimenclng 11t tbo N~caat Comer ofl.d Fiw (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Sll'l1181 Towns!tc; 
~cnco West along the N<ril Urie of Let Pi~ (5), • Qiana. of 40 ftitt to a point: thalco 
south~lt:rly ''°"' Miftlo Sired • dWBn~ of MO filet to a pohlt; lhenco south 63 ~to a 
poiol; lhoicc East 9~ m.. et 11 point on !ho Batt llM of .1,,a1 5; lh~ Nanh US kt !O the 
POlN'l' OP BEGINN'ING. 
IU'.8ERVING UNTO GRANTOR A LIFE I.ST ATE IN SAID PROJ1'J\Tr, 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with the appurtmln0('4 unto the grantee, 
2ta heka sru'1 assigns furevel'. And tho gtanlor does hereby ool'eOaltt to and with tho $did ~ 
that it is tho OW1'1¢f ill too sfmple of said prcri!ta end tbtlt diey sre ~ from all CllCUmbmocca 
and that it will WARRANT and Dl!FEND the same from all Jawi\Jl cJaim.s whatsoever. 
OATED tbis 5~ day ofIXccmbcr, 2001. 
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FOA $NAWlR CAPn'AL XMPROVllMl!l'ft'9, Tttru IS UdtJmOU!NT MAlll<fif DAYA YO'~Rli! AtlY VAWll 
OJFfliREHCE BASED ON THO:lll .l'MPKOYcHl9fl'\9, 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and WeJfare (hereinafter the 
"Department"), tluough undersigned counsel, and, pursuant to Rule 12(f), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, moves this court for an order striking that portion of the "Demand for Notice and 
Special Appearance" that is not simply a 14Demand for Notice" as provided in Idaho Code§ 15-3-
204. This motion is made because: 
I) Cathie Peterson is attempting to re-litigate issues that have already become final; 
MOTION TO STRIKE - l Y;\MRCllses\Estate\PeteraonMeMn\l'leadln~\Motlott to Strike.wpd 
Q35 
Sep.22. 2010 2:19PM No. 2438 P. 9/26 
2) The "motion" in paragraph 3 is vague, fails to identify any order which Cathie 
Peterson finds offensive, and is not authorized by any provision in the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure or the Idaho Probate Code. 
This motion is supported by the Department's Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Strike filed herewith. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2010, 
~fit CARTWRIGIIT 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre~paid, to the following: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM1 CHTD. 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
DATED this 22- day of September, 2010. 
j~ ~. fNatvv~ 
Lisa M. Warren, Paralegal 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
11Department"), through undersigned counset and submits the following memorandum of points 
and authorities in support of its Motion to Strike: 
I. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative for this estate on July 26~ 2007. 
Since that time~ over a three year period, several contested proceedings involving her have 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE Y:\MR.Case&\Eslalc\Pcter&0nMelvin\Pleadin1l5\Mcmo in SuppOrt Motion lo Slrike.wpd 
Sep.22. 2010 2:19PM No. 2438 P. 11/26 
occurred in this matter including the Department's Petitions for Allowance of Claim, Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim, motions relating to the hiring of an appraiser, Petition to Compel 
Sale of Home and Payment to Department, an appeal to the District Court. and remand for 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. A Notice of Hearing setting a pre-trial conference and 
trial setting was filed and served on the parties on July 30, 2010. The Department served a 
Notice of Deposition on Cathie Peterson on September 7, 2010. The pretrial conference is 
currently set for October 5, 2010, and the trial is set for October 21, 2010. 
Cathie Peterson has now, at this late date, retained an attorney to protect her personal 
interests in the real property of this estate, and has filed a "Demand for Noticen pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 15-3-204. Included in the "Demand for Notice" are false and unsupported statements and 
a vague motion purportedly raised under Rule l 2(b): 
2. The nature of Demandant's interest is fee title holder in certain real 
property against which the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, 
asserts a claim as creditor of the above entitled estate and which Property has been 
the subject of Motions, Petitions and Court Orders all without notice, service of 
process or jurisdiction over the Demoodant. Cathie Peterson. 
3. * * * The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders 
entered with regard to her real property pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 12(b). 
Demand for Notice and Special Appearance (underline added). 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule l 2(f), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: 
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to 
a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is pennitted by these rules. upon motion 
made by a party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the 
pa1fy or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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Sep.22. 2010 2:19PM 
from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant. immaterial. 
impertinent. or scandalous matter. 
Rule 12( f), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (underline added). 
No. 2438 P. 12/26 
Cathie Peterson is not a stranger to these proceedings. When she sought and obtained 
appointment as personal representativel she voluntarily submitted herself to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court. 
15-3-602. Acceptance of appointment-Consent to jurisdiction - By 
accepting appointmentl a personal representative submits personallx to the 
jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be 
instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to 
the personal representative, or mailed to him by ordinary first class mail at his 
address as listed in the application or petition for appointment or as thereafter 
reported to the court and to his address as then known to the petitioner. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-602 (emphasis added). There is only one Cathie Peterson. While she may 
have two roles in this case> she is a single person who long ago submitted herself personally to 
this court. She may now have another attorney to represent her personal interests, but she 
remains one person who has long been a party to these proceedin_g.9. Claims that these 
proceedings have taken place "without notice> service of process or jurisdiction over the 
Demandant, Cathie Peterson" are scandalous, impertinent and false. 
The petitions that are currently pending before the court are the Department's Petition to 
Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department, which is on remand for findings of fact and 
conclusions oflawi and the Department's Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
These Petitions seek orders against the personal representative of this estate. If Cathie Peterson 
and the personal representative were distinct individuals (which they are not), she would not have 
standing to challenge the Department's petitions. While she may be an •'interested person,. as 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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defined by Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(25), she would not have the standing of "parti' to b1ing a 
Rule 12(b) motion. 
The Unifonn Probate Code provides for fonnal proceedings which are initiated by 
Petition and notice of hearing. The Probate Code provides for certain specified actions that may 
be brought by an interested person against the personal representative. For example, an 
interested person can seek supervised administration. Idaho Code§ 15-3-501. An interested 
person can seek an order requiring the personal representative to post bond. Idaho Code § 15-3-
605. An interested person can seek an order restraining the personal representative. Idaho Code 
§ 15w3~607. All of these are actions against the personal representative. Nothing gives an 
interested person the right to seek to dismiss a petition brought by a creditor against the personal 
representative. 
Here, Cathie Peterson is attempting to litigate the same issues that have already been 
decided in this case. Mounting absurdity upon absurdity) she is attempting to separate herself 
into two and then litigate with the Department. now as an "interested person," instead of as the 
I 
pe1-sonal representative. Nothing in the Probate Code permits such a procedure. 
Cathie Peterson may avoid the effect of any orders issued pursuant to the Department's 
Petitions by the simple expedient of resigning as personal representative. If that were the case, 
any action to require the partition of the real property would have to be brought against her 
personally by the successor personal representative. In such a proceeding she would have the 
opportunity to assert her rights as an individual (to the extent her participation in these 
proceedings does not result in orders that would be res judicata against her). However, Cathie 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Sep.22. 2010 2:19PM No. 2438 P. 14/26 
Peterson remains as personal representative of this estate. She cannot on the one hand act as the 
personal representative, and at the same time take a position contrary to the estate she represents 
as an "interested person," 
Cathie Peterson's vague attempt at a Rule 12{h) motion is insufficient, redundant, 
immaterial, and impertinent, and should be stricken. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2010, 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM! CHTD. 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
DATED this Z 2--day of September, 2010. 
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~ f1A. . V(}a,-w~ 
Lisa M. Warren, Paralegal 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DMSION 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-0009 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515 
ISB No. 3361 
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov 
No. 2438 P. 15/26 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
FOR CAUSE 
COMBS NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department"), through undersigned counsel, a creditor herein, and, pursuant to Idaho Code § 
15-3-611 petitions this court to remove Cathie Peterson as personal representative herein, as 
follows: 
1. Melvin Peterson was bor and died at the age of 83 on Mal'ch 3, 
2007. 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
Sep. 22. 2010 2:19PM No. 2438 P. 16/26 
2. Prior to his death, and after the age of 55, the Department paid Medicaid benefits 
on Melvin Peterson's behalf in the sum of at least $171,386.94. 
3. Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative of this estate on July 26, 
2007. 
4. The Department filed an Amended Claim Against estate in the amount of 
$171,386.94 on December 10, 2007. 
5. By order dated April 4, 2008, the court ordered the Department>s claim allowed. 
Said order was not appealed and is now final. 
6. Melvin Peterson owned real property in Moyie Springs which, on December 5, 
2001, he conveyed to Cathie Peterson! retaining a life estate. 
7. On June 12, 2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of 
Claim. Said order, among other things, (1) Required that the life estate held by Melvin Peterson 
prior to his death be an asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, (2) 
Required the personal representative to include the life estate as an asset of the estate in the estate 
inventory, and (3) Required the personal representative to assign an appropriate value to the life 
estate based on its value at the time of Melvin Peterson's death. 
8. On June 22, 2010, the personal representative presented an "Amended Personal 
Representative's Inventory" listing the life estate with a value of $0, thereby flaunting the order 
of the court. 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 Y:\MRCases\&ta1e\PelmonMelvin\Plcadings\Petitlon to Remove PltWpd 
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9. On September 17, 2010, Cathie Peterson, through attorney Brent C. Featherston, 
filed a Demand for Notice and Special Appearance which includes a motion "to vacate and 
dismiss all orders entered with regard to" Cathie Peterson's real property. 
IO. Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 provides as follows: 
(a) A person interested in the estate max petition for removal of a personal 
r.m;!resentative for cause at any time. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix 
a time and place for hearing. Notice shall be given by the petitioner to the pe1'sonal 
representative, and to other persons as the court may order, Except as otherwise 
ordered as pmvided in section 15-3-607 of this Part, after receipt of notice of 
removal proceedings, the personal representative shaJl not act except to account, 
to co1rect maladministration or preserve the estate, If removal is ordered, the court 
also shall direct by order the disposition of the assets remaining in the name of, or 
under the control of, the personal representative being removed. 
(b) Cause for removal exists when removal would be in the best interests 
of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person seeking 
h1s appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the proceedings 
leading to his appointment, or that the personal representative has disregarded an 
order of the court. has become incapable of discharging the duties of his office. or 
has mismanaged the estate or failed to perfonn any duty pertaining to the office. 
Unless the decedent's will directs otherwise, a personal representative appointed at 
the decedent's domicile, incident to securing appointment of himself or his 
nominee as ancillary personal representative, may obtain removal of another who 
was appointed personal representative in this state to administer local assets. 
Idaho Code § 15-3-611 (underline added). 
11. The personal representative herein has disregarded an order of the court by failing 
to "assign an appropriate value to the life estate based on its value at the time of Melvin 
Peterson's death." 
12. The personal representative has become incapable of discharging her fiduciary 
duties in this estate because she has taken a position, personally in direct opposition to her duty 
to the estate as pe1'sonal representative. 
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13. It would be in the best interests of the estate to remove Cathie Peterson as 
personal representative so that the remaining issues in this matter can be finally detennined and 
this estate concluded. 
DATED this 22nd day of September~ 2010l 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre~paid, to the following: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHID. 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
DATED this 22..-cJayofSeptember, 2010. 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL 
COMES NOW the State ofidahoi Depa11ment of Health and Welfare {hereinafter the 
"Department11), through undersigned counsel, a creditor herein, and submits the following 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of its Petition for Removal of Personal 
Representative for Cause: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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I. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
Melvin Peterson was bor and died at the age of83 on March 3, 2007. 
The Department has an allowed claim against this estate in the amount of$171,386.94. Cathie 
Peterson was appointed pel'sonal representative of this estate on July 26, 2007. On June 12, 
2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim. Said order, among 
other things, (1) Required that the life estate held by Melvin Peterson prior to his death be an 
asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, (2) Required the personal 
representative to include the life estate as an asset of the estate in the estate inventory, and (3) 
Required the personal representative to assign an appropriate value to the life estate based on its 
value at the time of Melvin Peterson's death. On June 22, 2010, the personal representative 
presented an 11Amended Personal Representative's Inventory'' listing the life estate with a value 
of $0. On September 17, 2010, Cathie Peterson, through attorney Brent C. Featherston, filed a 
Demand for Notice and Special Appearance which includes a motion "to vacate and dismiss all 
orders entered with regard to" Cathie Peterson's real property. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Removal of a personal representative for cause is governed by Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 
which provides as follows: 
15-3-611. Termination of appointment by removal-Cause-Procedure 
(a) A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal 
representative for cause at any time. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix 
a time and place for hearing. Notice shall be given by the petitioner to the personal 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP 
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representative, and to other persons as the court may order. Except as otherwise 
ordered as provided in section 15-3-607 of this Part, after receipt of notice of 
removal proceedings, the personal representative shall not act except to account, 
to correct maladministration or preserve the estate. If removal is ordered, the court 
also shall direct by order the disposition of the assets remaining in the name of, or 
under the control of, the personal representative being removed. 
(b) Cause for removal exists when l'emoval would be in the best interests 
of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person seeking 
his appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the proceedings 
leading to his appointment, or that the personal representative has disregarded an 
order of the court. has become incapable of discharging the duties of his office. or 
has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office. 
Unless the decedent's will directs otherwise, a personal representative appointed 
at the decedent's domicile, incident to securing appointment of himself or his 
nominee as ancillary personal representative, may obtain removal of another who 
was appointed personal representative in this state to administer local assets. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 (underline added). 
A. Cathie Peterson Has Chosen Sides in this Matter and it Would Be in the Best Interest of 
the Estate That She Be Removed as Personal Representative. 
A personal representative is a fiduciary who holds the assets of the estate for the benefit 
of creditors and others interested in the estate. Idaho Code §§ 15-3-703 and 711. A personal 
representative has a duty to proceed expeditiously to administer and settle an estate. Idaho Code 
§ 15-3~703. 
A personal representative has a duty to maximize the value of the estate. In the case of 
Matter of Estate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d 676 (N.D. 1995), the court addressed the personal 
representative's attempt, to the dettiment of creditors, to convey estate property to a devisee for 
less than the actual value of the property: 
A personal representative is a fiduciary who must observe the standards of care 
applicable to trustees. The personal representative's fiduciary obligation requires 
that he act reasonably for the benefit of the heirs, creditorsl and other parties 
interested in the estate. Section 30.lul8ul2, N.D.C.C., provides that the personal 
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representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from a 
breach of his fiduciary duty. 
The personal representative must settle and distribute the estate as 
expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. 
The personal representative must inventory and determine fair market value of the 
decedent's property. If the Rersonal representative sells estate property. he must 
obtain the best possible price: 
I~ in the administration of the estate. the personal representative 
undertakes to sell property of the estate. his fiduciary obligation requires 
him to secure the best price obtainable under the circumstances. He may 
not merely sit dormant and accept such offers as are tendered to him, but 
must make diligent, impartial effort to obtain the best offer possible. 
Thus, an executor's trust is not discharged by selling at the appraised price 
unless there is evidence to show that was the best price that could be 
obtained in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and Administrators § 768 (1989) (footnotes omitted) 
Estate ofThomas1 532 N.W.2d at 686 (citations omitted; underline added). 
A personal representative is not permitted to take sides in a dispute between one heir or 
claimant and another. Matter of Estate ofWise1 20 Kan.App.2d 624, 627, 890 P.2d 744, 746 
(1995) (executor may not take sides in a dispute regarding distribution of an estate); Matter of 
Estate of Pence, 511 N. W .2d 651, 652 (Iowa App. 1993) ("An executor or an administrator must 
be concerned with the preservation of the estate for both the creditors and the beneficiaries and 
cannot act to protect one group with complete disregard to the other''); Estate of Denman, 94 
Cal.App.3d 2891 156 Cal.Rptt. 341 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1979) ("The executor serves as a neutral 
stakeholder with a fiduciary obligation'1); In re Miller's Estate, 259 Cal.App.2d 536, 544, 66 
Cal.Rptr, 756, 762 (Cal.App, 5 Dist. 1968) e1t is unquestionably true that, generally speaking, an 
executor or administrator of an estate should remain neutral in the estate proceedings as between 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REMOVAL w 4 Y:\MRCases\Estalell'etenonMeM-i\l'leiidlngs\Memo in Suppol1 Polition co Removo.wpd 
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parties such as heirs and devisees with conflicting claims to portions of the estate"); In re 
Jacobson's Estate, 387 A.2d 590, 591 (D.C. 1978) ('1Rather than champion particular claims 
against the estate, an executor is expected to remain neutral as to all creditors''); In re Morine's 
Estate, 363 A.2d 700, 703 (Me. 1976) ([T)he executor may not take sides in the adjudication of 
the individual claims of beneficiaries one against another"). There can no longer be any question 
in this case, but that Cathie Peterson has taken sides against the interest of the Department. 
Cathie Peterson is the owner of real property in which the court has already detennined 
the Depa11ment has an interest. Her conflict of interest is greater than where a personal 
representative may also be an heir, or where the estate assets are separate from the assets of the 
personal representative. If the estate is maximized, Cathie Peterson loses a portion of her 
property interest. If the estate is maximized, her interest in her property is minimized. If the 
asset is partitioned Cathie Peterson may lose the property entirely. Because Cathie Peterson is 
living on the real property, it is Jn her best interest to delay the administration of the estate. 
Also in this case, Cathie Peterson has now taken a position in direct opposition to the 
estate she represents as shown in the Demand for Notice and Special Appearance in which she 
seeks "to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real property." Clearly, Cathie 
Peterson has put herself in a role where she can no longer both serve as personal representative 
and litigate her own personal interests in the estate property. These confHcdng roles are 
demonstrated by the following table: 
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Personal ReRresentative Cathie Peterson 
Duty to maximize the estate Interest in minimizing estate value 
Duty first to creditors Interest first to her personal interest 
Duty to proceed expeditiously Interest in delaying distribution 
Cannot take sides Has already taken sides 
Clearly, the conflict of interest has become an impediment to the administration of this 
estate. It would be in the best interest of the estate for Cathie Peterson to be removed as personal 
representative. 
B. The Personal Representative Herein Has Disregarded an Order of the Court. 
On June 12, 2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim. 
Said order required the personal representative to "assign an appropriate value to decedenes life 
estate interest held in real property at the time of death." The question of the valuation of the 
property "at the time of death11 had been contested in the proceeding leading up to the order and it 
was clear to all parties what the order meant. However, on June 22; 2010; the personal 
representative presented an "Amended Personal Representative's Inventory" listing the life estate 
with a value of $0. Zero is simply not a ''value" it is no value at all) contrary to the clear meaning 
and intent of the court. This is not a good faith attempt to value the life estate at the time of 
death of the decedent. In presenting this inventory, the personal representative has "disregarded 
an order of the court'' and should be removed. 
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Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time for an orderly administration of this estate. All parties' interest may be heard 
and fairly decided without the legal maneuvering and wrangling on the part of Cathie Peterson 
that has heretofore marked these proceedings. Cathie Peterson should be removed as personal 
representative. As a private individual she can take such actions as are permitted by law to 
protect her interests in her real property. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2010, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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Deputy Attorney General 
Y;\MaC/lses\&tate\PetenooMelvln\Pleadlngs\Memo In S11pport l'efitio1110 Removc.wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre·paid, to the following: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint> ID 83864 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
DATED this 22-dayofSeptember, 2010 . 
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Lisa M. W aiTen, Paralegal 
Contracts and Administrative Law Division 
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ORiGiNAL 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
brent@featherstonlaw.com 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
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DEMAND FOR NOTICE 
and SPECIAL APPEARANCE 
(I.C. 15-3-204) 
(I.R.C.P. Rule 4(i)(2)) 
1. Demandant, Cathie Peterson, individually, has a financial or property interest in the 
above estate proceedings, in which decedent died on March 3, 2007. 
2. The nature of Demandant's interest is fee title holder in certain real property against 
which the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, asserts a claim as creditor 
of the above entitled estate and which Property has been the subject of Motions, 
Petitions and Court Orders all without notice, service of process or jurisdiction over the 
Demandant, Cathie Peterson. 
3. Demandant, through counsel, makes demand for notice of the following matters all 
petitions, applications, and filings concerning the above estate. Demandant files this 
Demand for Notice and Special Appearance without waiving issues of jurisdiction, 
venue, service of process and due process, pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 4(i)(2). The 
undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real 
property pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 12(b). 
4. Notice shall be given to Demandant's attorney, whose name and address are set forth 
above. 
DATED:9- (~-I~ 
DATED: r-.1? 2£2/tJ 
Attorney for Demandant 
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'.Danid P. :Featlierston 
'.Brent C. :Featherston* 
Jeremy P. :Featherston 
J!.ttamey; at £aw 
113 S. Secomf .J'l.ve. 
Samfpoint, Iaalio 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
7'•7( (208) 263-0400 
* Lie.en.set£ in 
I aalio & 'Wasfiington 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the ,Qra' day of September, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person( s) in the following 
manner: 
John A. Finney, Esq. 
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
W. Cory Cartwright, Esq. 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 









U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
Hand delivered 
Facsimile No. (208) 263-8211 
Other: ________ _ 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Overnight Mail 
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120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
FINAL ACCOUNTING AND PETITION 
FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION; 
and NOTICE OF HEARING 
(October 21, 2010 9:30 a.m.) 
Fee Category: 
J(l) (a) - $25.00 
J(l) (d) - $ 9.00 
COMES NOW CATHIE L. PETERSON, Personal Representative of the 
Estate, by and through her attorney, JOHN A. FINNEY, and files 
this Final Accounting and Petition for a Decree of Distribution, 
as follows: 
1. The Decedent died March 3, 2007, intestate. CATHIE L. 
PETERSON and CARL PETERSON are the sole surviving issue and heirs 
at law of the Decedent. CARL PETERSON executed a Renouncement Of 
And Consent To Appointment as Personal Representative, the 
original of which is on file with the Court. 
2. CATHIE L. PETERSON is the Court appointed Personal 
Representative of the Estate. 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING 
AND PETITION FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION - 1 
3. The Personal Representative published a Notice to 
Creditors on August 16, 2007, August 23, 2007, and August 30, 
2007; and the time to make a creditor's claim has expired. 
4. A Notice to Known Creditor to the State of Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare, dated August 6, 2007, was filed 
August 8, 2007. 
5. The .Amended Estate Beginning Inventory was 
$(156,711.12), which consisted of: 
A. Real Estate 
B. 
c. 
** Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion Only** 
Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two 
(2), Moyie Springs Townsite and described as 
follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot 
Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs 
Townsite; thence West along the North Line of 
Lot Five (5) , a distance of 40 feet to a 
point; thence Southwesterly along Moyie 
Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; 
thence South 63 feet to a point; thence East 
95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5; 
thence North 125 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
Stocks, Bonds & Certificates of Deposit 
None 
Mortgages, Notes & Cash 
(1) Mountain West Bank Acct# ****2078 




(2) First .American Title Escrow 
Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest) as 
of 03/02/07 11,344.35 
D. 
E. 
(3) Boundary Community Hospital Refund 
Other Miscellaneous property 
Miscellaneous Furniture, & clothes 
Approved or Allowed Claims 
(1) Principal Financial Group 
RPS No.:XX:XXX4185 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING 




(2) Boundary Community Hospital 
- Withdrawn 
(3) State of Idaho, Department of 




6. An Amended Claim Against Estate was filed by the State 
of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, for medical 
assistance benefits in the amount of $171,386.94 was allowed. 
7. A "claim" letter dated August 3, 2007 was received from 
Provincial Financial Group for $362.88. This claim was allowed. 
8. A claim was made by Boundary Community Hospital which 
was later withdrawn and the sum of $2,163.74 reimbursed to the 
estate, which was deposited to the estate checking account. 
9. The breakdown of the estate checking account activity 
is as follows: 
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK CHECKING ACCOUNT No.****2078 
Beginning Balance of Account as of 03/30/07 
Payments Received from First American Title 
Escrow Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest) 
Boundary Community Hospital Refund 
Sum Received from Sale of ~ Interest First 
American Title Escrow Acct #*****452 
Payment of Approved Partial Attorney Fees & 
Costs 







10. The Estate does not have sufficient funds or assets to 
satisfy the costs of administration and the allowed claims, as 
significant debts exceed the available assets. 
11. The costs of administration to date are as follows, 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING 
AND PETITION FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION - 3 
with additional costs of administration being incurred. 
Attorney Fees to 6/22/2010 
Costs to 6/22/2010 
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES 
Attorney Fees to Distribution 
Costs to Distribution 
Recording Fee - Assignment 
Filing Fee - Final Acct/Decree 
Certify & Record Decree (Est 5pgs) 









12. The remaining funds held by the Personal Representative 
in the sum of $8,134.01 appear to be sufficient to satisfy the 
remaining unpaid costs of administration incurred to date and to 
be incurred up to the date of distribution. 
13. Any sums remaining after the payment of the final costs 
of administration, shall be disbursed to the extent of said 
funds, pursuant to the classification of claims of Idaho Code § 
15-3-805(4) to the claimant State of Idaho Department of Health 
and Welfare, with insufficient funds to disburse to the remaining 
claimant (15-3-805(6)). 
14. Upon disbursement of the funds, the Estate should be 
closed and the Personal Representative discharged. 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing has been set upon said 
petition on October 21, 2010, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock a.m., at 
the Courtroom of the above entitled Court at Bonners Ferry, 
Boundary County, Idaho, at which time all interested persons must 
appear and show cause, if any they have, why the petition should 
not be granted by the Court. If no persons appear to contest the 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING 
AND PETITION FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION - 4 
accounting or proposed distribution, then the Court may enter a 
Decree of Distribut~oJ1 in conformity with this Petition. 
DATED this 1,2, day of September, 2010. 
~~y-r.~ 
~ttorney for CATHIE L. 
PETERSON, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of MELVIN PETERSON 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING AND PETITI0,,!1...,,4_ 
FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION was mailed, postage prepaid, this J/b"'-
day of September, 2010 and was addressed to: 
Cathie L. Peterson 
P.O. Box 442 
Moyie Springs, ID 83845 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Carl Peterson 
1016 South Whitman # 105 
Tacoma, WA 98465-2301 
Provincial Financial Group 
Principal Life Insurance 
Company 
Repetitive Payment Services 
P.O. Box 4926 
Grand Island, NE 68802-4926 
By:fvCi·J:~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
MELVIN PETERSON 
) 
) Case No: CV-2007-0000266 
) 
) ORDER DENYING AMENDED 
) MOTION FOR AUTOMATIC 
) DISQUALIFICATION - IRCP 40(d)(1) 
Deceased. ) --------------
On September 23, 2010, Attorney Brent C. Featherston filed an IRCP 40(d)(1) 
motion for automatic disqualification of the undersigned judge, on behalf of Cathie 
Peterson "individually". Cathie Peterson has been the Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Melvin Peterson in this proceeding since her appointment by this Court on July 
27, 2007. 
Since her appointment as Personal Representative of the estate, Ms. Peterson 
has pursued both the interests of the estate as well as her own personal interests in this 
litigation. One example of Ms. Peterson pursuing her purely personal interest as the 
Personal Representative is the litigation of the issue of the Court's personal jurisdiction 
over her and her real property in the course of an appeal to District Court. 
Probably in response to the Court's prior admonition of an apparent conflict of 
interest to the Personal Representative's attorney, John Finney, Ms. Peterson has now 
appeared "personally" through Mr. Featherston. 
1. ORDER DENYING AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION 
IRCP 40(d)(1)(D) provides in part that when a "new party" is joined in an action 
after the time for disqualification has passed, the "new party" shall have the right to file for 
disqualification within 14 days of first appearance. 
In the above-entitled proceeding, Cathie Peterson is not a "new party" as 
contemplated by IRCP 40(d)(1)(D). She has been a litigant in this proceeding since its 
inception, and has pursued her own personal financial interests as well as those of the 
estate. The fact that she and her attorney belatedly recognized the potential conflict of 
interest does not render her a "new party" with the right to an automatic disqualification. 
Additionally, IRCP 40(d)(1)(D) applies to new parties "joined in an action". Ms. 
Peterson individually has not been involuntarily joined, but instead chose to appear in her 
personal capacity years after her personal interest in the probate of the estate became 
apparent. 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Peterson's motion for automatic disqualification is 
deemed untimely and is thJlefore denied. 
DATED this 97 day of ptember, 2010. 
2. ORDER DENYING AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular 
mail, postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this di]__ day of September, 2010, to: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
John A. Finney 
Attorney at Law 
120 E. Lake St., Ste. 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
W. Cory Cartwright 
Dep. Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
3. ORDER DENYING AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION 
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ORDER REMOVING PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
The Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause of the State ofldaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare, having come before the Court, and the Court finding that 
removfil °Is~ers~u;:;ep~tativ~ i~~tst uzest o~ est•c!:r~· ~ 
~£,4~erest which does nom, a.R:d tas existed h~eu the personal intcrelts 9fCatl:He 
Retus0a flB:S lt8f f8S~0B:si8ilities as piili'Qlial raproSintuti I Bf~is estEHfi'; tg mjt· ili:e }l8f88Ral. 
·'f@r ill:e }l8'nttlit cf cnditorn bcfulC the inteteeJtl'! efheitl'!, mrJ to be a ncabal 1taldi 'rqr;.. 
Aa i tho Cettrt ~w i1tdill@ lltBt Cathie Petetl'!en haeJ diMegar8e8: tits cz illl' Mtml'! 1 g 1Ct 
4i1:ted June 12, dQQg, 8)1 failittg t1 1tuigH' ;; t1lm lti! 1' ,. s nt!Ma iilttH a ' Ji Hbe 1 ' I tit: time -
..efti• ath gf tltc ft88@attat; 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Cathie Peterson shall be, and 
hereby is, REMOVED as personal representative of this estate; 
ORDER REMOVING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED as follows: 
1) That Cathie Peterson shall take no actions to the detriment of this estate and shall not 
dispose of, conceal, or damage any asset of this estate, whether or not disputed by her, pending 
the appointment of a successor personal representative and a final order of this court wrapping up 
this estate; 
2) That Cathie Peterson shall, upon appointment of a successor personal representative, 
deliver all assets of this estate, including documents pertaining to this estate to the successor 
personal representative; 
3) That Cathie Peterson shall remain subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court for 
the purpose of any further orders necessary to administer and wrap up this estate, including any 
order surcharging her for any loss or damage to the estate for any malfeasance heretofore or 
hereafter committed, or for the repayment of any sums the court may determine were wrongfully 
retained or withheld. ;t!f 
DATED this 2_ day of Octob 
ORDER REMOVING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 
~us 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
Attorney at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83 720-0009 
·1"" DATED this __ day of October, 2010. 
ORDER REMOVING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 3 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101 
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0009 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
cartwriw@dhw.idabo.gov 
FI t_ 
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STATE OF iD.t>.HO 
COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
GLENDA POSTm•. CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
MELVIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-2007-266 
PETITION FOR FORMAL 
APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
(1.C. §§15-3-301, and 15-3-613) 
PETITIONER, LARRY E. TISDALE, CHIEF, BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS, 
DIVISION OF MEDICAID, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT: 
1. Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of a creditor of the estate of Melvin Peterson. 
2. This Court appointed Cathie Peterson as personal representative of the above named estate 
on July 26, 2007. 
3. The above referenced estate is still in administration. 
4. Petitioner is qualified to act as successor personal representative. 
PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT: 
1. Upon the acceptance and qualification of Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial 
Operations, Division of Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, as 
personal representative of the above named estate, accepting Cathie Peterson's resignation 
as personal representative of the above named estate. 
2. The Court appoint Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division of 
Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, as successor personal 
representative of the above named descendant, to act without bond. 
3. The Court authorize and direct Cathie Peterson to transfer title in the assets of the estate, 
and to distribute them, to Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division 
of Medicaid, State ofidaho, Department of Health and Welfare. 
4. After Cathie Peterson as personal representative has made distribution of the assets to Larry 
E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division of Medicaid, State of Idaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare, a receipt for the same be filed with the Court, 
discharging Cathie Peterson as personal representative of the above named estate. 
5. Upon qualification and acceptance by Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial 
Operations, Division of Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, 
Letters of Administration be issued. 
DATED this _2_ day of October, 2010. 
~LC):CXJ 
PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Larry E. Tisdale, being first duly sworn on oath, states that he has read the foregoing 
document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
DATED this 2_ day of October, 2010. 
LA E:TISDALE, Chief 
Bureau of Financial Operations 
Division of Medicaid 
State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0009 
(208) 287-1150 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this l day of October, 2010. 
····· ·······~ •'' 11.& Ill 
........ l"fl• "'4~ 
i''y~ ......... J4P~ . 
: ... ~ ·. 
f I ~OTA~~ ·~ 
: ~ ..... : : p : 
~ f.!>, llauc I ·.';>... ... ~ · .. """' ......... () ,, .. · ..• lfop10"-~ ,, .... .. ,, 
···········•'' 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: '(-l 3-<Jc? 
PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE was 
served on the "l~ day of October, 2010 to: 
CA THIE L PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BRENT C FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM CHTD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
113 SOUTH SECOND A VENUE 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 4 
~ Hand-delivered 
d... Hand-delivered 
.,LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
MEL VIN PETERSON, 
Deceased. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2007-266 
) 
) ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT 
) (LC. § 15-3-602) 
) 
) 
The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to the office of personal representative of 
the estate of the above named decedent and agrees to perform and discharge the trust of said 
office. The undersigned hereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of this Court in any 
proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by an interested person as defined by the 
Idaho Uniform Probate Code. 
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT - I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _s_ day of October, 2010. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: 7,. \~-l(s:> 
ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT was served on the ~day of October, 
2010, to: 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
C/O JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
BRENT C FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM CHTD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
113 SOUTH SECOND A VENUE 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 




JOHN A. FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Phone: 208-263-7712 
Fax: 208-263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
FILED 
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STATE Of IOAHO 
GCLO.£U~HTY OF BOUN. DARY. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 













Case No. CV-2007-0266 




TO: THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AND 
THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, DEPUTY ATTORNEY 
GENERAL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN TIU~T CATHIE PETERSON, in her 
capacity as the PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELVIN 
PETERSON, herein APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and 
Idaho Code§ 17-201, as follows: 
1. The title of the court from which the appeal is taken 
is the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of 
Boundary, Magistrate.Judge Justin W. Julian, presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 dt~ 
2. The title of the Court to which the appeal is taken is 
the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary. 
3. The date and heading of the judgment or decision from 
which the appeal is taken is the Order Removing Personal 
Representative, entered October 7, 2010. 
4. The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and 
matters of fact. 
5. The testimony and proceedings of the original trial or 
hearing were recorded by the Boundary County Clerk and are in 
the possession of the Boundary County Clerk. The proceedings 
resulting in the order were held on October 7, 2010. 
6. The issues on appeal upon which the appellant intends 
to assert in the appeal (but such list is not an exhaustive 
list), and provided that any such list of issues on appeal shall 
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal 
thereafter discovered by the appellant is as follows: 
a. Did the Magistrate err in removir1g Cathie 
Peterson as Personal Representative pursuant to the 
statutory provisions? 
b. Did the Magistrate err in asserting jurisdiction 
over real property not vested in the estate? 
c. Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion 
of jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a 
party to the proceeding? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
d. Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed 
from further proceedings in the matter? 
Dated this l~~y of October, 2010. 
~ 
~~;j;~~ 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by deposit in First Class, U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, as indicated, this (')....~day of October, 2010 and was 
addressed to: 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0009 
Brent Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
Attorneys at Law 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
Oct. 12. 2010 12:04PM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY 




) Case No. CV-2007-266 
) 
) ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
) SUCCESSOR PERSONAL 
) REPRESENTATIVE 
) (J.C. 15-3-401) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-> 
The Court having entered its Order Removing Personal Representative on October 7, 
20 i 0, and the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, being a creditor herein and 
being qualified for appointment as successor personal representative; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT Larry E. Tisdale, in 
his capacity as Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division of Medicaid, State ofldaho, 
Department of Health And Welfare, be and hereby is; appointed as successor personal 
representative of the decedent's estate to act without bond. 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - I 
Oct. 12. 2010 12:04PM No. 2917 P. 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE was 
served via facsimile, on the \~ day of October, 2010, to: 
CATHIE L PETERSON 
CID JOHN A FINNEY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA 
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
FACSIMILE~ (208) 263-8211 
BRENT C FEATHERSTON 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM CHTD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
113 SOUTH SECOND A VENUE 
SANDPOINT ID 83864 
FACSIMILE~ {208) 263-0400 
W COREY CARTWRIGHT 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
3276 ELDER STE B 
POBOX83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0009 
FACSIMILE-(208) 334-6515 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 ;;)~ ~ 
FROM FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY 2 P"q211 
' 
JOHN A. FINHBY 
FINNEY FINNEY & FlNHBY, P.A. 
Attorneys at. Law 
Old Power Bouse Building 
120 Eaat Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint., Idaho 83864 
Phone: (208) 263-7712 
Fax: (208) 263-8211 
ISB No. 5413 
Attorney for Appellant 
(MON) JAN 24 2011 15" 1"T. 15:15/No. 6810297669 P 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FXRST JUDICIAli DISTRICT or TllE 
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COMES NOW the Appellant, CATHIE PETERSON, PERSONAL 
:REPRESENTATIVE OF TD ESTATE 01' MELVIN PBTBRSON, by and throu9h 
counsel, JOHN A. FINNEY, of FINNEY FINNEY & FINHBY, P.A. , and 
submits this Appellant's Brief pursuant to the Notice Of Settlinq 
Transcript On Appeal And B~iefing Schedule, filed December 20, 
2010, as follows: 
X • STADMINT OF 'l'RE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Caae 
This is an appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code § 
17~201 in th• above referenced estate from the Magistrate 
Division of the District Court of the First Judicial Dietriot of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundazy, Magistrate 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1 
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Judge Justin W. Julian, presidi.ng. The judgment or decioion from 
which the appeal is taken is the Order Removing Pe~•onal 
Representative, entered October 7, 2010, which is based upcn 
proceedings held on October 7, 2010 (as well as prior proceedings 
in the estate proceeding) and any appointment of a Suocessor 
Personal Representative. 
'l'he nature of the issues on appeal is the Magistrate's 
continued assertion of jurisdiction over real property not vested 
in the estate (which is vested in a person not a party to the 
proceeding) and the Magistrate'• act of therefore removing Cathie 
Peterson as Personal Representative and appointing a creditor of 
the estate as Peraonal Representative. The culminating iasue is 
whether the Magistrate should be removed from further proceiadinqs 
.in the matter. 
B. Course Of Proceedings Zn The Magistrate Court Below 
Following the prior appeal and Decision On .Appeal reve~sing 
and ~eman.ding the valuation and o~der of sale deciaion by the 
Magistrate, Cathie Peterson As Personal Represeni:ative Of Th• 
Estate Of Melvin Peterson, continued completing the remaining 
administrative matters in the estate and filed the l'BRSOHA:L 
REPUSEN'l'ATIVE'S FINAL ACCOON'l'ING AND PETITION FOlt DECREB OF 
DISTRIBUTION; and NOTICE OF REAltING, setting th• matter for 
hearing on October 21, 2010. 
Following t.he Decision on Appeal, the State of Idaho, 
Department Of Health And Welfa.J:e (herein "Department") first 
sought entz:y of Findings of Fa~t and Conclusions of Law, without 
any further proceedings. When that effort was unsuocessful, the 
Department then initiated written d.:iaoovezy and notice up a 
APPILLAN1'' S BIUJili' - 2 
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deposition. The Departznent then filed its' Petition For Removal 
Of Personal Repr••entative For Cause and its' Memo~andum In 
Support Of Petition For Reinoval, each dated September 22, 2010. 
Cathie Peterson As Perao~al Representative Of The Estate Of 
Melvin Paterson, objected to the various relief requested by the 
Department. 
The petition for removal and the objection thereto oame for 
hearing on October 7, 2010 at which time the Ma9istrate entered 
an Order R~ovinq Personal Representative, as well as accepting a 
petition to appoint and orderin9 the appointaent of Larry B. 
Tisdale, Chief, Bureau Of rinancial Operations, Division Of 
Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department Of Health And Welfare to 
serve as successor Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Melvin Petersen. 
On or about October 13, 2010, Cat.hie Petersen as Personal 
Representative filed her Notice Of Appeal p~rsuant to l.R.C.P. 83 
and Idaho Code § 17-201 (specifically includi.ng subsection 1). 
This prooeedinq follows. 
C. Statement Of Fact• 
In this ~atter the Magistrate baa not heard any testimony 
nor taken any evidence. All •uc:h m.attei;s have come •• positions 
or attachments by counsel, essentially as offe~s of proof, or 
baaed upon filings in the matter. 
The Department sought and the Magistrate terminated the 
appointment of Cathie Petersen as Personal Representative and 
appointed an employee of the Department as Successor Personal 
Representative, upon no showing of any legal cause and contrary 
to the priority for appointment by Idaho statute. Further, the 
APPELLAN'l''S BRIEF - 3 
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teJ:mination and appointment rune contrary to the prior Decision 
On Appeal regarding tit1e to the property. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The iaaues on appea1 the appel1ant identified in the Notioe 
Of Appeal are, ae follows: 
a. Did the Magistrate err in removing Cathie Peterson 
as Personal Representative p~rsuant to the statutoi:y 
provisions? 
b. Did the Magistrate err in asserting jurisdiction 
over real property not vested in the estate? 
c. Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion 
of jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a 
party to the proceeding? 
d. Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed from 
further proceedings in the matter? 
III . .ARGOMllNT 
A. Standai:d Of Review 
In the Matter 0£ Estate of Spencer, 106 Ida.ho 316, 320, 679 
P.2d 108, 112 (Idaho App., 1984), the applicable standard of 
review was set forth as follows: 
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the dietriot court on 
appeal f'rom a magistrate, we must dete.i:mine from the trial 
court (magistrate) record whether substantial evidence 
supports the magietrate's findings of fact and whether those 
findings support the JD.agistrate'a conclusions of law. 
Nicbolis v. Blas•r, 102 Iclaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); 
Uatick v. Uatick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083 
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principle• have 
been applied, then the district court'• decision affirming a 
magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only whe~e the 
record is ao clear as to 9ive the appellate court a complete 
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understanding of the materia1 issues and the basis of the 
magistrate's reasoning will the absence of findings of fact 
not result in a rem.and for adeq\1.ate findings. See Pope v. 
Intenzrountafn Gaa Co., 103 Idaho 217, 6'6 P.2d 988 (1982); 
In re Z8tate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974). 
The standard would similarly apply to the District Court'• review 
of a decision of the Magistrate Court in a probate matter. 
B. The Magistrate Brred As No Evidenoe Was Ever Taken And 
t;o Findings Could Be Made 
As shown by the record and the Transcript of the proceedings 
on October 7, 2010, th• Magistrate did not hear any testimony nor 
taken any other evidence, document• or otherwise. 
As set forth in the Matter of Estate of SJ>!l!cer, 106 Idaho 
316, 320, 67B P.2d 108, 112 (Idaho App., 1984) (citations 
omitted), "Only wh•re the record is so clear as to give the 
appellate court a complete understanding of the material issues 
and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning will the absence of 
findings of fact not result i.n a remand for adequate fi:n.din9a." 
The Magistrate could not make any findings of fact nor make any 
conclusions, aa no hearing was held on the Personal 
Representati~'s Final Aclcounting- And Petition For Decree Of 
Distribution. Similarly no object.ion was filed to the accounting 
and petition. Lastly, no evidence was introduced at the October 
7, 2010 bearing. 
~ha Magistrate failed to take any evidence and failed to 
even set forth findings and conclusion as to the applicability of 
the requirements to meet the statute for remova1 proffered by the 
Department. The Magistrate failed to properly consider the 
statutes regarding priority and once again failed to recognize 
the jurisdictional limitations regarding the real property not 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - S 
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vested in the estate. 
C. The Magistrate Mis-Applied Idaho Code § 15-3-611 In 
Determining Removal Por Cause 
Idaho Code § 15-3-611 p~ovides, as follows: 
§ 15-3-611. Termination of appointment by rem.oval -
Cause - ProQedure 
(a) A person interested. in the estate may petition for 
removal of a personal representative for oause at any tinle. 
Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix a tim.e and 
place for bearing. Notice shall ba given by the petitioner 
to the personal representative, and to other pei:sons as the 
court may order. Except as otherwise ordered as provided in 
section 15-3-607 of this Part, a~ter recaipt of notice of 
removal proceeclinge, the per•onal representative shall not 
act except to account, to co~rect maladministration or 
preserve the estate. If removal is ordered, the court also 
shall direct by order the disposition of the assets 
remaining in the name of, or under the control of, the 
personal representative being removed. 
(b) Cau•• for removal exists when r911loval would be in 
the beet interests of the estate, or if it is shown that a 
personal representative or the person seeking his 
appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in 
the proceedin9a leadin9 to his appointment, or that the 
personal representative bae diareqarded an order of the 
court, has become incapable o~ discharging the duties of his 
office, or has miSlnanaged the estate or failed to perform 
any duty pertaining to th• ct:f'ice. O'nless the decedent'• 
will directs otherwise, a personal rep~esentative appointed 
at the decedent's domicile, incident to seourinq appointment 
of him.self or his nominee as ancillary personal 
representative, m.ay obtain rem.oval of another who was 
appointed personal representative in this atate to 
administer local assets. 
As set forth in Kolouch v. First See. Bank of Idaho, 128 
Idaho 1B6, 192, 911 P.2d 779, 785 (Idaho App., 1996) for removal 
of a personal representative to be in the best interest of the 
estate, there must be actual evidence presented of financial 
mismanagement. It is not sufficient to remove a Personal 
Representative with priority for appointment as an heir and to 
appoint a creditor, without soae sort of act~al evidence on the 
FROM FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY 20 r 0 ~211 (MON) JAN 24 2011 15 · 7/~T. 15: 15/No. 6810297669 P 8 
record of m.ismanaqem.ant. There was no evidence before the 
Magistrate. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-203 "Pz-ioi:ity among persons 
seeking appointment as personal. representative," Cathie Patarsen 
has priority as an heir of the deoedent (subaeotion (a)(S)) ahead 
of the Department as a creditor of the decadent (aubaection 
(a) (6)). As set forth in Matter of Bowman's Estate, 101 Idaho 
131, 133-134, 609 P.2d 663, 665 - 666 (Idaho, 1980), "I.C. s 15-
3-203 establishes the priority for appointment o~ personal 
representatives. It is our conclusion that those provisions are 
mandatory and not to be disregarded." 
The Magistrate's erroneous basis for ram.oval is summarized 
on paqe 13 of the transcript from. the October 7, 2010 hearing, as 
foll.ows: "COURT: I quess that was kind o~ my point. 'l'hat the 
Department as • oreditor would seem to have a higher level of -
of standing if, uh, there's a probl.em with the way the estate' a 
currently being administered." The Magistrate (and the 
Department) considers the administration of the estate to be a 
"problem" because the Pez:sonal Representative filed an appeal and 
had the Magistrate's prior valuation and sal.e order for property 
not vested in the estate rever•ed and remanded. 'l'he Magistrate's 
problem with the administration is that the Magistrate still 
wants to assert jurisdiction over real property not vested in the 
estate and assert jurisdiction over real property veated in a 
person not a part:y to the proceeding. 
Aaauming for argument only, if the Magistrate is correct 
that Cathie Petersen as Personal Representative of the Estate has 
a conflict of interest becauoa ohe is the vested own.er of the 
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:real estate that the Department urge111 is an asset (in some form 
or another) of the estate, then that e~act same conflict of 
interest exists for the State of Idaho, Department of Health .And 
Welfare as its position is in conflict with th.a vestinq of the 
real estate. If these so called oonfliets of interest are 
sufficient to disqualify for cause, then the Department is not a 
proper Successor Personal Representative, and an independent 
third pa~ty should be appointed as Successor. 
D. The Magistl::ate Should Be Raaoved Prom :Further 
Procaedinqs Ypon Remand 
The Magistrate's removal of Cathie Petersen as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Melvin Petersen, and the 
appointment of the Department as Successor ~eraonal 
Jil9preaentative is in error. Aqain the Magistrate act.ad without 
any evidence upon which to make any findings or conclusions of 
law. The Magistrate's rulinqs :i.n this matter have been a. 
continued ebuse of disoretion, illustrating an inability to 
impartially p~oceed, even with direction upon ram.and. Milgiatrate 
Justin Julian should be disqualified and a different Magistrate 
should be appointed. to the proceeding following upon raaand. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
'l'ha orders removing Cathie Petersen and appointing an 
employee of the Oepartaent as Successor Personal Representative, 
for the grounds set forth above, were entered upon reversible 
error, and are not supported by fact or law, and should be 
reversed. Upon rem.and, a new Magistrate should be appointed for 
the remaininq proceeding• of the Bstate. 
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DATED this ~ ~Y of January, 2011. 
for Appellant Ca 
Petersen •• Personal 
Representativ. of the Estate 
of Melvin Petersen 
CERTIFICA'l'B OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and 00~~~9t_copy of the 
foregoing was served as indicated this ~y of January, 2011 
and was addressed to: 
W. Corey Cart~right 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boiae, Idaho 83720-0009 
(Vi• U.S. Mail) 
Brent Feathereton 
Featherston Law •irm, Chtd. 
Attorneys at Law 
113 S. Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
(Via U.S. Mail) 
APPEI.IJ\NT'S BR.IEF - 9 
The Honorable Steve Verby 
Bonner County Courthouse 
Chambers 
Sandpoint, Idaho 
(Via Hand Delivery) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order in a probate case removing the personal representative for 
cause. The underlying dispute involves a creditor's claim filed by the State ofldaho, Department 
of Health and Welfare (the "Department") for Medicaid estate recovery as provided in Idaho 
Code§ 56-218. "Medicaid estate recovery'' is a program required by federal Medicaid law that 
seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, in order to reimburse 
the taxpayers for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. The Department's 
claim involves the value of a life estate which the Medicaid recipient had retained upon gifting 
his real property to his daughter, who is also the removed personal representative. 
Course of Proceedings 
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative in this matter July 26, 2007. 
The personal representative mailed a "Notice to Known Creditor" to the Department on 
August 6, 2007. She also published a Notice to Creditors with a first publication date of August 
16, 2007. 
On November 19, 2007, the Department filed a timely Claim Against Estate, in the 
amount of $171,134.28, and a Demand for Notice. 
Without stating any reason, the personal representative denied the Department's claim, 
mailing a "Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Itemization" to the Department on 
November 28, 2007. 
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On December 10, 2007, the Department filed an Amended Claim Against Estate in the 
amount of$171,386.94. 1 At the same time, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of 
Claim. 
The following day, the personal representative, again, disallowed the Department's claim 
without stating any reason. See Notice ofDisallowance of Claim dated December 11, 2007. In 
response, a Petition to Require Payment of Claim was filed by the Department on December 19, 
2007, and a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim was filed on December 28, 2007. 
About January 2, 2008, the personal representative filed a document called "Objections" 
in which she objected to the procedure, but still did not state any reason for the disallowance of 
the claim. 
After a hearing on March 25, 2008, the court entered its Order Granting Petition for 
Allowance of Amended Claim. 
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, which 
together with the Department's Briefin support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim, set 
forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life estate. See Idaho Code§ 56-
218(4)(b). 
About May 28, 2008, the personal representative filed "Personal Representative's 
Inventory." At the same time, the personal representative filed her Objection to Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim, stating its position relating to the life estate. 
1Since health care providers have up to one year after the service to present claims to Medicaid, it is not 
uncommon for the initial claim to increase somewhat. 
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After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" on 
June 12, 2008. This order established the life estate as an asset of the estate for purposes of 
Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to amend the Inventory and assign an 
appropriate value to the life estate. 
About August 5, 2008, the personal representative filed her Motion to Hire Appraiser. 
The Department objected, in part, by its "Objection to Motion to Hire Appraiser" filed August 
11, 2008. 
After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser" on 
September 23, 2008, approving an appraisal determining the fee simple value of the real 
property. 
On May 14, 2009, the Department filed its "Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal" 
contending the appraisal approved by the court in September, 2008, had never been performed. 
On July 15, 2009, the Department filed its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and 
Payment to Department," together with a ''Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum." 
After a hearing on July 28, 2009, the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to 
Compel" on August 11, 2009. 
The personal representative appealed from this order, filing a ''Notice of Appeal" about 
August 19, 2009. 
A "Decision on Appeal" was issued by the District Court on May 25, 2010, vacating the 
"Order Granting Petition to Compel" and remanding "so that findings of facts and conclusions of 
law can be established." 
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About June 22, 2010, the personal representative filed a "Petition for Authority to Sell," 
together with a "Petition for Approval of and Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs," 
seeking to liquidate an escrow account and pay the attorney for the personal representative. On 
the same day, the personal representative filed an "Amended Personal Representative's 
Inventory" for the first time listing the life estate in the inventory, but assigning the life estate a 
value of$0. 
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27, 2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an 
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21, 2010 to detennine all remaining factual issues. 
On July 28, 2010, the Department submitted its "First Requests for Admission" to the 
personal representative. 
After a hearing on August 10, 2010, the Court, on August 17, 2010, entered its "Order for 
Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Payment of Costs" approving a partial payment of attorney 
fees in an amount to be stipulated by the parties. At the same time, the Court deferred the 
Department's Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law to follow the trial scheduled 
for October 21, 2010. 
The parties' "Stipulation Regarding Partial Payment of Attorney Fees" was filed about 
August 24, 2010, with the parties agreeing to reserve objections to the final settlement of the 
estate. 
About ~ugust 27, 2010, the personal representative submitted her Responses to First 
Requests for Admission and thereafter, on September 7, 2010, the Department filed its ''Notice 
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of Deposition" to take the oral testimony of the personal representative. An "Amended Notice of 
Deposition" was filed on September 15, 2010. 
Two days later, on September 17, 2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for 
Notice and Special Appearance" on behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually." Said notice also 
stated: "The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real 
property pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)." At the same time, attorney Brent Featherston, on 
behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually'' filed a "Motion for Automatic Disqualification of Judge 
l.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)." 
On September 22, 2010, the personal representative (through attorney John Finney) filed 
"Personal Representative's Final Accounting and Petition for Decree of Distribution." On the 
same day, the Department filed its "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause" 
and its "Motion to Strike." Also on the same day, attorney Brent Featherston, on behalf of 
"Cathie Peterson, individually" filed an "Amended Motion for Automatic Disqualification of 
Judge l.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)." 
On September 27, 2010, the Court entered its "Order Denying Amended Motion for 
Automatic Disqualification - IRCP 40(d)(l)." 
Also on September 27, 2010, the Department filed a ''Notice to Vacate Deposition." 
On September 28, 2010, the personal representative filed "Objections" to the 
Department's petitions. 
On October 7, 2010, hearing was held on the Department's "Petition for Removal of 
Personal Representative for Cause" and its "Motion to Strike." On the same day, the court 
entered its "Order Removing Personal Representative." 
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This appeal followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
Melvin Peterson ("Melvin") was bor nd died at the age of 83 on March 
3, 2007. Petition to Require Payment of Claim, if 1. Prior to his death, but after reaching the age 
of 55, Melvin applied for and received state medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits in the amount 
of$171,386.94. Petition to Require Payment of Claim,~ 2. Melvin owned real property in 
Moyie Springs which, on December 6, 2001, he conveyed to his daughter Cathie Peterson, 
retaining a life estate. Exhibit "A" to Petition to Require Payment of Claim. Melvin possessed 
this life estate interest at the time of his death. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 12-117. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Removal of a personal representative for cause, as provided in the Uniform Probate Code, 
is within the discretion of the probate court. In re Estate of Anderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. 352, 
355, 174 P.3d 512, 513-4 (Mont. 2007); In re Estate of Hass, 643 N.W.2d 713, 717 (N.D. 2002); 
Matter of Estate of Peterson, 265 Mont. 104, 108, 874 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Mont. 1994). In 
examining a magistrate court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court considers: (1) whether 
the court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3) 
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 678, 
152 p .3d 544, 549 (2007). 
The personal representative, in her Notice of Appeal, contends there are issues of fact. In 
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008) the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained: 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). A 
court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by 
substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence. 
Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 431, 196 P.3d at 349. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 7 Z:IMReases\Estate\WeC\ wee Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\Deourt\Respondents Brief2.wpd 
II. 
A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE MAY BE REMOVED 
WHEN IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-611, part of the Uniform Probate Code, provides, in part, as follows: 
15-3-611. Termination of appointment by removal- Cause -
Procedure 
(a) A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a 
personal representative for cause at any time. * * * 
(b) Cause for removal exists when removal would be in the best 
interests of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person 
seeking his appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the 
proceedings leading to his appointment, or that the personal re.presentative has 
disregarded an order of the court, has become incapable of discharging the duties 
of his office, or has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any duty 
pertaining to the office. * * * 
Idaho Code § 15-3-611 (emphasis added). Therefore, "cause" for removal of a personal 
representative may arise from many circumstances, at least two of which are applicable here: (1) 
Where removal is "in the best interest of the estate," and (2) Where the personal representative 
has disregarded an order of the court. 
The personal representative argues, at page 6 of her brief, that "for removal of a personal 
representative to be in the best interest of the estate, there must be actual evidence presented of 
financial mismanagement." There is simply no basis in law for that contention. First, it clearly 
conflicts with the plain language ofldaho Code§ 15-3-611. Moreover, the case cited by the 
personal representative, Kolouch v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 128 Idaho 186, 911 P.2d 779 (App. 
1996), says no such thing. While the Court in Kolouch upheld removal for mismanagement of 
the estate, the Court nowhere suggests that is the exclusive grounds for removal. 
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III. 
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE REQUIRES 
REMOVAL OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH A 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST LIKE THAT HERE. 
In her Appellant's Brief, the personal representative failed to cite a single case, statute, or 
other authority for her contention that removal "in the best interest of the estate" requires proof of 
financial mismanagement. To the contrary, the case law uniformly supports removal for the type 
of conflict of interest present here. The issues in this case are quite similar to those in the case of 
In re Estate of Anderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. 352, 174 P.3d 512 (2007). In that case, the 
appointed personal representative, Feeley, was the surviving spouse of the decedent. The will 
left one fourth of the estate to each of the decedent's three children (who were not children of 
Feeley) and the final fourth to Feeley. The decedent's son learned that the decedent's estate, 
estimated at more than $4 million when the will was executed, had been reduced to only $30,000 
at the time of decedent's death. The decedent's adult children filed an action in the district court 
alleging various causes of action against Feeley. Feeley defended on the grounds that such court 
actions could only be brought by a personal representative. The children then moved to remove 
Feeley as personal representative. The court ordered Feeley's removal and Feeley appealed. The 
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the removal. The court first explained: 
We review a district court's decision regarding the removal of an estate's 
personal representative to determine whether the court abused its discretion. 
*** 
In his petition for removal of Feeley as personal representative of Jan's 
estate, Hadachek [decedent's son] argued that Feeley has a conflict of interest in 
that Feeley will not pursue claims against himself, contrary to the best interests of 
the estate. After a hearing on May 31, 2006, to determine whether Feeley should 
be removed as personal representative of Jan's estate, the District Court 
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determined that Feeley had a conflict of interest which would not serve the best 
interests of the estate. 
In re Estate of Anderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. at 354, 174 P.3d at 513 (underline added). After 
discussing a previous Montana case, In re Estate of Peterson, 265 Mont. 104, 874 P.2d 1230 
(1994) (discussed below), the Court held as follows: 
Based on our review of the record and the findings of the District Court, it 
is clear that sufficient evidence of a conflict of interest existed to justify removal 
of Feeley as personal representative of Jan's estate, pursuant to§ 72-3-526, MCA. 
The existence of a potential claim against Feeley is sufficient to create a conflict 
of interest, and such conflict of interest is sufficient for removal of Feeley as 
personal representative of Jan's estate. Peterson, 265 Mont. at 109, 874 P.2d at 
1233. Like the District Court, we are making no determination as to the merit of 
Hadachek's underlying claims against Feeley. Rather, we simply agree with the 
District Court that Hadachek has presented sufficient evidence that a claim or 
claims against Feeley may exist. Applying the standard set forth in Peterson, we 
conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in removing Feeley as 
personal representative of Jan's estate. 
In re Estate of Anderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. at 356, 174 P.3d at 514 (underline added). 
The case of In re Estate of Peterson, 265 Mont. 104, 874 P.2d 1230 (1994), discussed in 
the Anderson-Feeley case, also presents issues similar to those here. In that case, the decedent's 
brother sought to remove a personal representative who was nominated and appointed pursuant 
to the decedent's will. The appointed personal representative was a lawyer who had represented 
the decedent in a personal injury action. The decedent's brother contended that the estate had a 
claim for reimbursement of excessive attorney fees charged by the lawyer/personal representative 
in a prior personal injury matter, and that the lawyer would not sue himself. The District Court 
removed the personal representative after it "determined that a conflict of interest existed 
between the Estate and Mr. Whalen [the personal representative/attorney] as Mr. Whalen could 
not be expected to pursue a claim against himself on behalf of the Estate." In re Estate of 
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Peterson, 265 Mont. at 108, 874 P.2d at 1232. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court: 
Removal of a personal representative for cause pursuant to § 72-3-526, 
MCA, is within the sound discretion of the district court and this Court will not 
overturn such a termination unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. A district 
court can remove a personal representative or refuse to appoint a person as 
personal representative for cause if there is a conflict of interest between that 
person's interests and those of the estate. 
The District Court expressly relied on Estate of Obstarczyk, which 
affirmed a removal of an executrix on the grounds that her interests were adverse 
to the estate and held as follows: 
... The duty of an executor is to examine strictly all claims against 
an estate ... seeking judicial interpretation if necessary .... It is clear that 
[the executrix's] own interests are antagonistic to the estate ... 
In the Tice case, supra, we quoted with approval from In re Rinio 's Estate 
as follows: 
* * * The law does not look with favor upon the administration of 
estates by a person where conflicts in the performance of his duty are 
likely to arise. 
We conclude that the potential claim against Michael J. Whalen for 
excessive attorney fees is sufficient to create a conflict of interest in this case. A 
conflict of interest is sufficient for removal of the personal representative for 
cause under § 72-3-526, MCA. 
We hold the District Court properly exercised its discretion in determining 
that it was in the best interests of the Estate to remove Michael J. Whalen as 
personal representative. 
In re Estate of Peterson, 265 Mont. at 108-9, 874 P.2d at 1232-3 (citations omitted; underline 
added); see also Matter of Estate ofUnke, 583 N.W.2d 145, 1998 S.D. 94 (1998) (Removal of 
personal representative nominated by the will and initially appointed by the court was in the best 
interest of the estate where the court found that hatred between the personal representative and 
other heirs was likely to give rise to "much future litigation.") 
Another case raising issues very similar to those here is a case from the state of Nebraska 
reported only in Westlaw: In re Estate of Crawford, 2010 WL 3137525 (Neb.App. 2010) (copy 
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attached). In the Estate of Crawford case the decedent had executed a series of wills. The last 
will, referred to as the 2001 will, nominated Alta Empkey to be personal representative. Empkey 
was also the trustee of the decedent's family trust. The 2001 will left all of the probate estate to 
Empkey as trustee for the trust. Empkey was appointed personal representative and pursuant to 
the terms of the will, she transferred the assets of the probate estate to the trust. Empkey then 
sought an order for final settlement of the probate estate which was opposed by other heirs. The 
other heirs challenged the 2001 will as the product of undue influence. The will was eventually 
declared invalid. The heirs petitioned the court to remove Empkey as personal representative and 
also sought an order requiring Empkey to return the assets she had transferred to the trust to the 
probate estate. The court ordered the return of the assets but refused to remove Empkey as 
personal representative. Both parties appealed. 
The Nebraska Court of Appeals found no merit in Empkey's appeal, but was struck by the 
oddity of a personal representative opposing the return of the probate property from the trust to 
the probate estate: 
On direct appeal, Empkey has challenged the county court's ordering of 
the transfer of assets back to the estate and the court's awarding of attorney fees 
and costs. Putting aside the somewhat unusual notion of the personal 
representative of an estate challenging an order for the return of property to the 
estate for proper distribution. we find no merit to either assertion. 
Estate of Crawford, p. 3 (underline added). The Court went on to reverse the District Court's 
refusal to remove Empkey as personal representative. The Court's explanation is helpful here: 
The court found that there was no evidence of malfeasance on the part of Empkey 
or her counsel and that there was no evidence to establish a conflict of interest. 
We disagree. 
In this case. Empkey is serving in two capacities. First. she is the personal 
representative representing the best interests of the estate and its heirs. Second. 
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she is the trustee representing the best interests of the trust. Pursuant to the 2001 
will, Empkey, as personal representative of the estate, transferred all assets of the 
estate to the trust. The 2001 will, and transfer of assets pursuant to it, have been 
declared invalid. As a result, Empkey is now serving in two roles that have 
directly conflicting interests. 
As personal representative, Empkey' s obligation should be to accumulate 
and preserve the estate for proper distribution to the parties entitled to 
distribution. As trustee, Empkey's obligation should be to attempt to preserve the 
trust for proper distribution to the parties entitled to distribution. Inasmuch as all 
assets of the estate have been transferred to the trust, this means that Empkey now 
has one role that requires her to seek the return of improperly distributed assets 
and another role that requires her to simultaneously resist the return of the same 
assets. 
Estate of Crawford, p. 5 (underline added). Finally, the Court explained that Empkey's conflict 
of interest required a finding that her removal was in the best interest of the estate: 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2454 (Reissue 2008) provides that cause for removal 
of a personal representative exists when, among other factors, removal of the 
personal representative would be in the best interests of the estate or it is shown 
that the personal representative has become incapable of discharging the duties of 
her office. In this case, it is apparent that the best interests of the estate would be 
served by not having the personal representative simultaneously serving as trustee 
of the trust and resisting the return of assets to the estate for proper distribution. 
Similarly, it is apparent that Empkey's dual capacities make her incapable of 
discharging her duties as both personal representative and trustee. 
Estate of Crawford, p. 6 (underline added); see also Estate ofReinek, 1997 WL 618740 
(Neb.App. 1997) (copy attached) (Personal representative should have been removed where she 
would be required to both evaluate claims against herself and, if necessary, sue herself). 
It cannot be disputed that under the Uniform Probate Code, removal of a personal 
representative is in the best interest of the estate where the personal representative has a conflict 
of interest that prevents her from pursuing assets belonging to the estate. 
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IV. 
JUDGE JULIAN CORRECTLY FOUND REMOVAL OF 
CATHIE PETERSON AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE. 
A. The Personal Representative Fails to Identify Any Findings or Conclusions She Claims 
Are Not Supported in the Record. 
The personal representative, ignoring the record of the proceedings and the arguments 
and admissions of counsel, contends that, "[t]he Magistrate failed to take any evidence and failed 
to even set forth findings and conclusion as to the applicability of the requirements to meet the 
statute for removal proffered by the Department." Appellant's Brief, p. 5 (underline added). Of 
course, the Judge Julian did make findings and conclusions on the record. Tr. p. 33, 1. 20 to p. 
35, 1. 6 (discussed and quoted below). The personal representative, however, completely ignores 
these findings and conclusions and fails to identify any of these findings and conclusions with 
which she takes issue. 
The burden is on the appellant to come forward and identify what findings and 
conclusions she contends are unsupported. As stated in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P .3d 
1146 (2010): 
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with 
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those 
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz, 
96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and 
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal 
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445, 
263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the record on appeal for 
error. Suits v. Jdaho Bd. of Prof'! Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 
326 (2003). Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued 
and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. 
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
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Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152. The personal representative's general claim 
that the Court's action removing the personal representative is not supported is not sufficient to 
identify any error on appeal. 
B. The Long Record of this Case. Including the Positions Taken by the Personal 
Representative in Opposition to the Interests of the Estate Were Before Judge Julian When He 
Made His Decision. 
The Department's "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause" did not 
arise in a vacuum. The Department has provided a detailed "Course of Proceedings," beginning 
on page 1 of this brief, to demonstrate the long series oflegal actions leading up to the 
Department's Petition. The personal representative was appointed in July, 2007, more than three 
and a half years ago. A personal representative has an obligation to proceed "proceed 
expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a decedent's estate." Idaho Code§ 15-3-
704. She is to "do so without adjudication, order, or direction of the court," but "may invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court ... to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration." Id. 
And yet nothing at all has yet been done to administer this estate. All that the personal 
representative has done is to attempt to thwart the administration of this estate. 
Twice the personal representative filed a disallowance of the Department's claim without 
stating any reason. (November 28, 2007 and December 11, 2007). After a hearing the 
Department's claim was allowed. Note that this had nothing to do with the current dispute about 
the life estate, since the validity of the Department's claim has nothing to do with whether there 
are assets of the estate to pay the claim. 
Another petition and hearing was required to force the personal representative to include 
the life estate in decedent's real property as an asset of the estate. See "Order on Petition to 
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Require Payment of Claim" (June 12, 2008). This order also required the personal representative 
to "assign an appropriate value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time 
of death." 
The transcript of the hearing that resulted in this June 12, 2008 Order is in the record of 
this case. See Clerk's Transcript of Petition to Require Payment of Claim of June 3rd, 2008. 
The position of the personal representative in that proceeding is telling and significant. The issue 
involved whether the life estate retained by the decedent when he gifted the real property to 
Cathie Peterson was an asset of the estate under Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). The attorney for the 
personal representative, throughout that hearing, sought to minimize the estate by arguing that 
the life estate was not an asset of the estate. This was, of course, in the interest of Cathie 
Peterson, individually, but was not in the best interest of the estate. 
Even after the June 12, 2008 Order, which should have been enough to clarify the duty 
and responsibility of the personal representative, Cathie Peterson still drug her feet. After 
securing an "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser" on September 23, 2008, it was necessary for 
the Department to file a "Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal" on May 14, 2009, to move 
this matter forward. After additional delay, the Department acted again on July 15, 2009, filing 
its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department." In the course of this hearing, 
the conflict of interest became obvious to Judge Julian. The attorney for the personal 
representative, apparently representing Cathie Peterson's individual interests, rather than the 
interests of the estate, argued as follows: 
Um, as to the specifics of the assertions here that the Court somehow has the 
authority to compel Cathy Peterson, in her individual capacity, who is the vested 
titleholder of the real estate, to somehow sell her interest in the property, I submit 
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that it is not properly before the Court in an estate proceeding and - and this Court 
would not have jurisdiction to do so under the relevant statutory provisions, um, 
as would apply to partition as cited by the Department. The ..... 
Clerk's Transcript of Petition to Compel of July 28th 2009, p. 3, I. 22 top. 4, I. 2. Judge Julian 
immediately recognized the conflict of interest: 
The law is very clear that the taxpayers need to be reimbursed. That there is not, 
basically, a, uh, a windfall to somebody simply because, uh, a person on their 
deathbed hands over a, uh, some sort oflife estate or any other gift deed. So the 
bottom line is the money needs to be found in this estate and if we don't have it in 
liquid funds to payoff this debt the property is going to be sold. And if your client 
is not going to cooperate with that then I am going to remove her as the personal 
representative and appoint somebody who will. 
*** 
The personal representative basically has the option of coming up with the money 
to, uh, in terms of taking out a loan personally or something, uh, or finding an 
investor to payoff the State's interest in the house and release that claim or sell it. 
*** 
... Mr. Finney, I've certainly been around long enough to know that a seller of 
property - they don't cooperate in good faith can frustrate, uh, any potential sale. 
Ifl see evidence of that and upon motion of the State your client will be deemed 
to be in breach of fiduciary duties as personal representative and would be, 
following a hearing of course and the opportunity to be heard, if that evidence, uh, 
was brought forth, would be removed by the Court and somebody more suitable 
would be appointed. 
Clerk's Transcript of Petition to Compel of July 28th 2009, p. 4, I. 23 top. 5, I. 4; p. 11, 11. 4-7, 
17-23 (underline added). 
After a hearing on July 28, 2009, the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to 
Compel" on August 11, 2009. The personal representative appealed this order and this Court, on 
May 25, 2010, remanded the matter for entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. 
About June 22, 2010, the personal representative filed an "Amended Personal 
Representative's Inventory," for the first time listing the life estate in the inventory. This was 
required by the Court's order of June 12, 2008. However, whereas the court had ordered her to 
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"assign an appropriate value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time of 
death," the personal representative flaunted the court's order by assigning a value of $0. 
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27, 2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an 
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21, 2010 to determine all remaining factual issues. 
The Department immediately (on July 28, 2010) submitted Requests for Admission to the 
personal representative to determine what factual issues remained to be tried. 
About August 27, 2010, the personal representative submitted her Responses to First 
Requests for Admission and thereafter, on September 7, 2010, the Department filed its ''Notice 
of Deposition" to take the oral testimony of the personal representative. An "Amended Notice of 
Deposition" was filed on September 15, 2010. 
Two days later, on September 17, 2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for 
Notice and Special Appearance" on behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually." The "Demand for 
Notice and Special Appearance," signed by Cathie Peterson and Mr. Featherston, stated: 
1. Demandant, Cathie Peterson, individually, has a financial or property 
interest in the above estate proceedings, in which decedent died on March 
3, 2007. 
2. The nature of Demandant's interest is fee title holder in certain real 
property against which the State ofldaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare. asserts a claim as creditor of the above entitled estate and which 
Property has been the subject of Motions, Petitions and Court Orders all 
without notice, service of process or jurisdiction over the Demandant, 
Cathie Peterson. 
Demand for Notice and Special Appearance (Sept. 17, 2010) (underline added). The "Demand 
for Notice and Special Appearance" also stated: "The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss 
all orders entered with regard to her real property pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 12(b )." At the same 
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time, attorney Brent Featherston, on behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually'' filed a "Motion for 
Automatic Disqualification of Judge I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)." 
On September 22, 2010, the personal representative (through attorney John Finney) filed 
"Personal Representative's Final Accounting and Petition for Decree of Distribution." 
This was the posture ofthis case when the Department finally filed its "Petition for 
Removal of Personal Representative for Cause." 
During the hearing on the Department's petition, held on October 7, 2010, Mr. Finney, by 
this time supposedly representing Cathie Peterson only as the personal representative of the 
estate, again sought to minimize the value of the estate. Tr. p. 10, 1. 12 top. 11, 1. 2. Also again, 
he challenged the jurisdiction of the court over the real property held by Cathie Peterson. Tr. p. 
11, 11. 20-25. Again, Mr. Finney challenged the court's jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson as 
owner of the real property. Tr. p. 12, 11. 12-17. All of these positions are in favor of Cathie 
Peterson individually, but are adverse to the interests of the estate. So, even when Cathie 
Peterson had separate counsel, in her capacity as personal representative, she was still unable to 
seek the interests of the estate and instead sought only her own personal interests. 
Likewise, Attorney Featherston, arguing on behalf of Cathie Peterson said his role was 
"to make the Court aware that, um, Ms. Peterson has a separate interest from her role as, um, 
Personal Representative here." Tr. p. 16, 11. 22-23. Mr. Featherston joined Mr. Finney in arguing 
that the court lacked jurisdiction over the property of the estate held by Cathie Peterson. Tr. p. 
17, 11. 8-10. He further joined Mr. Finney in challenging the personal jurisdiction of the court 
over Cathie Peterson. Tr. p. 17, 1. 23 top. 21, 1. 3. IfMr. Featherston was, as he said, arguing a 
separate interest from Cathie Peterson's role as personal representative, it was not apparent from 
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the argument since all of the arguments were in favor of Cathie Peterson personally and no-one 
spoke for the interests of the estate. 
Perhaps the most telling discussion relating to the conflict of interest between Cathie 
Peterson as personal representative and in her individual capacity is found in Mr. Featherston's 
argument relating to his "special appearance" to challenge jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson. Mr. 
Featherston argued that the Department should have taken some action to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson: 
The State hasn't done what they should do if they want to make me a party 
individually but I don't want to be left away from the table, have a decision be 
made adverse to my individual interest and have that decision, um, if you will, be 
issued and have an effect where there hasn't been a proper service upon her. The 
solution to that is for a -- for her to have separate counsel to appear specially as 
we have here. We're doing it specially, uh, because quite honestly as we've said 
we don't believe the State has appropriately brought jurisdiction against her 
or her individual assets. She didn't take benefits from the State ofldaho. It 
wasn't her individually that did that. So there is nothing scandalous about this 
appearance. It is a routine civil procedure matter that happens all the time in civil 
cases where there has not been an appropriate, uh, service of process or process 
has not been effectuated correctly. 
Tr. p. 20, I. 16 top. 21, 1. 2 (emphasis added). Apparently, Mr. Featherston forgot that the 
Department is merely a creditor and a claimant in this estate. It is the personal representative 
alone who has the authority to bring an action against a third party. Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703(c); 
15-3-715(22). It is for an estate administrator to quiet title or remove a cloud from title to 
property belonging to an estate. Cleland v. McLaurin, 40 Idaho 371, 232 P. 571 (1925). Judge 
Julian recognized this contradiction: 
COURT: Well let me- let me ask you this. Does not this very argument 
that you're making tend to militate strongly in favor of the State's petition to 
remove Ms. Peterson as Personal Representative because maybe there's a way to 
do it but it certainly seems that if third parties need to be brought into the 
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litigation that's what the Personal Representative would do representing the 
estate, not a creditor who's representing a debt that they're claiming. 
*** 
COURT: I understand that part but my question was more the nature of 
you seem to be barking, on behalf of your client individually, seem to be barking 
up the tree of she should have been officially joined with a summons as a third 
party defendant, something of that nature, and my point was more like well, um, 
you know can a creditor in an estate, which is the State ofldaho at this point. even 
do that? That was-that's something a personal representative, it seems to me at 
least at first blush. would have to do and the problem we have is Cathie Peterson 
is the Personal Representative and she don't wanna do that. to put it in the 
vernacular. So doesn't that tend to really militate in favor of the State's position 
that hey, to satisfy your complaints that you haven't been properly joined, that 
can't be done until the State is the Personal Representative. And again if you 
want to just demur as not being your issue I will understand ... 
*** 
MR. FEATHERSTON: I don't know ifit can done within the probate so I 
will demur on that point because I'm speaking in ig - in ignorance of that issue. I 
haven't researched it but certainly within a District Court matter they could a quiet 
title partition, whatever you choose to, declaratory judgment they certainly have 
that ability. And I think the -- the Court has the ability here to require the P.R. to 
go forward in District Court identifying claims and identifying the parties. 
COURT: So would have I have the ability to order the Personal 
Representative to properly serve herself with process to bring herself as a third 
party defendant into this case? Which is almost what you are ... 
MR. FEATHERSTON: Perhaps. 
Tr. p. 22, I. 9 top. 24, I. 10 (underline added). 
The very fact that the personal representative found it necessary to appear individually by 
one attorney and as personal representative by another, reveals a fundamental conflict in her roles 
in this case. Clearly, there was more than sufficient evidence in the record for Judge Julian to 
find a conflict of interest between Cathie Peterson as personal representative and in her 
individual interests. 
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C. Judge Julian Correctly Exercised His Discretion in Removing the Personal 
Representative. 
Judge Julian stated his findings and conclusions on the record beginning on page 33 of 
the transcript: 
Uh, regarding the primary, uh, issue that brings us here today, the removal of the 
Personal Representative, I do find, uh, looking at all sides and weighing all of this, 
that it is in fact in the best interest of the estate- the estate that, uh, Ms Peterson 
be removed as the Personal Representative and that the, uh, the State ofldaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare as, uh, the sole creditor, um, be, uh, appointed 
to that capacity, um, the, uh, Department, uh, being basically the next in line, uh, 
statutorily under the circumstances of this case in terms of preference for Personal 
Representative. Um, in noting that I - I do believe that there is a conflict of 
interest between Cathie Peterson's interest personally and that of, uh, the interest 
of the estate, uh, with her acting as the Personal Representative. there being a 
statutory obligation for the Personal Representative to maximize the reach of the 
estate under any reasonable interpretation of the statute versus, uh. Ms. Peterson's 
personal interest to see that those statutes be, uh, intei:preted such that the estate's 
reach is minimized and doesn't touch the property that's in her name. Uh, 
previously the Court did, uh, order her to include the, um, value - include and 
evaluate the life estate. Uh, that order has been somewhat flaunted to the extent 
that the life estate is listed but with a zero value and that really doesn't, uh, serve 
the, uh, the intent of the Court's prior ruling. And I would-I would note too 
prior to Mr. Cartwright and Mr. Featherston's involvement in this, uh, case, that, 
uh, Ms. Peterson was warned that if she didn't comply with the Court's rulings on 
that, though they were clearly against her personal interest, that, uh, removal as 
Personal Representative was a potential consequence. So it's not like this motion 
to remove, uh, can be seen as being, you know, unexpected under the 
circumstances. It also seems to the Court that there is a self dealing issue here 
with Ms. Peterson acting as her - in her own capacity as a - a limited, uh, party 
now, uh, being represented by Mr. Featherston, and acting as the Personal 
Representative, some of that, uh, self dealing or conflict of interest I think became 
rather apparent in the Court's conversation with Mr. Featherston that, as he's 
representing Ms. Peterson personally the crux of her - of her obiection is that she 
hasn't been made a third party defendant and hasn't been served a summons in 
this case and that's typically what the Personal Representative would do and yet 
she's also the Personal Representative. So she's almost claiming that she didn't-
didn't do things against herself that she should have to give the Court jurisdiction 
over her personally. It gets to be rather circular and I only bring that up because I 
think it does illustrate, uh, one of the reasons why it is in the best interest of the 
estate to grant the Petition for Removal. 
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Tr. p. 33, 1. 20 top. 35, 1. 6 (underline added). 
Judge Julian's decision is well supported in both fact and law. A personal representative 
is a fiduciary who holds the assets of the estate for the benefit of creditors and others interested in 
the estate. Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703 and 711. A personal representative has a duty to maximize 
the value of the estate. In the case of Matter of Estate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d 676 (N.D. 1995), 
the court addressed the personal representative's attempt, to the detriment of creditors, to convey 
estate property to a devisee for less than the actual value of the property: 
A personal representative is a fiduciary who must observe the standards of care 
applicable to trustees. The personal representative's fiduciary obligation requires 
that he act reasonably for the benefit of the heirs, creditors, and other parties 
interested in the estate. Section 30.1-18-12, N.D.C.C., provides that the personal 
representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from a 
breach of his fiduciary duty. 
The personal representative must settle and distribute the estate.as 
expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. 
The personal representative must inventory and determine fair market value of the 
decedent's property. If the personal representative sells estate property, he must 
obtain the best possible price: 
If, in the administration of the estate. the personal rwresentative 
undertakes to sell property of the estate. his fiduciary obligation requires 
him to secure the best price obtainable under the circumstances. He may 
not merely sit dormant and accept such offers as are tendered to him, but 
must make diligent, impartial effort to obtain the best offer possible. 
Thus, an executor's trust is not discharged by selling at the appraised price 
unless there is evidence to show that was the best price that could be 
obtained in the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and Administrators§ 768 (1989) (footnotes omitted) 
Estate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d at 686 (citations omitted; underline added). 
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A personal representative is not permitted to take sides in a dispute between one heir or 
claimant and another. Matter of Estate of Wise, 20 Kan.App.2d 624, 627, 890 P.2d 744, 746 
(1995) (executor may not take sides in a dispute regarding distribution of an estate); Matter of 
Estate of Pence, 511 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Iowa App. 1993) ("An executor or an administrator must 
be concerned with the preservation of the estate for both the creditors and the beneficiaries and 
cannot act to protect one group with complete disregard to the other"); Estate of Denman, 94 
Cal.App.3d 289, 156 Cal.Rptr. 341 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1979) ("The executor serves as a neutral 
stakeholder with a fiduciary obligation"); In re Miller's Estate, 259 Cal.App.2d 536, 544, 66 
Cal.Rptr. 756, 762 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1968) ("It is unquestionably true that, generally speaking, an 
executor or administrator of an estate should remain neutral in the estate proceedings as between 
parties such as heirs and devisees with conflicting claims to portions of the estate"); In re 
Jacobson's Estate, 387 A.2d 590, 591 (D.C. 1978) ("Rather than champion particular claims 
against the estate, an executor is expected to remain neutral as to all creditors"); In re Morine 's 
Estate, 363 A.2d 700, 703 (Me. 1976) ([T]he executor may not take sides in the adjudication of 
the individual claims of beneficiaries one against another"). 
Cathie Peterson's conflict of interest is greater than where a personal representative may 
also be an heir, or where the estate assets are separate from the assets of the personal 
representative. Ordinarily, a personal representative who is also an heir has an interest in 
maximizing the value of the estate, since doing so will benefit not only creditors, but the heirs as 
well. But, in this case, Cathie Peterson holds title to the real property which is subject to the life 
estate which is the primary asset of this estate. In other words, she has a personal claim, not as 
an heir, but as an owner of property which the estate must also claim. 
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In this case, if the estate is maximized, Cathie Peterson loses a portion of her property 
interest. If the estate is maximized, her interest in her property is minimized. If the asset is 
partitioned Cathie Peterson may lose the property entirely. Because Cathie Peterson is living on 
the real property, it is in her best interest to delay the administration of the estate. 
With the appearance of Mr. Featherston, Cathie Peterson was clearly in direct opposition 
to the estate she was charged to represent. In her Demand for Notice and Special Appearance she 
sought "to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real property." Clearly, Cathie 
Peterson put herself in a role where she could no longer both serve as personal representative and 
litigate her own personal interests in the estate property. These conflicting roles are 
demonstrated by the following table: 
Personal R~resentative Cathie Peterson 
Duty to maximize the estate Interest in minimizing estate value 
Duty first to creditors Interest first to her personal interest 
Duty to proceed expeditiously Interest in delaying distribution 
Cannot take sides Has taken sides 
It was clear to Judge Julian that the conflict of interest had become an impediment to the 
administration of the estate. He was correct to find that it was in the best interest of the estate for 
Cathie Peterson to be removed as personal representative. 
Judge Julian also found that the personal representative had disregarded an order of the 
court. This is also correct and is further grounds for removal under Idaho Code § 15-3-611 (b ). 
The entire argument between the parties leading up to the June 12, 2008, "Order on Petition to 
Require Payment of Claim" was whether the life estate interest was lost upon the death of the 
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decedent or its value retained as contemplated by Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). See e.g. Brief in 
Support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim (filed May 5, 2008). When the court ordered 
the personal representative to include the life estate in the inventory and to "assign an appropriate 
value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time of death," this was a 
substantive ruling and required the personal representative to determine what the life estate was 
worth immediately prior to death and to list that value in the inventory. It was bad enough that it 
took the personal representative more than two years to file an amended inventory listing the life 
estate as an asset. However, when she didn't even give it a nominal value, but valued it at $0, it 
was clearly flaunting the order of the court and, despite the court's ruling, going back to her 
defeated claim that the life estate no longer existed. 
The failure to comply with the June 12, 2008, order also goes to the conflict of interest. 
The Court had considered the arguments of the parties and had ordered the personal 
representative to do something that was entirely consistent with her duty as personal 
representative, but was contrary to her own personal interest. She chose to disregard the order of 
the court and seek her own personal interest instead of doing what the Court had determined was 
in the best interest of the estate. This is the type of conduct that§ 15-3-61 l(b) is clearly designed 
to reach, and removal would have been appropriate for that reason alone. 
D. The Priorities for Initial Appointment Clearly Don't Apply Here. 
The personal representative points out that under Idaho Code§ 15-3-203, Cathie 
Peterson, as an heir, had priority for appointment as personal representative. This is true and 
Cathie Peterson, indeed, was appointed personal representative without objection by the 
Department. That is not what is in issue here. What is in issue here is § 15-3-611 and removal 
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for cause. Cathie Peterson has had three and a half years to administer this estate. However, 
rather than do so she has chosen to pursue her own personal interests. The conflict of interest 
which became apparent following her appointment and her disregard of the Court's order 
demonstrate that removal under Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 is appropriate. The priorities for 
appointment in the first instance do not prevent her from being removed in accordance with § 15-
3-611. 
E. Action by the Department as Personal Representative of this Estate Will Shorten These 
Proceedings Without Limiting Cathie Peterson's Rights to Protect Her Own Interests. 
The June 12, 2008, "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" determined that the 
life estate held by the decedent at the time of his death was an asset of the estate for purposes of 
Medicaid recovery. The determination of its value should have been a mechanical calculation. 
The only remaining question was how the Department would receive payment. The personal 
representative had authority to seek partition of the real property in order to pay the Department's 
claim. Idaho Code§ 15-3-715(6). If the personal representative had been acting in the interest of 
the estate, rather than her own personal interest, this is what she would have done. After the 
Court ordered this very thing by ordering the real property sold to pay the Department, the 
personal representative appealed to this court. This is something Cathie Peterson had the right to 
do in her individual capacity, but it was not something the personal representative, acting in the 
best interest of the estate would have done. 
By removing Cathie Peterson as the personal representative, she continues to have every 
right to act in her own personal interest, but she is relieved of her conflicting responsibility of 
acting in the best interests of the estate as personal representative. The successor personal 
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representative, acting in the best interest of the estate, may now bring an action in the District 
Court to partition the real property so that the estate creditors may be paid. In that action, Cathie 
Peterson may assert any defense available to her. This will allow this estate to be fully 
administered without further delay or legal wrangling over claims that she cannot be forced to act 
as personal representative in contravention of her personal interests. 
There is no prejudice to Cathie Peterson except to remove her ability to further delay 
these proceedings. At the removal hearing the court asked Mr. Finney how the estate would be 
prejudiced by removing Cathie Peterson as personal representative. Mr. Finney was unable to 
articulate any prejudice to the estate, and in fact, his answer supports replacement of Cathie 
Peterson with a personal representative who has authority to bring an action against her 
personally for partition of the real property: 
COURT: I'll pose the same question to you Mr. Finney. How would the 
estate be prejudiced ifthe Court did remove Ms. Peterson, let her focus all of her 
time and energy on her personal, uh, claims or interests in this estate and allow the 
State of Idaho basically to take the reins as the Personal Representative and go 
forth? How would - how would that injure the estate? 
MR. FINNEY: I guess I- well I'll see it- say it, uh, as in this regard. 
Whoever's Personal Representative, I don't think has the authority in this action 
to adjudicate, in this probate, to adjudicate with a third party. Whether it's the 
Department as a P.R., Cathie Peterson as a P.R., an independent person who has, 
you know, isn't a creditor, and isn't uh - uh, third party, uh, title holder. Uh, I just 
- I just don't. That's the only prejudice I see to estate is a proceeding that really 
doesn't give a result that can be granted. Uh, now, so that's the only prejudice I 
see as to who is the Personal Representative. 
Tr. p. 12, 11. 7-19. 
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As in the cases previously cited, since Cathie Peterson is unable to evaluate and bring an 
action against her own personal interests, it is in the best interest of the estate to remove her and 
appoint another capable of bringing such an action. 
v. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AW ARD ED ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL 
Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding 
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117 (underline added). Similarly, Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides as follows: 
12-121. ATTORNEY'S FEES. -In any civil action, the judge may award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this 
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for 
the award of attorney's fees. The term ''party" or ''parties" is defined to include 
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of 
Idaho or political subdivision thereo£ 
Idaho Code§ 12-121. Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(l), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, attorney fees 
may be awarded under this section where "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Cathie Peterson's appeal of the order removing her meets 
the requirements for both of these provisions. She presented four issues on appeal: 
a. Did the Magistrate err in removing Cathie Peterson as Personal 
Representative pursuant to the statutory provisions? 
b. Did the Magistrate err in asserting jurisdiction over real property 
not vested in the estate? 
c. Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion of jurisdiction over 
real property vested in a person not a party to the proceeding? 
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d. Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed from further 
proceedings in the matter? 
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. For three of these issues, "b," "c," and "d," she presented no cogent 
argument or authority. The issue presented in "a" was the actual issue before the court and the 
personal representative has presented no authority that actually supports her appeal. The 
I 
personal representative cited a single case that related to removal of a personal representative, 
Kolouch v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, 128 Idaho 186, 911 P.2d 779 (App. 1996), and stated: 
As set forth in Kolouch v. First Sec. Bank ofldaho, 128 Idaho 186, 192, 
911 P.2d 779, 785 (Idaho App., 1996) for removal of a personal representative to 
be in the best interest of the estate, there must be actual evidence presented of 
financial mismanagement. It is not sufficient to remove a Personal Representative 
with priority for appointment as an heir and to appoint a creditor, without some 
sort of actual evidence on the record of mismanagement. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 6. This is a blatant misrepresentation of what Kolouch held. Moreover, as 
discussed earlier, while the personal representative argued there was a lack of evidence to 
support the findings of the Court, he failed to identify any finding that was unsupported. The one 
reference to the transcript made by the personal representative, on page 7 of Appellant's Brief, 
refers not to the removal of the personal representative, but rather to the choice of the 
Department as successor. Likewise, at page 8 of Appellant's Brief, the personal representative 
argues that "the Department is not a propert Successor Personal Representative." However, the 
personal representative did not appeal the separate "Order for Appointment of Successor 
Personal Representative" entered October 19, 2010. Therefore, the question of the choice of a 
successor personal representative isn't even before the court. The personal representative has 
failed to show any reasonable basis in fact or law for her appeal of her removal. 
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The issues on appeal cited by the personal representative are also without merit. Issues 
"b" and "c" seem to suggest Judge Julian asserted jurisdiction "over real property not vested in 
the estate" and "over real property vested in a person not a party to the proceeding." However, 
the Order appealed from, the Order Removing Personal Representative, merely removes the 
personal representative and orders her to take no action to the detriment of the estate. There is 
nothing in the Order having anything to do with the issues presented. Further, there is nothing in 
Appellant's Brief which elucidates this question. 
Similarly, issue "d" asks whether the Magistrate should "be removed from further 
proceedings in the matter." While Mr. Featherston sought automatic disqualification upon his 
initial appearance, that disqualification was denied by the Court's "Order Denying Amended 
Motion for Automatic Disqualification - IRCP 40(d)(I)." No appeal was taken from that Order, 
and it cannot, therefore, be the basis for this issue. The personal representative argues in 
Appellant's Brief that Judge Julian should be disqualified, but cites to no authority and refers to 
no legal principle at all that would support the action he seeks. This is clearly without any basis 
in fact or law. 
In the case of Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010), the Idaho Supreme 
Court recently dealt with a case where the appellant failed to support his issues on appeal with 
any reasonable authority or argument: 
The bulk of Bach's claims on appeal will not be considered by the Court 
because Bach has failed to support them with relevant argument and authority. We 
will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and authority in the 
opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181P.3d450, 454 
(2008); see also Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain the 
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript 
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and the record relied upon."). Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set 
forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only 
mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority. it 
cannot be considered by this Court. Inama v. Boise County ex rel. Bd. of 
Comm 'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003) (refusing to address a 
constitutional takings issue when the issue was not supported by legal authority 
and was only mentioned in passing). 
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152 (underline added). The court went on to 
award attorney fees against Bach, at least in part because of his failure to present argument or 
authority upon which reversal could be based: 
Idaho Code section 12-121 allows the award of attorney fees in a civil action if the 
appeal merely invites the Court to second guess the findings of the lower court. 
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181P.3d435, 440 (2007). Attorney 
fees may also be awarded under section 12-121 "ifthe appeal was brought or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. The award of fees 
under section 12-121 is within this Court's discretion. Id. 
Attorney fees will be awarded against Bach. Despite the fact that he 
presented three lengthy briefs, Bach has done nothing more than ask the Court to 
second guess the findings of the district court and he has provided no argument or 
authority on which reversal of the district court could be based. Other than Bach's 
abiding belief that he has been the subject of a conspiracy and is entitled to 
millions of dollars in damages as a result, there does not appear to have been any 
basis for this appeal. Because the appeal was brought unreasonably, we award fees 
to the above-named respondents under Idaho Code section 12-121. 
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho at 797, 229 P.3d at 1159 (underline added). 
The actions of the personal representative in this appeal are consistent with her actions 
from the time of appointment: they have been aimed at protecting her personal interest and not 
the estate. Through this meritless appeal she has extended her possession of the life estate 
interest in the real property and increased the recovery cost to the Department. 
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VI. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has failed to identify any error or abuse of discretion by the court below in 
removing her as personal representative of this estate. Moreover, she has wholly failed to 
support her other issues on appeal by any cogent legal argument or reference to legal authority. 
The Order Removing Personal Representative should be affirmed and the Department should be 
awarded its attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 18 day of February, 2011, 
~~ 
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Court of Appeals of Nebraska. 
In re ESTATE OF Henry Herbert REINEK, Jr., de-
ceased. 
Eva REINEK, appellant, 
v. 
Shirley K. SCHAFER, Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Henry Herbert Reinek, Jr., deceased, 
appellee. 
No. A-95-1195. 
Sept. 30, 1997. 
Syllabus by the Court 
*1 1. Decedents' Estates: Appeal and Error. In 
the absence of an equity question, an appellate 
court, reviewing probate matters, examines for er-
ror appearing on the record made in the county 
court. 
2. Trial: Witnesses. In a bench trial of a law ac-
tion, the court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge 
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 
given to their testimony. 
3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. It is not the 
province of an appellate court to weigh or resolve 
conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of wit-
nesses, or the weight to be given to their testimony. 
4. __ : __ . When reviewing a judgment for 
errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is 
whether the decision conforms to the law, is sup-
ported by competent evidence, and is neither arbit-
rary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory inter-
pretation is a matter of law in connection with 
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which an appellate court has an obligation to reach 
an independent, correct conclusion, irrespective of 
the determination made by the court below. 
6. Decedents' Estates: Property. The homestead 
allowance, the exempt property, and the family al-
lowance shall vest in the surviving spouse as of the 
date of decedent's death, as a vested indefeasible 
right of property. 
7. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not 
obligated to engage in an analysis which is not 
needed to adjudicate the case and controversy be-
fore it. 
8. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory inter-
pretation presents a question of law in connection 
with which an appellate court has an obligation to 
reach an independent conclusion. 
9. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Er-
ror. When settling upon the meaning of a statute, an 
appellate court must determine and give effect to 
the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascer-
tained from the entire language of the statute con-
sidered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. 
10. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The compon-
ents of a series or collection of statutes pertaining 
to a certain subject matter may be conjunctively 
considered and construed to determine the intent of 
the Legislature so that different provisions of the 
act are perceived as consistent, harmonious, and 
sensible. 
11. Appeal and Error. Cases are heard in an ap-
pellate court on the theory upon which they were 
tried. 
12. Jurisdiction. A party cannot confer subject 
matter jurisdiction on a judicial tribunal by either 
acquiescence or consent; neither may subject matter 
jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, or con-
duct of the parties. 
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13. Parties: Standing. To have standing, a 
plaintiff must have some legal or equitable right, 
title, or interest in the subject matter of the contro-
versy. 
14. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing relates to a 
court's power, that is, jurisdiction, to address issues 
presented and serves to identify the disputes which 
are appropriately resolved through the judicial pro-
cess. 
15. Claims: Parties. A litigant must assert the 
litigant's own legal rights and interests and cannot 
rest a claim on the legal rights or interests of third 
parties. 
*2 16. Standing: Courts. A court before which 
a case is pending can raise the question of standing 
at any time during the proceeding. 
17. Parties: Jurisdiction: Waiver. The presence 
of necessary parties is jurisdictional and cannot be 
waived. 
18. Decedents' Estates: Executors and Admin-
istrators. A representative sued in his representative 
capacity is a distinct person from a representative 
sued in his private or individual capacity and within 
the eyes of the law is a stranger to any right or liab-
ility as an individual. 
19. Fraud: Limitations of Actions. One who by 
deception conceals material facts and thereby pre-
vents discovery of the wrong should not be permit-
ted to take advantage of his or her own deceit or 
concealment by asserting the statute of limitations 
or repose. 
20. Actions: Pleadings. The essential character 
of an action and relief sought, whether legal or 
equitable, is determinable from its main object, as 
disclosed by the pleadings. 
21. Actions: Words and Phrases. A cause of ac-
tion consists of the fact or facts which give one a 
right to relief against another. 
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22. Decedents' Estates: Courts: Jurisdiction: 
Equity. In exercising probate jurisdiction, a court 
may use equity power and principles to dispose of a 
matter within the court's probate jurisdiction. 
23. Decedents' Estates: Actions: Equity: 
Courts: Jurisdiction. In common-law and equity ac-
tions relating to decedents' estates, the county 
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with the 
district courts. 
24. Decedents' Estates: Executors and Admin-
istrators. An action to surcharge a personal repres-
entative may be brought to recover losses to an es-
tate for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the 
personal representative. 
25. · __ . A person interested in the es-
tate may petition for removal of a personal repres-
entative for cause at any time. 
26. __ : __ . It is not competent for a per-
sonal representative acting in his or her representat-
ive capacity to sue himself or herself in his or her 
individual capacity. 
27. Principal and Agent: Gifts: Intent. No gift 
may be made by an attorney in fact to himself or 
herself unless the power to make such a gift is ex-
pressly granted in the instrument itself and there is 
shown a clear intent on the part of the principal to 
make such a gift. 
28. Decedents' Estates: Executors and Admin-
istrators. A personal representative is authorized, if 
not charged with the duty, to evaluate and pursue 
actions for the benefit of the estate. 
Appeal from the County Court for Red Willow 
County: B. BERT LEFFLER, Judge. Dismissed in 
part, affirmed in part, and in part reversed and re-
manded with directions. 
Daylene A. Bennett, of Burger & Bennett, P.C., for 
appellant. 
R. Kent Radke for appellee. 
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SIEVERS, MUES, and INBODY, Judges. 
MUES, Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Eva Reinek, surviving spouse of Henry Herbert 
Reinek, Jr., appeals from an order of the county 
court for Red Willow County dismissing her de-
mand for statutory allowances, dismissing her peti-
tion for elective share, denying her petition for re-
moval of the personal representative, and dismiss-
ing her motion for an accounting and constructive 
trust. 
II. STATEMENT OF CASE 
*3 Henry and Eva were married on June 15, 
1968. Henry had two daughters from a previous 
marriage, Shirley K. Schafer and Connie Rogers. 
Henry was hospitalized on December 7, 1990. Fol-
lowing quadruple bypass surgery and a stroke, 
Henry underwent rehabilitation and eventually went 
to a nursing home. On January 12, 1991, a power of 
attorney was executed, making Schafer Henry's at-
torney in fact. On April 18, 1992, an irrevocable 
living trust agreement was executed, naming Henry 
as trustor, Schafer as trustee, and Schafer and Ro-
gers as beneficiaries. "Schedule A" attached to the 
trust lists the assets placed in the trust. They in-
clude a Putnam account, three certificates of depos-
it, and a 1967 Cadillac. The agreement provided 
that additional funds and properties could be trans-
ferred by the trustor to the trustee. 
Henry died September 3, 1992. At the time of 
his death, aside from minimal personal property, 
Henry's assets existed in right of survivorship ac-
counts (none of which were held with Eva) and in 
the irrevocable living trust (of which Eva was not a 
beneficiary). Henry also had some life insurance, 
but Eva was not a beneficiary of this either. 
On December 21, 1993, Eva filed a petition for 
formal adjudication of intestacy, determination of 
heirs, and appointment of personal representative. 
Schafer filed an objection to this motion on January 
19, 1994, along with a petition for formal probate 
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of Henry's will. Attached thereto was Henry's will 
dated May 15, 1984, in which he named Rogers and 
Schafer as copersonal representatives. Aside from a 
$10,000 bequest to Rogers' son Sean, the remainder 
of Henry's estate was to go to Rogers and Schafer. 
Eva was not mentioned in the will. An order dated 
February 10, 1994, admitted the will to probate, de-
termined Henry's heirs to be Eva, Schafer, and Ro-
gers, and formally appointed Schafer as personal 
representative. 
On February 24, 1994, Eva filed a "Demand for 
Cash Satis-faction of Homestead Allowance and 
Family Allowance" with the court, in which she 
made "demand for immediate payment of the al-
lowances by the Personal Representative." On this 
same date, Eva also filed a "demand for exempt 
property." On March 24, Eva filed a petition for 
elective share. 
On April 7, 1994, Schafer, as personal repres-
entative, filed a rejection of Eva's demand for cash 
satisfaction of homestead allowance and family al-
lowance. On April 8, Schafer likewise filed a rejec-
tion of Eva's demand for exempt property. Both re-
jections were based on the fact that the administrat-
ive expenses exceeded the estate. On February 28, 
1995, Schafer filed a motion for summary judg-
ment, asking the court to enter judgment in her fa-
vor rejecting Eva's demands for statutory allowance 
and petition for elective share. This motion was 
overruled. 
On March 24, 1995, Eva filed a petition for re-
moval of the personal representative for cause. In 
this motion, Eva alleged that Schafer had acted as 
Henry's attorney in fact and that Schafer had pre-
pared an irrevocable living trust agreement in 
which she was the trustee and a cobeneficiary. The 
motion further averred that Schafer, acting in these 
capacities, had misappropriated, converted, and 
wasted Henry's assets by transferring and disposing 
of them for her own benefit and the benefit of oth-
ers. 
*4 On August 4, 1995, Eva filed a "Motion for 
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Accounting by Personal Representative and to Im-
pose Constructive Trust." This motion alleged that 
Schafer had procured the power of attorney from 
Henry and in that capacity had converted assets to 
her benefit, including certain certificates of deposit 
held by Henry, and written checks from Henry's 
personal bank accounts to herself and her nephew 
Sean. It further alleged that on "her [Schafer's] own 
initiative" the trust had been created for Schafer's 
and Rogers' benefit and that Schafer then placed 
substantial assets of Henry's into that trust. The mo-
tion alleged that the actions of Schafer constituted a 
fraud upon Eva and other creditors of the estate. 
The motion sought an order for an accounting by 
the personal representative of her actions since she 
was granted the power of attorney on January 12, 
1991, and the imposition of a constructive trust on 
all assets reflected on the estate inventories filed by 
the personal representative. 
On August 10, 1995, Schafer filed an amended 
answer to the petition for elective share, asking that 
the petition be dismissed. Schafer's original answer 
is not in our record. On August 14, Schafer filed an 
answer and demurrer to Eva's motion for an ac-
counting and to impose a constructive trust. 
On August 30 and 31, 1995, a trial was held on 
Eva's demand for cash satisfaction of statutory al-
lowances (including exempt property), the petition 
for elective share, the petition for removal of the 
personal representative for cause, and the motion 
for an accounting by the personal representative 
and to impose a constructive trust. By order filed 
September 29, the court found that costs and ex-
penses of administration exceeded the value of all 
property subject to the statutory allowances, that 
the petition for elective share was filed more than 2 
years after Henry's death, that Schafer had commit-
ted no fraudulent acts, and that funeral and admin-
istrative expenses exceeded the value of all remain-
ing property subject to the augmented estate com-
putation resulting in the value of the augmented es-
tate being zero. Thus, Eva's demand for statutory 
allowances, petition for elective share, petition for 
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removal, and motion for an accounting and con-
structive trust were all dismissed. In addition, the 
court awarded the personal representative attorney 
fees and costs to be determined upon later 
"certification." On November 8, that award was 
deemed erroneous and such relief was denied. Eva 
filed two notices of appeal, one on October 27 and 
one on December 1. 
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Summarized and restated, Eva asserts that the 
county court erred in (1) dismissing her demand for 
statutory allowances, (2) dismissing her petition for 
elective share, (3) failing to remove Schafer as per-
sonal representative, and (4) failing to find that 
Schafer acted fraudulently by making nonprobate 
transfers to herself and others and failing to impose 
a constructive trust, accounting, or both on those 
assets transferred through nonprobate means by 
Schafer to herself and others. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
*5 Eva asserts that since this is an equity action 
for an accounting and to impose a constructive 
trust, our standard of review is de novo on the re-
cord and we are to reach conclusions independent 
of the factual findings of the trial court. Schafer 
agrees. We do not disagree that such action is equit-
able with the standard of review stated. See, e.g., 
Hanigan v. Tn1mble, 252 Neb. 376, 562 N.W.2d 
526 (1997); Mischke v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 530 
N.W.2d 235 (1995). 
[l] However, the trial below combined several 
separate proceedings, some of which are not equit-
able. In the absence of an equity question, an appel-
late court, reviewing probate matters, examines for 
error appearing on the record made in the county 
court. In re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 
503 N.W.2d 540 (1993); In re Estate of Schenck, 5 
Neb.App. 736, 568N.W.2d 567 (1997). See, also, In 
re Estate a/Disney, 250 Neb. 703, 550 N.W.2d 919 
(1996); In re Estate of Soule, 248 Neb. 878, 540 
N.W.2d 118 (1995). 
(2,3] In a bench trial of a law action, the court, 
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as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibil-
ity of witnesses and the weight to be given to their 
testimony. In re Estate of Disney, supra. It is not 
the province of an appellate court to weigh or re-
solve conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of 
witnesses, or the weight to be given to their testi-
mony. Id 
[4] When reviewing a judgment for errors ap-
pearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the de-
cision conforms to the law, is supported by compet-
ent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, 
nor unreasonable. Klinginsmith v. Wichmann, 252 
Neb. 889, 567 N.W.2d 172 (1997). 
[5] Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in 
connection with which an appellate court has an ob-
ligation to reach an independent, correct conclu-
sion, irrespective of the determination made by the 
court below. Bank of Papillion v. Nguyen, 252 Neb. 
926, 567 N.W.2d 166 (1997). 
V. JURISDICTION 
We must first address Schafer's claim that we 
have no jurisdiction over this appeal. The court's 
order overruling Eva's demands, petitions, and mo-
tion was filed September 29, 1995. In it, the court 
ordered, inter alia, that the personal representative 
be awarded attorney fees and costs, to be determ-
ined upon certification of said costs and fees within 
21 days of September 25, the date of that order. 
Eva filed a notice of appeal on October 27, 
1995, expressly referencing the September 29 or-
der. On November 3, a hearing was held on 
Schafer's motion to approve attorney fees, Eva's ob-
jections thereto, and Eva's objection to the court's 
jurisdiction. The county court entered an order 
overruling the jurisdictional objection and finding 
that the court's September 29 order was erroneous 
insofar as the award of attorney fees and costs. It 
denied Schafer's motion for said fees. This order 
was filed November 8. Eva filed a second notice of 
appeal on December 1, referencing the county 
court's order of November 3, filed November 8, 
"along with all prior orders." Our record contains 
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no dismissal of Eva's first appeal, either before or 
after the second appeal was filed. 
*6 Schafer argues that the September 29 order 
was a final order and that Eva failed to timely ap-
peal from that order, contending that Eva filed her 
notice of appeal on December 6, outside the 30-day 
period required by Neb.Rev .Stat. § 25-19 I 2 
(Reissue 1995). Schafer's argument totally ignores 
Eva's first notice of appeal, filed October 27, and 
misstates the date of her second appeal, filed 
December 1. Moreover, we disagree with Schafer's 
contention that the September 29 order was a final 
order. 
The September 29 order expressly reserved for 
later ruling the assessment of attorney fees and 
costs in favor of the personal representative. The 
question of whether an order granting attorney fees 
in an amount to be determined at some future time 
constitutes a final, appealable order has recently 
been answered by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In 
State ex rel. Fick v. Miller, 252 Neb. 164, 560 
N.W.2d 793 (1997), the court held that in order to 
be final, a judgment for money must specify the 
amount awarded or specify the means for determin-
ing the amount. In that case, because the judgment 
left the amount of attorney fees to be awarded un-
determined, the Supreme Court held that it was not 
final and, consequently, that the court lacked juris-
diction to entertain an appeal from the order. 
Here, as in State ex rel. Fick, the September 29 
judgment left the amount of attorney fees and costs 
for later determination. It did not specify the 
amount awarded. It merely stated that said costs 
and fees would be "determined upon certification." 
If one were to construe this order as requiring only 
a unilateral certification from the personal repres-
entative to determine the amount, it might be ar-
gued that the judgment provided a means for de-
termining the amount as required by State ex rel. 
Fick. However, such interpretation is not reason-
able, as a later hearing was set, and held, to adju-
dicate the amounts. The September 29 order was 
not a final, appealable order, and we lack jurisdic-
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tion over Eva's "first" appeal, filed October 27. 
The question now presented is, What effect did 
Eva's first appeal, though improper, have on the tri-
al court's November 8 order? If the first appeal di-
vested the trial court of jurisdiction, then the 
November 8 order is void; there is still no final, ap-
pealable order; and we lack jurisdiction over Eva's 
second appeal as well. 
This court, in Swain Constr. v. Ready Mixed 
Concrete Co., 4 Neb.App. 316, 542 N.W.2d 706 
( 1996), addressed two pending appeals. The first 
was from an order sustaining a demurrer but not 
dismissing the case. While that appeal was pending, 
and prior to the issuance of the mandate of this 
court summarily dismissing that appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction, the district court entered another order, 
this time dismissing appellant's petition. A second 
appeal was then filed from that order. Appellee 
moved to dismiss the second appeal based on the 
principle that after an appeal is perfected, the trial 
court is generally divested of jurisdiction over the 
case until an appellate court renders a final determ-
ination, which ordinarily occurs when the appellate 
court issues its mandate. See Currie v. Chief School 
Bus Serv., 250 Neb. 872, 553 N.W.2d 469 (1996). 
Appellant argued that appellate jurisdiction existed 
over its second appeal because the first was taken 
from a nonfinal order which was not appealable, 
that is, that "an appeal from an order that is not ap-
pealable does not divest the trial court of jurisdic-
tion over the case." Swain Constr., 4 Neb.App. at 
319, 542 N.W.2d at 709. This court rejected that ar-
gument after an extensive review of Nebraska juris-
prudence. We reasoned, inter alia, that while the 
appeal of the nonfinal order was pending in this 
court, the trial court was without authority to enter 
its second order of dismissal, even though the first 
appeal was ultimately dismissed for lack of juris-
diction: "This court had jurisdiction of the case to 
determine if it had jurisdiction and retained such 
jurisdiction until the issuance of the mandate, de-
priving the trial court of jurisdiction to dispose of 
the case during the pendency of the first appeal." 
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Id. at 323, 542 N.W.2d 706, 542 N.W.2d at 711. 
Appellant's second appeal was dismissed as being 
from an order which the trial court was not author-
ized to enter because an appeal from an extrajudi-
cial order does not confer jurisdiction upon this 
court. 
*7 If the reasoning of Swain Constr. were ap-
plied to the case before us, Eva's first appeal would 
have divested the lower court of jurisdiction, even 
though we now decide it did not confer jurisdiction 
on this court because it was from a nonfinal order 
under the holding of State ex rel. Fick, supra. Un-
der Swain Constr., Eva's second appeal is from the 
extrajudicial order of November 8, 1995, and such 
order does not confer jurisdiction upon this court. 
In sum, under State ex rel. Fick, Eva's first appeal 
must be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion. Under Swain Constr., Eva's second appeal 
would suffer the same fate. 
We now tum to a recent expression of the Su-
preme Court on this issue. In Jn re Interest of 
Joshua M et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548 
(1997), the Supreme Court faced several pending 
appeals arising out of orders entered in juvenile 
proceedings. As is relevant to the present case, it 
concluded that one of the pending appeals in one of 
the proceedings was improper, as it was from a 
nonfinal order, and dismissed it. The appeal found 
to be improper was pending at the time of the sub-
sequent order of the juvenile court which was the 
subject of a second appeal in the same proceeding. 
The Supreme Court stated that since the first appeal 
was not properly pending, the juvenile court had 
jurisdiction to issue its subsequent order, which was 
the subject of the second appeal. The Supreme 
Court proceeded to exercise appellate jurisdiction 
and render an opinion on the second appeal. 
Jn re Interest of Joshua M et al. does not ex-
pressly reject, or even discuss, Swain Constr. and 
the authority cited in it. Yet it clearly teaches that 
in a juvenile context, a pending appeal from a non-
final order does not divest the lower court of juris-
diction to enter subsequent orders in the same pro-
33D 
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ceeding and, accordingly, that appellate jurisdiction 
lies over an appeal from the subsequent order. This 
seems directly contrary to Swain Constr., and the 
Supreme Court authority which it relied on, unless 
one attempts to distinguish the latter solely on the 
nature of the case, i.e., nonjuvenile. While a ration-
al distinction might be articulated on that basis, in 
the absence of clear authority to the contrary, we 
conclude In re Interest of Joshua M et al. is con-
trolling here. Thus, Eva's first appeal, though im-
proper as from a nonfinal order, did not divest the 
county court of jurisdiction to enter the November 
8 order. Therefore, Eva's timely appeal from the fi-




The single trial below consolidated four differ-
ent matters which, though obviously somewhat in-
terrelated, are separate and independent proceed-
ings. Thus, while they are combined, we essentially 
address four distinct appeals. 
2. STATUTORY ALLOWANCES 
*8 [6] A surviving spouse of a decedent domi-
ciled in this state is entitled to a homestead allow-
ance in the amount of $7,500, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2322 (Reissue 1995); to value, not exceeding 
$5,000, in excess of any security interests therein, 
in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, 
appliances, and personal effects, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2323 (Reissue 1995); and to a family allowance, 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2324 (Reissue 1995). These 
statutory allowances have priority over all claims 
except for costs and expenses of administration. §§ 
30-2322 to 30-2324. The homestead allowance, the 
exempt property, and the family allowance shall 
vest in the surviving spouse as of the date of de-
cedent's death, as a vested indefeasible right of 
property. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2325 (Reissue 
1995); In re Estate of Carman, 213 Neb. 98, 327 
N.W.2d 611 (1982). 
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On February 24, 1994, Eva directed a written 
demand for payment of these statutory allowances 
on the personal representative. Schafer rejected 
Eva's demands, asserting that when certain non-
probate transfers were excluded, the costs and ex-
penses of administration exceeded the assets of the 
estate, leaving no money to pay said allowances. 
According to the second amended inventory con-
tained in our record, Henry's estate consisted of ap-
proximately $4,100 in personal property; there was 
$6,188.32 in life insurance proceeds payable to 
Schafer and Rogers; $50,028.79 in property was 
held with right of survivorship with his daughters, 
Rogers and Schafer; and approximately $123,511 in 
assets was titled in Henry's trust, with Rogers and 
Schafer as beneficiaries. Eva's demands and 
Schafer's rejections were filed in the probate pro-
ceedings. Eva did not separately petition the county 
court for relief following Schafer's rejection. 
Rather, Eva's demands simply came on for trial. In 
its order, as relevant to dismissing Eva's demands 
for statutory allowances, the county court found 
generally that "( c ]osts and expenses of administra-
tion exceeded the value of all property subject to 
homestead allowance, exempt property allowance 
and family allowance." On appeal, Eva generally 
assigns as error this finding of the county court. 
The court made no specific finding on what the 
costs and expenses of administration were, what the 
value of Henry's probate estate was, or what other 
property, if any, had been considered to be "subject 
to" these allowances. 
We do not understand Eva to seriously contend 
that Henry's probate estate was sufficient to fund 
her statutory allowances, that is to say, that his es-
tate at his death had funds left over, after payment 
of costs and expenses of administration, to pay 
those allowances. Rather, Eva contends that certain 
nonprobate transfers should have been declared in-
effective by the court under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2726 (Reissue 1995) to the extent necessary to 
pay her statutory allowances. Eva devotes the en-
tirety of her argument on this subject to the propos-
ition that she timely commenced a proceeding un-
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der § 30-2726 for purposes of asserting the liability 
for her statutory allowances against surviving 
parties or beneficiaries of survivorship or "POD" 
accounts, thus presuming that the county court re-
jected her allowances because it found that she did 
not timely proceed. We find nothing in the court's 
order to suggest that this was or was not the court's 
reasoning. 
*9 Schafer argues that the county court prop-
erly dismissed Eva's demands for statutory allow-
ances because the probate estate was insufficient to 
pay them; that no proceeding was ever commenced 
under§ 30-2726; and that, even ifit was, due to the 
lateness of Eva's request for these allowances, be-
neficiaries of these nonprobate transfers, i.e., right 
of survivorship accounts and POD accounts, could 
not be required to account to the estate under that 
section. 
[7] We do not frame the "lateness" issue be-
cause it is unnecessary for us to decide it. We con-
clude that the proceedings below were improperly 
initiated under § 30-2726. An appellate court is not 
obligated to engage in an analysis which is not 
needed to adjudicate the case and controversy be-
fore it. Motor Club Ins. Assn. v. Fillman, 5 
Neb.App. 931, 568 N.W.2d 259 (1997). 
(8] The county court, in its interlocutory order 
denying Schafer's motion for summary judgment, 
reasoned that Eva had timely commenced a pro-
ceeding under § 30-2726. Why it ultimately dis-
missed Eva's claims for allowance altogether is in-
decipherable from its order, although Schafer re-
quested written findings of fact. However, statutory 
interpretation presents a question of law in connec-
tion with which an appellate court has an obligation 
to reach an independent conclusion. Kerrigan & 
Line v. Foote, 5 Neb.App. 397, 558 N.W.2d 837 
(1997) (citing Payne v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. 
Servs., 249 Neb. 150, 542 N.W.2d 694 (1996)). 
[9,10] When settling upon the meaning of a 
statute, an appellate court must determine and give 
effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as 
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ascertained from the entire language of the statute 
considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, 
it being the court's duty to discover, if possible, the 
Legislature's intent from the language of the statute 
itself. Id. The components of a series or collection 
of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter 
may be conjunctively considered and construed to 
determine the intent of the Legislature so that dif-
ferent provisions of the act are perceived as consist-
ent, harmonious, and sensible. Id. 
We believe much confusion occurred below by 
failing to honor the distinction between the process 
of generally asserting rights to statutory allowances 
and a proceeding under § 30-2726. 
(a) Statutory Allowances Generally 
As noted, a surviving spouse's entitlements to 
the homestead allowance, exempt property, and 
family allowance are statutorily defined. See §§ 
30-2322, 30-2323, and 30-2324. The statutes creat-
ing those entitlements do not define the procedure 
by which they are to be asserted. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2209(4) (Reissue 1995) defines "claim" to in-
clude "liabilities of the estate which arise at or after 
the death of the decedent," expressly excluding cer-
tain matters irrelevant here. Statutory allowances 
are obviously payable from estate assets. Section 
30-2325 provides in pertinent part: "The homestead 
allowance, the exempt property, and the family al-
lowance as finally determined by the personal rep-
resentative or by the court, shall vest in the surviv-
ing spouse as of the date of decedent's death, as a 
vested indefeasible right of property .... " (Emphasis 
supplied.) See In re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 
890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). Thus, these rights ac-
crue to the recipient statutorily upon the decedent's 
death. In re Estate of Carman, 213 Neb. 98, 327 
N.W.2d 611 (1982). Statutory allowances generic-
ally fall within the definition of a claim found in § 
30-2209(4). 
*10 Eva's demands for statutory allowances 
were filed in the probate proceeding and were dir-
ected to Schafer as personal representative of 
Henry's estate. They reference only the statutory 
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sections of the Nebraska Probate Code which create 
these entitlements. Arguably, they were presented 
as a "written statement of the claim" as required by 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2486 (Reissue 1995) (claims 
against decedent's estate may be presented by filing 
written statement of claims with clerk of court). In 
any event, it is clear that Eva did not file a petition 
for allowance in the probate proceedings or other-
wise commence a proceeding on the claims after 
Schafer rejected the demands. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2488 (Reissue 1995). Neither did Eva petition 
the court for relief under § 30-2325, which, ad-
dressing determinations of statutory allowances, 
provides that "any interested person aggrieved by 
any selection, determination, payment, proposed 
payment, or failure to act under this section may 
petition the court for appropriate relief .... " 
While the issue is troubling, for our purposes, 
we will accept that Eva's demands and the personal 
representative's rejections sufficiently presented the 
county court with a proceeding to adjudicate Eva's 
entitlement to statutory allowances. It is only the 
"proceeding" under § 30-2726 which Schafer ques-
tions and which is the focus of Eva's assigned error. 
That proceeding is separate and distinct, as we now 
discuss. 
(b) § 30-2726 
By necessity, statutory allowances can be paid 
only if there are sufficient estate assets to pay them. 
If not,§ 30-2726 offers special relief through an ad-
junct proceeding. Section 30-2726 provides, in per-
tinent part: 
(a) If other assets of the estate are insufficient, 
a transfer resulting from a right of survivorship or 
POD designation under sections 30-2716 to 
30-2733 is not effective against the estate of a de-
ceased party to the extent needed to pay ... statutory 
allowances to the surviving spouse and children .... 
(b) A surviving party or beneficiary who re-
ceives payment from an account after death of a 
party is liable to account to the personal represent-
ative of the decedent for a proportionate share of 
Page9 
the amount received to which the decedent, imme-
diately before death, was beneficially entitled under 
section 30-2722, to the extent necessary to dis-
charge the amounts described in subsection (a) of 
this section remaining unpaid after application of 
the decedent's estate. A proceeding to assert the li-
ability for ... statutory allowances may not be com-
menced unless the personal representative has re-
ceived a written demand by the surviving spouse .... 
The proceeding must be commenced within one 
year after the death of the decedent. 
(Emphasis supplied.) (A predecessor statute, 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2707 (Reissue 1989) (repealed 
by 1993 Neb. Laws, L.B. 250, § 34), allowed the 
proceeding to assert this liability to be commenced 
within 2 years after death.) 
*11 The purpose of this proceeding is seen in 
the comment to § 30-2707, the predecessor statute, 
which comment, in pertinent part, states: 
Under this section a surviving spouse is auto-
matically assured of some protection against a mul-
tiple-party account if the probate estate is insolvent; 
rights are limited, however, to sums needed for stat-
utory allowances. The phrase "statutory allow-
ances" includes the homestead allowance under 
section 30-2322, the family allowance under sec-
tion 30-2324, and any allowance needed to make up 
the deficiency in exempt property under section 
30-2323. 
Section 30-2726(c) provides that surviving 
parties or beneficiaries against whom a proceeding 
to account is brought may join as a party to the pro-
ceeding other surviving parties or beneficiaries of 
any other accounts of the decedent, and subsection 
( d) provides in part: "Sums recovered by the per-
sonal representative must be administered as part 
of the decedent's estate." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In sum, § 30-2726 creates a separate and inde-
pendent proceeding from that merely asserting a 
general claim or demand for statutory allowances. 
The statute is clear. It creates the right to com-
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mence a separate proceeding to fund statutory al-
lowances found due and owing by the estate. ( 1) Its 
provisions are triggered by a surviving spouse's de-
mand on the personal representative, and (2) the 
proceeding is brought to enhance assets of the es-
tate (3) against surviving parties or beneficiaries of 
survivorship and POD accounts ( 4) with sums re-
covered by the personal representative to be admin-
istered as part of a decedent's estate. 
( c) Proceeding Below 
[11] Did the proceeding in this case, even in 
substance, conform to that anticipated by § 
30-2726(b )? First, whether such a proceeding was 
ever commenced is questionable. Section 
30-2209(35) defines "proceeding" as including ac-
tions at law or in equity. An action at the most fun-
damental level involves pleadings seeking relief 
from a court and defining issues. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2405 (Reissue 1995), for example, provides that 
interested parties may petition the county court for 
orders within the court's probate jurisdiction. 
"Petition" is defined as a written request to the 
court for an order after notice. § 30-2209(34). Eva's 
demands on the personal representative seek no re-
lief from the county court and certainly none under 
§ 30-2726. But our decision does not rest on this 
flaw in form. The parties below apparently chose to 
overlook procedural niceties and, from all we can 
determine, treated Eva's demands as sufficient to 
present both a claim for statutory allowances gener-
ally and a proceeding seeking relief under § 
30-2726. Indeed, it was Schafer, not Eva, who first 
injected § 30-2726 into the matter by reference in 
her rejection of the demands. Schafer, in conjunc-
tion with her summary judgment motion, argued 
that no proceeding had been commenced under § 
30-2726, but at no point prior to the court's overrul-
ing that motion, or afterward, did Schafer file any 
pleading raising the issue, by demurrer or other-
wise; she simply proceeded to trial. Cases are heard 
in an appellate court on the theory upon which they 
were tried. Sunrise Country Manor v. Neb. Dept. of 
Soc. Servs., 246 Neb. 726, 523 N.W.2d 499 (1994); 
Donahoo v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 229 
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Neb. 197, 426 N.W.2d 250 (1988). The parties ob-
viously tried this case under the view that it in-
volved a proceeding under § 30-2726. Schafer can-
not now successfully contend otherwise. But see 
Hynes v. Hogan, 251 Neb. 404, 558 N.W.2d 35 
( 1997) (in nonprobate context, objection that cause 
of action has not been stated can be raised at any 
time). 
*12 Second, § 30-2726(b) requires that the per-
sonal representative receive a written demand as a 
condition to commencing a proceeding under that 
section. Arguably, that occurred here, although as 
stated, Eva's demand made no reference to pursuing 
third parties, but the statute also requires surviving 
parties or beneficiaries to account "to the personal 
representative" and addresses sums recovered "by 
the personal representative. While it is not ex-
pressly stated, we believe a reasonable interpreta-
tion of this statute is that bringing this proceeding, 
and most others involving collection of estate as-
sets, is the duty of the personal representative, un-
less the court orders otherwise. See, e.g., 
Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 30-2470, 30-2471, and 
30-2476(2) (Reissue 1995). 
[12] Parties may waive pleading defects. 
However, they cannot confer subject matter juris-
diction on a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence 
or consent; neither may subject matter jurisdiction 
be created by waiver, estoppel, or conduct of the 
parties. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510 
N.W.2d 318 (1994); State v. Baltimore, 242 Neb. 
562, 495 N.W.2d 921 (1993). 
[13-16] We believe § 30-2726 gives the per-
sonal representative, not the surviving spouse, 
standing to bring such proceedings. To have stand-
ing, a plaintiff must have some legal or equitable 
right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy. Marten v. Staab, 249 Neb. 299, 543 
N.W.2d 436 (1996). Standing relates to a court's 
power, that is, jurisdiction, to address issues 
presented and serves to identify the disputes which 
are appropriately resolved through the judicial pro-
cess. State v. Baltimore, supra. Standing relates to 
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jurisdiction and prudential considerations regarding 
exercise of jurisdiction. Id. Generally, a litigant 
must assert the litigant's own legal rights and in-
terests and cannot rest a claim on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties. Id. A court before which a 
case is pending can raise the question of standing at 
any time during the proceeding. Id. "[S]tanding is 
not a mere pleading requirement, but is an indis-
pensable component of a party's case because only 
a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the court." Forrest v. Eilenstine, 5 Neb.App. 
77, 82, 554 N.W.2d 802, 807 (1996). 
Eva is clearly an interested person under the 
Nebraska Probate Code, see § 30-2209(21), and 
could seek an order to secure proper performance 
of the personal representative's duties. See 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2450 (Reissue 1995) and § 
30-2405. However, she did not do so, instead pro-
ceeding forward on her own. The estate is liable to 
Eva for any statutory allowances due. Of course, 
Eva would benefit from a successful accounting un-
der § 30-2726, because it might enable the estate to 
pay her claim. However, any proceeds of such an 
accounting belong to the estate, to be administered 
by the personal representative. It is the estate's legal 
right, not Eva's, that § 30-2726 addresses. 
*13 [17,18] But Eva's proceeding was deficient 
for another reason. Section 30-2726 addresses an 
accounting of proceeds from surviving parties or 
beneficiaries of described accounts. Although the 
absence of a petition alleging grounds for relief un-
der § 30-2726 and naming the persons against 
whom it was sought is a fundamental defect infect-
ing this entire matter, at most, Eva's demands or 
"petition" was against Schafer as personal repres-
entative. Schafer's appearance below was carefully 
limited to that capacity. Indeed, no person was in-
volved below other than Eva and the personal rep-
resentative. The presence of necessary parties is 
jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Robertson v. 
School Dist. No. 17, 252 Neb. 103, 560 N.W.2d 469 
( 1997). A person acting in two different capacities 
is, in fact, two distinct entities and must be made a 
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party in the capacity or capacities in which it is de-
sired to bind him or her. State on behalf of Dunn v. 
Wiegand, 2 Neb.App. 580, 512 N.W.2d 419 (1994) 
. "[A] representative sued in his representative ca-
pacity is a distinct person from a representative 
sued in his private or individual capacity, and with-
in the eyes of the law is a stranger to any right or li-
ability as an individual." 34 C.J.S. Executors and 
Administrators § 713 at 699 (1942). See, also, 67A 
C.J.S. Parties § 117 (1978); Burton v. Williams, 63 
Neb. 431, 88 N.W. 765 (1902) (where administrator 
is sued only in his official capacity, judgment can-
not be rendered against him personally). That 
Schafer, individually, may have been the target of 
Eva's proceeding under § 30-2726 does not change 
the legal reality that she was not made a party to the 
proceeding in that capacity. 
( d) Conclusion 
Because Eva lacked standing to bring a pro-
ceeding under§ 30-2726 and because parties indis-
pensable to such action were not present, the county 
court lacked jurisdiction to determine the merits of 
such proceeding, and to the extent its order may be 
so construed, it is void. We, too, lack jurisdiction to 
address the merits. The evidence at trial shows that 
Schafer and her sister were clearly beneficiaries of 
certain survivorship accounts, but whether the evid-
ence required an accounting under § 30-2726 is an 
issue we cannot decide. 
Schafer, as personal representative, obviously 
did not bring such a proceeding, and whether this 
constituted a breach of her fiduciary duty in the ab-
sence of a request or court order we also do not de-
cide, as it is not before us on appeal. Eva made no 
such request and sought no such order. In any 
event, Schafer's failure to act did not empower Eva 
to unilaterally take over as the estate's personal rep-
resentative. 
As to Eva's claims for statutory allowances, 
generally, the court's finding of insufficient assets 
to fund them has support in the record. However, 
the court erred in dismissing those claims, and that 
part of its order is reversed. Eva's right to such al-
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 1997 8740 (Neb.App.) 
(Cite as: 1997 WL 618740 (Neb.App.)) 
lowances is separate from the estate's ability to pay 
them. On remand, the amounts thereof should be 
determined so that in the event estate funds become 
available, they can be paid as provided by law. 
3. ELECTIVE SHARE 
*14 Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2313 (Reissue 1995) 
entitles a surviving spouse to an elective share in 
any fraction not in excess of one-half of the aug-
mented estate. The surviving spouse must assert 
this right to elect by filing a petition in probate 
court within 6 months after probate of the will, or 9 
months after death, whichever is later. 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2317(a) (Reissue 1995). Henry 
died on September 3, 1992, but the will was not ad-
mitted to probate until February 10, 1994. Eva's pe-
tition for elective share was timely filed on March 
24, 1994, within 6 months after probate of the will. 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2314 (Reissue 1995) sets 
forth guidelines for the determination of the aug-
mented estate. That determination provides the 
basis for the court's calculation of the spouse's 
elective share, payment of which it then orders 
from the assets of the augmented estate or by con-
tribution from distributees and recipients of por-
tions of the augmented estate. See § 30-2317 and 
Neb.Rev.Stat.§ 30-2319 (Reissue 1995). See, also, 
In re Estate of Ziegenbein, 2 Neb.App. 923, 519 
N.W.2d 5 (1994). Briefly digressing, the elective 
share/augmented estate procedure does not increase 
probate estate assets for purposes of paying stat-
utory allowances which are otherwise unpayable 
because of the insufficiency of such estate. Indeed, 
the augmented estate by definition includes an ini-
tial reduction from the estate for such allowances, 
see§ 30-2314(a), and a surviving spouse is entitled 
to statutory allowances whether or not he or she 
opts to take an elective share. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2318 (Reissue 1995). 
The augmented estate consists of the decedent's 
estate first reduced by the amount of funeral and 
administration expenses, statutory allowances, and 
enforceable claims. § 30-2314(a). It is then in-
creased by those items set forth in§ 30-2314(a)(l). 
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However, "[n]onprobate transfers described in sec-
tion 30-2314(a)(l) shall not be included within the 
augmented estate for the purpose of computing the 
elective share if the petition is filed later than one 
year after death." § 30-23 l 7(a). Further, § 
30-2314(c)(3) excludes from the augmented estate 
"[p ]roperty transferred by or from the decedent to 
any person by any means other than intestate suc-
cession or testamentary disposition if a petition is 
not filed or delivered under section 30-2317 within 
nine months of the death of the decedent." Eva ac-
knowledges that she did not file her petition for 
elective share within either 9 months or 1 year after 
Henry's death. 
Eva specifically takes issue with the county 
court's finding that she failed to file her petition for 
elective share within 2 years of Henry's death. The 
court's finding in this regard was clearly erroneous. 
However, this error is inconsequential. While Eva's 
petition was timely filed under § 30-2317, it was 
not filed in time to increase the augmented estate 
by the nonprobate transfers described in § 
30-2314(a)(l) and those transfers described in § 
30-2314(c)(3). From what we can gather, these are 
the only types of transfers by which Eva seeks to 
increase the augmented estate. 
*15 On appeal, Eva asserts error in the county 
court's not stopping Schafer from asserting these 
time limitations due to her fraudulent conduct. Eva 
argues that a fiduciary cannot use a statute of limit-
ations as a shield to protect her from fraudulent 
acts. Schafer's amended answer to Eva's petition for 
elective share specifically pleads §§ 30-23 l 7(a) and 
30-2314(c)(3), alleging that Eva's failure to file her 
petition within 1 year and within 9 months, respect-
ively, results in the exclusion of certain transfers 
from the augmented estate. Our record contains no 
reply of Eva alleging facts in avoidance of these 
time limits. It is only by reference to Eva's separate 
petition to remove Schafer as personal representat-
ive that we fmd allegations ofrepeated inquiries re-
garding the existence of a will and Schafer's alleged 
failure to acknowledge the existence of any such 
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will. In that petition, Eva also alleges that Schafer's 
petition for determination of inheritance tax con-
cealed Henry's will. 
While unorthodox to rely on pleadings in sep-
arate proceedings, we will assume for our purposes 
that Eva presented this issue below, although the 
county court made no express ruling thereon. We 
gather that Eva's argument is that Schafer fraudu-
lently concealed the existence of Henry's will until 
January 19, 1994, when she objected to Eva's peti-
tion for adjudication of intestacy and that this con-
cealment somehow induced Eva not to file her peti-
tion for elective share in time to include the subject 
transfers in the augmented estate. 
(19] The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be 
applied to prevent a fraudulent or inequitable result 
of the statute of limitations. Schendt v. Dewey, 246 
Neb. 573, 520 N.W.2d 541 (1994). Equitable estop-
pel may be applied to bar a defendant's use of a 
statute of repose. Id. One who by deception con-
ceals material facts and thereby prevents discovery 
of the wrong should not be permitted to take ad-
vantage of his or her own deceit or concealment by 
asserting the statute of limitations or repose. Id. 
Our review of the evidence leads to several in-
escapable conclusions. First, the only evidence that 
Schafer affirmatively denied the existence of 
Henry's will exists by inference from the petition 
for determination of inheritance tax filed October 1, 
1993. Schafer, individually, is the petitioner, but 
the pleading is signed only by her attorney. The pe-
tition alleges that Henry died intestate and that he 
did not, during his lifetime, convey any property in 
trust. Both of those statements are obviously un-
true. However, whether Eva was privy to these al-
legations and, if so, relied on them to her detriment 
is another issue. The order determining inheritance 
tax reflects that notice to interested parties was dis-
pensed with because Schafer agreed to pay the full 
inheritance tax due. Moreover, these allegations 
were not made until October 1, 1993, more than a 
year after Henry's September 3, 1992, demise. The 
time limits of§§ 30-2317(a) and 30-2314(c)(3) are 
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l year and 9 months, respectively, from date of 
death. We fail to see how reliance on these mis-
statements, not made until after the time limits had 
already passed, could be deemed the cause of Eva's 
failure to file her petition at an earlier date and 
within the periods necessary to include the subject 
transfers in the augmented estate. While these un-
truths might be probative of Schafer's concealing 
the will during an earlier time, there is no other 
evidence that she did so or that Eva ever inquired 
about it. Eva did not testify. Indeed, the only person 
testifying, other than the attorney who prepared the 
trust documents, was Schafer. 
*16 Next, the concealment of which Eva com-
plains necessarily occurred before Schafer was ap-
pointed as the estate's personal representative. Eva 
cites us to no authority that the actions of a third 
person, Schafer in her non-personal-representative 
capacity, estop an estate, through its duly appointed 
personal representative, from asserting such time 
limits on behalf of the estate. Again, a person act-
ing in two different capacities is really two separate 
and distinct entities. State on behalf of Dunn v. 
Wiegand, 2 Neb.App. 580, 512 N.W.2d 419 (1994). 
Henry died September 3, 1992. There is no 
evidence that Eva was not made aware of his 
passing. Eva resided in McCook until after Henry's 
funeral. The elective share procedure protects a sur-
viving spouse against donative inter vivos transfers 
which would deprive her of her "fair share." In re 
Estate of Ziegenbein, 2 Neb.App. 923, 519 N.W.2d 
5 (1994). It exists whether a will is involved or not. 
No formal action was taken by Eva until December 
21, 1993, over a year after Henry's death, when she 
filed her petition for formal adjudication of intest-
acy. She did not file her petition for elective share 
until March 24, 1994. The time provisions of §§ 
30-2314 and 30-2317 make it incumbent upon a 
surviving spouse to act with reasonable dispatch to 
determine if a petition for elective share may be ap-
propriate, whether the decedent left a will or not. 
The transfers excluded from the augmented estate 
due to delayed filing have serious consequences, as 
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is apparent here. 
The trial court correctly determined that the 
augmented estate could not include the transfers de-
scribed due to the filing date of Eva's petition for 
elective share. Without these transfers, the value of 
the augmented estate was zero, a fact Eva does not 
dispute, and there was nothing for Eva to take an 
elective share in. However, as we discuss later, that 
is not to say that the augmented estate may not be 
increased by other appropriate proceedings for re-
covery of assets of the estate. Thus, it was error to 
dismiss Eva's petition for elective share on the mer-
its. 
4. MOTION FOR ACCOUNTING AND TO IM-
POSE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
This phase of the proceedings is no less 
troublesome than was the statutory allowances 
phase. Eva filed her motion on August 4, 1995. 
Schafer, as personal representative, filed her com-
bined answer and demurrer on August 14. Trial 
commenced on August 30. Schafer generally denied 
all allegations and alleged that the motion failed to 
state facts sufficient to allow the court to grant the 
relief requested, in other words, that it failed to 
state a cause of action. The court's order dismissing 
this motion did not specify why it did so. Nonethe-
less, as part of its general findings, the court stated: 
"No fraudulent act has been shown to have been 
committed by Shirley K. Schafer with respect to as-
sets in which Eva Reinek held any interest." 
(a) Nature of Action 
*17 [20,21] The essential character of an action 
and relief sought, whether legal or equitable, is de-
terminable from its main object, as disclosed by the 
pleadings. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510 
N.W.2d 318 (1994). A cause of action consists of 
the fact or facts which give one a right to relief 
against another. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 
Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994). 
The main objective of the motion was an ac-
counting by Schafer of her actions since being ap-
pointed attorney in fact in January 1991 and the im-
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position of a constructive trust on all assets reflec-
ted on the inventories filed by the personal repres-
entative, most of which were nonprobate. We gath-
er that Eva's purpose in seeking this relief was to 
increase Henry's estate, which increase would re-
dound to her benefit in two ways-first, it would cre-
ate a probate estate sufficient to fund her statutory 
allowances; second, it would naturally increase 
Henry's augmented estate (to the extent that the 
augmented estate begins with the decedent's estate, 
which is then reduced by certain amounts and in-
creased by others, see § 30-2314 ), thus, potentially 
providing something against which her elective 
share could be applied. The general nature of the 
claim is that after Schafer was appointed attorney in 
fact for Henry, she began to convert Henry's assets 
to her benefit and that of others, including placing 
the assets in Henry's irrevocable trust and in vari-
ous jointly held certificates of deposit, which 
breached her fiduciary duty and worked a fraud 
upon Henry. Eva's motion is based on theories and 
principles of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and actual or constructive fraud committed by 
Schafer, whereby Schafer obtained benefits to 
which she was not otherwise entitled. The motion, 
by implication, seeks that assets be ordered held in 
trust for the benefit of the estate. We conclude that 
the essential character of this part of Eva's motion 
is equitable. See, Vejraska v. Pumphrey, 241 Neb. 
321, 488 N.W.2d 514 (1992); In re Estate of 
Widger, 235 Neb. 179, 454 N.W.2d 493 (1990); 
Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 N.W.2d 576 
(1989); Ruppert v. Breault, 222 Neb. 432, 384 
N.W.2d 284 (1986). 
Eva's motion can also be construed as simply 
seeking an accounting by Schafer of her actions as 
personal representative. 
(b) Action to Impose Constructive Trust 
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised sua sponte by a court. Scherbak v. Kissler, 
supra. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdic-
tion on a court by acquiescence or consent; neither 
may subject matter jurisdiction be created by 
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waiver, estoppel, or conduct of the parties. Id. 
[22,23] In exercising probate jurisdiction, a 
court may use equity power and principles to dis-
pose of a matter within the court's probate jurisdic-
tion. Jn re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503 
N.W.2d 540 (1993). In common-law and equity ac-
tions relating to decedents' estates, the county 
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with the 
district courts. Marten v. Staab, 249 Neb. 299, 543 
N.W.2d 436 (1996) (citing Jodence v. Potmesil, 239 
Neb. 387, 476 N.W.2d 554 (1991), and Jn re Estate 
ofSteppuhn, 221 Neb. 329, 377 N.W.2d 83 (1985)). 
*18 As stated, Eva's motion seeks equitable re-
lief. It seeks to impose a trust in favor of the estate 
on moneys held by third persons. It sounds in fraud, 
conversion, and constructive trust principles. In 
Miller v. Janecek, 210 Neb. 316, 314 N.W.2d 250 
( 1982), the Supreme Court was faced with an 
equity action based on constructive trust or, in the 
alternative, conversion. It held, inter alia, that such 
action must be brought in district court and that 
county courts have no equity jurisdiction over this 
type of action. In Jn re Estate of Steppuhn, supra, 
the Supreme Court determined that a county court 
did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case 
involving the determination of title to bearer bonds 
as between the personal representatives of the de-
ceased owners. In so doing, the court stated: 
The grant of jurisdiction to the district court, 
however, while original, is not exclusive. That each 
of two courts may possess the same original juris-
diction is clear, but that two separate courts may 
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction is also clear. Our 
previous opinions have not always addressed this 
point. In considering the difference between exclus-
ive and original, the apparent conflict between the 
jurisdiction of the county court and the district 
court vanishes. 
Id. at 332, 377 N.W.2d at 85. 
Jn re Estate of Steppuhn, while arguably modi-
fying Miller, made no reference to it. Some 6 years 
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later, the Supreme Court in Jodence, supra, held 
that a county judge's jurisdiction regarding injunc-
tions is limited to issuing a temporary restraining 
order when there is no district judge in the county. 
Jodence cited both Jn re Estate of Steppuhn and 
Miller, the latter as an example of a determination 
of the limits of the county court's equity jurisdic-
tion. Jodence, quoting from Miller, again repeated 
that county courts have no equity jurisdiction over 
equity actions of a type based on constructive trusts 
or conversion. Miller has never been expressly 
overruled. 
Here, the county court was not asked to admin-
ister or determine title to or ownership of assets 
which belonged to Henry at the time of his death 
and were thus clearly included in his estate. See In 
re Estate of Severns, 217 Neb. 803, 352 N.W.2d 
865 (1984); In re Estate of Layton, 207 Neb. 646, 
300 N.W.2d 802 (1981). Rather, Eva's motion at-
tempts to establish title in the estate to property in 
the possession of others. We think that it is more 
than a coincidence that the cases cited by Eva for 
substantive principles regarding fraud, an account-
ing, and the imposition of a constructive trust were 
appeals from matters initially tried in district court 
and not in county court. In reliance on Miller, we 
conclude that the county court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to entertain Eva's equitable action 
based on principles of fraud, conversion, and con-
structive trust. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to 
address the merits of the appeal as it pertains to that 
part of this motion. In addition, as was the case 
with the proceeding under § 30-2726, we have seri-
ous doubts whether Eva was the proper party to 
bring such action, even had it been in district court, 
and whether bringing it against Schafer solely in 
her capacity as personal representative joined a 
proper party. Nevertheless, we need not, and we do 
not, decide those issues here. 
( c) Accounting by Personal Representative 
*19 [24] An action to surcharge a personal rep-
resentative may be brought to recover losses to an 
estate for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 1997 W 18740 (Neb.App.) 
(Cite as: 1997 WL 618740 (Neb.App.)) 
personal representative. See, Line v. Rouse, 241 
Neb. 779, 491 N.W.2d 316 (1992); Neb.Rev.Stat.§ 
30-2490(d) (Reissue 1995) (issues of liability as 
between estate and personal representative indi-
vidually may be determined in proceeding for ac-
counting, surcharge, or indemnification or other ap-
propriate proceeding). The powers and duties of a 
personal representative commence upon his or her 
appointment. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2462 (Reissue 
1995). 
To the extent that Eva's motion can be con-
strued as limited to seeking an accounting for the 
estate from the personal representative, it was with-
in the county court's probate jurisdiction. Assum-
ing, without deciding, that Eva was a proper party 
to assert these matters, it is apparent from the alleg-
ations of Eva's motion and even more so from her 
proof at trial that it was not Schafer's activities as 
personal representative, but, rather, her actions be-
fore Henry's death and before her appointment as 
personal representative, as attorney in fact and as 
trustee of Henry's trust, that supported the claims of 
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and construct-
ive fraud in the transfer of assets. 
A representative sued in his representative ca-
pacity is a distinct person from a representative 
sued in his private or individual capacity and within 
the eyes of the law is a stranger to any right or liab-
ility as an individual. 34 C.J.S. Executors and Ad-
ministrators § 713 (1942); 67 A C.J.S. Parties§ 117 
(1978). What Schafer may have done individually, 
as attorney in fact or as trustee during Henry's life-
time before becoming personal representative, is 
beyond the scope of Eva's motion for an accounting 
from Schafer as personal representative. 
It is true that upon Henry's death Schafer re-
ceived and distributed proceeds of certain joint ac-
counts, as beneficiary and survivor, and distributed 
assets of the trust, as trustee, both to herself and 
others. Even if some of these acts took place after 
her appointment as personal representative, they 
were not done as personal representative and the as-
sets involved were not part of the probate estate. In-
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deed, little was done by Schafer as personal repres-
entative in administering the small probate estate 
other than defending Eva's motions. To the extent 
that Eva's motion is construed as seeking a simple 
accounting from the personal representative, the 
court's dismissal of it was not erroneous. 
(d) Conclusion 
The county court had no jurisdiction over Eva's 
motion construed as an equitable action to impose a 
constructive trust based on principles of conversion 
and fraud. The county court properly denied the 
motion construed as one which sought only an ac-
counting against Schafer for her acts as personal 
representative. 
5. REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTAT-
IVE 
Finally, we come to Eva's appeal from the 
county court's denial of her petition to remove 
Schafer as personal representative. We believe it is 
clear from our resolutions of the appeals in the oth-
er proceedings that a more timely and separate re-
moval proceeding below may have avoided some 
procedural pitfalls. 
*20 Eva filed a petition for removal on March 
24, 1995. In it, she alleged that in addition to acting 
as personal representative of Henry's estate, Schafer 
also acted as attorney in fact to Henry and as trustee 
of Henry's inter vivos trust and was the beneficiary 
of Henry's inter vivos trust; that Schafer had con-
cealed the existence of a will from Eva; that 
Schafer, acting as attorney in fact, had made vari-
ous improper transfers to benefit herself and others 
and had "misappropriated, converted, and wasted" 
estate assets; and, finally, that Schafer had filed an 
improper claim against the estate. 
[25] "A person interested in the estate may pe-
tition for removal of a personal representative for 
cause at any time." Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2454(a) 
(Reissue 1995). Once the petition is filed, § 
30-2454(a) requires that the court fix a time and 
place for hearing. Once notice is given to the per-
sonal representative of the removal proceedings, he 
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or she "shall not act except to account, to correct 
maladministration or preserve the estate." Id. 
"Given the scope of the personal representative's 
power over the interests of the beneficiaries and 
other interested parties in an estate, the right con-
ferred by § 30-2454 to petition the county court to 
remove the personal representative for cause is a 
substantial right." In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 
198, 203, 443 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1989). 
Section 30-2454(b) sets forth the bases for the 
removal of a personal representative: 
Cause for removal exists when removal would 
be in the best interests of the estate, or if it is shown 
that a personal representative or the person seeking 
his appointment intentionally misrepresented ma-
terial facts in the proceedings leading to his ap-
pointment, or that the personal representative has 
disregarded an order of the court, has become in-
capable of discharging the duties of his office, or 
has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any 
duty pertaining to the office. 
See, e.g., In re Estate of Seidler, 241 Neb. 402, 
490 N.W.2d 453 (1992) (cause for removal exists 
where personal representative fails to follow court's 
progression order, fails to pay federal taxes, and 
fails to provide proposed distribution plan); In re 
Estate of Snover, supra ( cause for removal exists 
where personal representative fails to file federal 
tax return and violates court's progression order). 
[26] The issue is whether the evidence dis-
closed a sufficient conflict of interest to warrant re-
moval of Schafer as personal representative. Our 
review is for error appearing on the record. In re 
Estate of Snover, supra. The decision to remove is 
within the discretion of the county court. See Moss 
v. Eaton, 183 Neb. 71, 157 N.W.2d 883 (1968). It is 
not competent for a personal representative acting 
in his or her representative capacity to sue himself 
or herself in his or her individual capacity. 34 
C.J.S. Executors and Administrators§ 689 (1942). 
*21 Where an executor is personally interested 
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in the administration of an estate and in the disposi-
tion of the property which is to be distributed under 
the terms of a will, and which is then presently in 
the course of litigation, and the circumstances dis-
close that the interests of the executor are clearly 
such as to prevent his performing the duties con-
nected therewith in an impartial manner, such ex-
ecutor should be removed and another appointed in 
his stead. 
Where an executor's personal interests conflict 
with or are antagonistic to his duties as executor, he 
is not a proper person to act as such, and on proper 
application should be removed .... 
"An administrator is a quasi trustee, and should 
be a person who is not interested adversely to the 
estate in property which is the subject of adminis-
tration, and who will, while carefully guarding the 
interests of the estate, stand at least indifferent 
between it and claimants of the property." 
In re Estate of Marconnit, 119 Neb. 73, 75-76, 
227 N.W. 147, 148 (1929). See, also, Moss, supra 
(affirming refusal to appoint person against whom 
claim for accounting was subsequently filed by spe-
cial administrator as executor); Jn re Estate of 
McLean, 138 Neb. 757, 295 N.W. 273 (1940) 
(removal proper where personal representative's 
conduct antagonistic to other interested persons). 
Other courts have noted that "[a]n important aspect 
of an executor's fiduciary responsibility is the duty 
to maintain an undivided loyalty to the estate." 
Ramsdell v. Union Trust Co., 202 Conn. 57, 65, 519 
A.2d 1185, 1189 (1987). In Ramsdell, the execut-
or's potential conflict arose from its dual capacity 
as executor under the will and trustee of an inter 
vivos trust. As in this case, had the estate in Rams-
dell had a valid claim against the trustee, it would 
have been the executor's responsibility to sue itself 
as trustee. Concluding that the potential cause of 
action was sufficient to warrant consideration by a 
successor personal representative, the Ramsdell 
court held that the lower court abused its discretion 
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by refusing to order removal. 
[27] We reach a similar conclusion here. The 
law is clear that no gift may be made by an attorney 
in fact to himself or herself unless the power to 
make such a gift is expressly granted in the instru-
ment itself and there is shown a clear intent on the 
part of the principal to make such a gift. Mischke v. 
Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 530 N.W.2d 235 (1995); 
Vejraska v. Pumphrey, 241 Neb. 321, 488 N.W.2d 
514 ( 1992). Absent express intent, an agent may 
not exercise his or her power so as to make substan-
tially gratuitous transfers for the agent's or a third 
party's benefit. Mischke, supra. The power to make 
such transfers must be expressly granted in the in-
strument creating the relationship. Vejraska, supra. 
Any purported oral authorization is ineffective. Id. 
*22 In Vejraska, the defendant, attorney in fact, 
deposited a $5,000 check received by the decedent 
into a certificate of deposit held in joint tenancy 
with rights of survivorship by the defendant and the 
decedent. Following the decedent's death, the de-
fendant took sole possession of the certificate. Ac-
cording to defendant, the decedent told her he 
wanted her to have the check. The Supreme Court 
held that the personal representative of the estate 
had shown a prima facie case of fraud by proving 
that, using her power of attorney, the defendant had 
made a gift to herself. It then became the defend-
ant's burden of proof to show that she had acted 
pursuant to power expressly granted in the power of 
attorney document and pursuant to the clear intent 
of the donor. Id. See, also, Mischke, supra. 
[28] Considering the evidence below solely as 
it pertains to removing Schafer, it certainly presents 
the potential of causes of action existing against 
Schafer, and perhaps others, and in favor of Henry's 
estate. The evidence is that Schafer, as attorney in 
fact, made numerous transfers of Henry's moneys to 
and from several joint accounts, some of which ulti-
mately benefited her when Henry died. Some of 
these came from Henry's solely owned accounts 
and went into survivorship accounts. She also made 
payments to third persons from certain of these ac-
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counts which could be found as gratuitous. A per-
sonal representative is authorized, if not charged 
with the duty, to evaluate and pursue actions for the 
benefit of the estate. See §§ 30-2470 and 
30-2476(2). See, also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2464(c) 
(Reissue 1995) (personal representative of decedent 
has same standing to sue and be sued as his de-
cedent had prior to his death); § 30-2464(a) 
(personal representative shall observe standards of 
care applicable to trustees under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2813 (Reissue 1995) and must use his authority 
for best interests of successors to estate). 
Moreover, as we have already determined, it is 
the personal representative who has standing to 
bring proceedings against third parties under § 
30-2726. Here, the individual against whom such 
actions and proceedings potentially lie is the same 
person who must evaluate and initiate them. 
Schafer's conflict is obvious. For removal purposes, 
the likely success or failure of the proceedings or 
actions is only one of several considerations. 
Thus, had the county court been presented with 
a timely petition to remove, or even one to appoint 
a special administrator, see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2457(2) (Reissue 1995), separate from the other 
matters, and denied it on the evidence presented 
here, we would have no hesitation in finding such 
denial an abuse of discretion. But the issue is less 
clear here because the removal petition was filed 
over a year after Eva's demands for statutory allow-
ances and only a few months before she filed the 
motion seeking to impose a constructive trust. 
There is nothing in our record to suggest that Eva 
earlier sought a court order to compel the personal 
representative to bring any such proceedings or to 
allow Eva to do so. Moreover, rather than holding 
an immediate hearing on the removal petition, it 
was combined with a trial of all the matters then 
pending, including the very proceedings that cre-
ated the conflict. Of course, if those matters had 
been properly decided in favor of Schafer, it would 
have been superfluous for the trial court to then re-
move Schafer. 
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*23 The answer to this quandary lies in our pri-
or determination that there have been no binding 
determinations of any proceedings under § 30-2726 
or on the constructive trust actions because the 
county court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate those 
matters. Since the potential actions which create the 
conflict have never been properly determined, the 
conflict remains viable to the extent those actions 
remain viable. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of 
Eva's petition to remove and order that on remand 
Schafer be removed and a new personal represent-
ative be appointed. This decision is in no way to be 
construed as a comment on the likelihood of suc-
cess of any actions or on the effect time passage has 
had on them. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Eva's first appeal is dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. The county court lacked jurisdiction to ad-
judicate the merits of a proceeding under§ 30-2726 
and the equitable action to impose a constructive 
trust. Accordingly, its orders in that regard are a 
nullity. The motion for an accounting by the per-
sonal representative was properly denied. The 
county court properly excluded the subject transfers 
from the augmented estate, but erred in dismissing 
Eva's petition for elective share. The county court 
correctly found that current estate assets were in-
sufficient to pay statutory allowances, but erred in 
summarily dismissing Eva's claims for the same. 
Finally, the failure to remove the personal repres-
entative was erroneous. We remand this matter to 
the county court with directions for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN 
PART, AND IN PART REVERSED AND RE-
MANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. 
Neb.App.,1997. 
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*l Alta Empkey, personal representative of the 
estate of Esther Zoe Crawford, deceased, and trust-
ee of the Crawford Trust, appeals an order of the 
county court which, among other things, ordered 
the return of improperly distributed assets to the es-
tate from the trust and awarded attorney fees and 
costs to an heir who successfully challenged a will. 
Michael Blair Pierce and Amy Jo Pierce (the 
Pierces), heirs of Esther, cross-appeal an order of 
the county court which, among other things, gran-
ted Empkey a protective order concerning discov-
ery requested by the Pierces and refused to remove 
Empkey as personal representative and disqualify 
her counsel. We find no merit to Empkey's appeal, 
but we reverse the county court's grant of the pro-
tective order to Empkey and the county court's re-
fusal to remove Empkey as personal representative. 
We conclude that the record establishes that 
Empkey's dual roles as personal representative and 
trustee have become directly at odds with each oth-
er. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This case concerns the estate of Esther. Esther 
executed a series of wills during the course of her 
life, including wills executed in 1973, 1977, 1982, 
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1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2001. In 
December 2001, Esther's husband, Henry Crawford, 
established the Crawford Trust, and Empkey was 
named trustee of the trust. In the 2001 will, Esther 
named Empkey as personal representative and be-
queathed all her assets to Henry, if he survived her, 
or to Empkey, as trustee of the Crawford Trust, if 
Henry predeceased her. 
Henry predeceased Esther. Esther died on or 
about November 7, 2003. In January 2004, Empkey 
filed an application seeking informal probate of the 
2001 will. Empkey was informally appointed per-
sonal representative on January 6, 2004. 
Pursuant to the terms of the 2001 will, Empkey 
transferred assets of Esther to the Crawford Trust. 
On or about November 14, 2005, Empkey filed a 
petition seeking complete settlement of the estate. 
On December 6, 2005, Sandra Lassley, Michael, 
Tara Pierce, and Zane Pierce (the objectors) filed 
an objection to the petition for complete settlement. 
The objectors alleged that the 2001 will was invalid 
due to lack of competency and/or fraud and undue 
influence. 
The will contest proceedings were transferred 
from the county court for Douglas County, Neb-
raska, to the district court for Douglas County. On 
June 27, 2008, a jury returned a verdict finding that 
the 2001 will was invalid. 
On November 6, 2008, Margaret Schiffbauer 
filed a petition for formal probate of Esther's 1999 
will. In December 2008, Empkey, as personal rep-
resentative of the estate, filed a motion to dismiss 
Schiffbauer's petition and alleged that her request to 
probate the 1999 will was time barred. In addition, 
beneficiaries of the Crawford Trust, including Dun-
dee Presbyterian Church and the Pierces, filed an 
objection to Schiffbauer's petition. 
On March 2, 2009, Lassley filed a motion for 
attorney fees, seeking fees for her successful chal-
lenge to the 2001 will. On March 11, the Pierces 
filed a notice of intent to serve records subpoenas 
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on various parties, including Empkey. On March 
25, Empkey filed a motion for protective order con-
cerning the Pierces' discovery request. On March 
30, the Pierces filed motions seeking to remove 
Empkey as personal representative and to disquali-
fy Empkey's counsel from representing her as per-
sonal representative; both were based, in part, on 
assertions that Empkey and her counsel had a con-
flict of interest while Empkey was serving as both 
trustee of the Crawford Trust and as personal rep-
resentative of the estate. 
*2 The county court held hearings on January 
27 and April 1, 2009. On June 30, the county court 
entered an order disposing of the following issues: 
Empkey's challenge to Schiffbauer's petition to pro-
bate the 1999 will, Lassley's motion for attorney 
fees and costs, and the Pierces' motions to remove 
Empkey and disqualify her counsel. 
The county court found that Schiffbauer's at-
tempt to seek probate of Esther's 1999 will was 
time barred. The court found that Esther had died 
on November 7, 2003, and that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
30-2408 (Reissue 2008) required an action seeking 
probate be commenced within 3 years after de-
cedent's death. Because Schiffbauer did not file her 
request to probate the 1999 will until November 
2008, approximately 5 years after Esther's death, 
the court found Schiffbauer's request was time 
barred. The court held that Esther's estate should 
proceed as an intestate proceeding and directed that 
any assets transferred to the Crawford Trust under 
the invalid 2001 will should be returned as wholly 
as possible to the estate. 
The county court then found that Lassley's ac-
tions in successfully challenging the 2001 will res-
ulted in a benefit to the estate by "[t]hwarting dis-
tribution under an invalid will." The court found 
that under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2203 (Reissue 2008), 
an attorney fee is awardable to a party who brings 
legal proceedings that result in a benefit to the es-
tate. As such, the court awarded Lassley attorney 
fees and costs in the amount of $17,719.69 and 
ordered the fees to be paid out of Esther's assets, or 
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out of the Crawford Trust inasmuch as Empkey had 
transferred all assets of the estate to the Crawford 
Trust. 
Finally, the county court denied the motions to 
remove Empkey and disqualify Empkey's counsel. 
The court ordered that Empkey was to continue 
serving as both personal representative of the estate 
and as trustee of the Crawford Trust. These appeals 
followed. 
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Empkey filed a notice of appeal as "Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Esther Zoe Craw-
ford and Trustee of the [Crawford Trust]." Empkey 
assigned two errors on appeal: First, Empkey as-
serts that the county court erred in ordering the 
transfer of assets from the Crawford Trust back to 
the estate. Second, Empkey asserts that the court 
erred in granting Lassley's motion for attorney fees 
and costs and ordering them to be paid by the 
Crawford Trust. 
The Pierces, as heirs of the estate, filed a cross-
appeal. The Pierces assigned four errors, which we 
have consolidated for discussion to two: First, the 
Pierces assert that the county court erred in granting 
Empkey's motion for protection order concerning 
discovery requested by the Pierces. Second, the 
Pierces assert that the court erred in denying the 
motions to remove Empkey and to disqualify 
Empkey's counsel. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
1. EMPK.EY'S DIRECT APPEAL 
On direct appeal, Empkey has challenged the 
county court's ordering of the transfer of assets 
back to the estate and the court's awarding of attor-
ney fees and costs. Putting aside the somewhat un-
usual notion of the personal representative of an es-
tate challenging an order for the return of property 
to the estate for proper distribution, we find no mer-
it to either assertion. 
(a) Return of Property 
*3 Empkey first challenges the county court's 
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ordering of the transfer of assets back to the estate. 
Empkey argues that there was not a timely request 
for transfer of assets back to the estate, that the 
parties had agreed to limited issues being addressed 
and the transfer of assets back to the estate was not 
one of the issues, and that the transfer of assets 
back to the estate will result in a windfall to the 
Pierces. We find no merit to any of these assertions. 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-24,120 (Reissue 2008) 
provides that the right "to recover property improp-
erly distributed or the value thereof from any dis-
tributee is forever barred at the later of (1) three 
years after the decedent's death; or (2) one year 
after the time of distribution thereof." Thus, the 
right to recover assets improperly distributed from 
the estate to the trust was forever barred at the later 
of 3 years after Esther's death or 1 year after 
Empkey distributed assets to the trust. 
As noted, Esther died on or about November 7, 
2003. Three years after her death would have been 
on or about November 7, 2006. Empkey filed a 
schedule of distribution and filed the formal peti-
tion for complete settlement of Esther's estate on 
November 4, 2005, indicating that all assets had 
been distributed from the estate prior to that date. 
As a result, it appears that the right to recover as-
sets improperly distributed from the estate would 
have been forever barred on or about November 7, 
2006. Although it is accurate to note that a formal 
motion for the return of property was filed on June 
6, 2009, which was well outside the statutory peri-
od for seeking recovery of assets improperly dis-
tributed from the estate, the record indicates that 
such formal motion was not the first filing which 
arguably impacted the recovery of the assets. 
On November 4, 2005, Empkey filed a petition 
seeking settlement of the estate and seeking approv-
al of prior distributions. In that petition, Empkey 
requested "such other orders as the law may require 
and as the Court may deem applicable and proper." 
On December 6, objections were filed to Empkey's 
petition seeking settlement of the estate and seeking 
approval of prior distributions. In those objections, 
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Lassley and the Pierces specifically alleged that as-
sets should be distributed according to a prior will, 
that the probate of the estate would need to be re-
done in its entirety, and that the court needed to 
conduct a hearing on the validity of prior wills, and 
they requested that the court award "such other and 
further relief as may be warranted by the facts and 
the evidence ." Inasmuch as Empkey had affirmat-
ively represented that all assets had already been 
distributed pursuant to the 200 I will and sought ap-
proval of those distributions, inasmuch as Lassley 
and the Pierces challenged those distributions and 
requested distribution under a different instrument, 
and inasmuch as all parties had requested the court 
to take appropriate action to achieve those requests, 
the issue of whether assets would need to be re-
turned to the estate was raised from the outset, prior 
to the expiration of the statutory period. We find no 
merit to Empkey's assertion that the issue was time 
barred. 
*4 We similarly find no merit to Empkey's as-
sertions that the parties had agreed to limit the is-
sues by way of scheduling orders or that the return 
of assets results in a windfall to the Pierces. Al-
though Empkey represents on appeal that the court 
entered "a scheduling order on February 2, 2009, 
indicating that it would only address Lassley's re-
quest to probate the 1999 will" and that the court 
entered "a scheduling order on April 10, 2009, in-
dicating that it would only address Lassley's request 
for attorney fees and the Pierces' request to remove 
Empkey and disqualify [Empkey's counsel]," our 
review of the record does not support those asser-
tions. The only orders presented to this court 
entered on those dates appear to be orders summar-
izing what was previously presented to the court at 
hearings predating those orders, and our review of 
the orders does not support Empkey's assertion on 
appeal. We also find no merit to the assertion that 
ordering that assets improperly distributed from the 
estate be returned to the estate so that they can be 
distributed properly results in a "windfall." 
(b) Attorney Fees and Costs 
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Empkey also challenges the county court's or-
der awarding attorney fees to Lassley. Empkey ar-
gues that there is no statutory authority nor is there 
an accepted course of practice authorizing attorney 
fees in a case such as this one. We disagree. 
Attorney fees and expenses may generally be 
recovered in a civil action only where provided for 
by statute or when a recognized and accepted uni-
form course of procedure has been to allow recov-
ery of attorney fees. In re Estate of Chrisp, 276 
Neb. 966, 759 N.W.2d 87 (2009). Under 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2481 (Reissue 2008), attorney 
fees are awarded to the personal representative as 
part of the administration expenses. In re Estate of 
Chrisp, supra. It has long been the rule in Nebraska 
that no allowance is authorized to be made out of 
an estate for the services of an attorney not em-
ployed by the personal representative. See In re Es-
tate of Love, 136 Neb. 458, 286 N.W. 381 (1939). 
Such an allowance is permitted, however, when the 
services provided were in the interest of all persons 
interested in the estate and were beneficial to the 
estate. Id. 
In this case, Empkey initially distributed all as-
sets of the estate to the trust pursuant to the 2001 
will. Lassley objected to Empkey's petition for final 
settlement and challenged the 2001 will as being in-
valid. Following litigation, a jury returned a verdict 
finding that the 200 I will was, indeed, invalid. As a 
result, prior to Lassley's actions, the assets of the 
estate were entirely distributed to the trust; sub-
sequent to Lassley's actions, the authority for that 
distribution to the trust was invalidated. Now, the 
court has ordered the assets of the estate be re-
stored. Clearly Lassley's action provided benefit to 
the entire estate, and we find no merit to Empkey's 
assignment of error on appeal. 
2. THE PIERCES' CROSS-APPEAL 
*5 On cross-appeal, the Pierces have asserted 
that the county court erred in granting Empkey's 
motion for protective order concerning discovery 
and erred in denying the motion to remove Empkey 
and disqualify Empkey's counsel. We find merit to 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2010 137525 (Neb.App.) 
(Cite as: 2010 WL 3137525 (Neb.App.)) 
both assignments of error. 
(a) Discovery 
First, the Pierces assert that the county court 
erred in granting Empkey's motion for protective 
order concerning discovery. Upon our review of the 
record and the court's order, we find that the court 
erred in granting the protective order. 
On March 11, 2009, the Pierces filed a notice 
of intention to serve a records subpoena on, among 
other entities, Empkey. The subpoena requested re-
corded information concerning Empkey's receipts 
and disbursements from the trust. As noted above, 
Empkey had previously transferred all assets of the 
estate to the trust pursuant to the 200 I will, which 
was later found to be an invalid will. As such, the 
Pierce's request for discovery concerned whether 
assets transferred to the trust from the estate were 
still in the trust or had been disbursed to other 
parties. 
In the county court, Empkey argued to the 
court that the protection order should be granted 
and discovery denied because any claim to recover 
improperly distributed assets was time barred under 
§ 30-24,120. In open court, the court concluded that 
"based on the wording of § 30-24,120, the Court 
will grant-or sustain the motion for protective or-
der." 
We initially note that the court's conclusion 
with respect to the prospective order appears to in-
clude a conclusion that any claim for return of 
property improperly distributed from the estate un-
der the invalid 2001 will was time barred. At the 
same time, the court's final order in this case spe-
cifically ordered the return of assets improperly dis-
tributed from the estate under the 200 I will, as 
thoroughly discussed above. Above, we concluded 
that the issue of whether assets needed to be re-
turned to the estate was timely raised by the plead-
ings of the parties. In light of that conclusion, we 
similarly conclude that § 30-24,120 does not sup-
port a conclusion that Empkey should be protected 
from discovery requests concerning receipts and 
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disbursements by the trust. As such, we reverse the 
court's order granting a protective order to Empkey 
on the basis of§ 30-24, 120. 
(b) Removal of Empkey 
The Pierces also appeal the county court's order 
that Empkey should not be removed and that her 
counsel should not be disqualified. The court found 
that there was no evidence of malfeasance on the 
part of Empkey or her counsel and that there was 
no evidence to establish a conflict of interest. We 
disagree. 
In this case, Empkey is serving in two capacit-
ies. First, she is the personal representative repres-
enting the best interests of the estate and its heirs. 
Second, she is the trustee representing the best in-
terests of the trust. Pursuant to the 200 l will, 
Empkey, as personal representative of the estate, 
transferred all assets of the estate to the trust. The 
200 I will, and transfer of assets pursuant to it, have 
been declared invalid. As a result, Empkey is now 
serving in two roles that have directly conflicting 
interests. 
*6 As personal representative, Empkey's oblig-
ation should be to accumulate and preserve the es-
tate for proper distribution to the parties entitled to 
distribution. As trustee, Empkey's obligation should 
be to attempt to preserve the trust for proper distri-
bution to the parties entitled to distribution. Inas-
much as all assets of the estate have been trans-
ferred to the trust, this means that Empkey now has 
one role that requires her to seek the return of im-
properly distributed assets and another role that re-
quires her to simultaneously resist the return of the 
same assets. 
In its order, the county court cited 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-3862 (Reissue 2008), concern-
ing statutory grounds for removal of a trustee, in 
concluding that Empkey should not be removed. 
Part of the confusion in the record in this case ap-
pears to arise from the court's simultaneously con-
ducting proceedings related to the estate and pro-
ceedings related to the trust, but the appeal to this 
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court is from the estate proceeding. As such, we are 
concerned with whether Empkey should have been 
removed from her role as personal representative. 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2454 (Reissue 2008) 
provides that cause for removal of a personal rep-
resentative exists when, among other factors, re-
moval of the personal representative would be in 
the best interests of the estate or it is shown that the 
personal representative has become incapable of 
discharging the duties of her office. In this case, it 
is apparent that the best interests of the estate 
would be served by not having the personal repres-
entative simultaneously serving as trustee of the 
trust and resisting the return of assets to the estate 
for proper distribution. Similarly, it is apparent that 
Empkey's dual capacities make her incapable of 
discharging her duties as both personal representat-
ive and trustee. 
As such, we conclude that the county court 
erred in not ordering Empkey's removal as personal 
representative. We reverse the county court's order 
failing to remove Empkey as personal representat-
ive. We find no need to further address the propri-
ety of Empkey's counsel continuing to represent her 
as trustee. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the county court's order that assets 
improperly distributed from the estate to the trust 
be returned and the court's order that Lassley was 
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee and costs for 
successfully challenging the 2001 will. We find that 
Empkey's dual roles as personal representative and 
trustee have become directly at odds with each oth-
er, and we reverse the court's order granting 
Empkey's request for protective order and refusing 
to remove Empkey as personal representative. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART RE-
VERSED. 
N eb.App.,2010. 
In re Estate of Crawford 
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2010 WL 3137525 
(Neb.App.) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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both present telephonic. If not resolution need to schedule for trial. 
Questions if State is aware of anv resolution? 
H&W No resolution. HearinQ is necessarv. 
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Ct Featherston? 
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mediate. 
Ct State? 
H&W PTC not necessary. Familiar with issues. 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Decedent, Melvin Peterson, was born and died March 3, 2007, 
at the age of 83. 
2. On December 5, 2001, Melvin Peterson, conveyed real property in Moyie Springs, 
Idaho, theretofore owned by him, to Cathie Peterson, by Gift Deed, retaining a life estate. A true 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S REQUESTED FINDINGS 
OFF ACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 1 
Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\ WCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\PleadingslPR Req Findings and Conclusions. wpd 
and correct copy of said Gift Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
3. Melvin Peterson remained seised of the life estate until the time of his death. 
4. The State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, has an allowed claim for 
Medicaid recovery pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218, against the estate of Melvin Peterson, in the 
sum of$171,386.94. 
5. Cathie Peterson remains in possession of the real property described in Exhibit 
"A." 
II. 
REQUESTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6. This is a probate proceeding governed by the Idaho Probate Code and Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, and the court has in rem jurisdiction over the property of the estate and, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 15-3-105, has exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how 
decedents' estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended and 
distributed. 
7. The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin Peterson, is an 
asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 56-218(4). 
8. Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson the moment 
before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been determined pursuant to 
IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market value. The life estate factor of .38642 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S REQUESTED FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - 2 
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of the fair market value of the real property is the appropriate valuation of the estate's interest in 
the real property gifted to Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001. 
9. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a 38.642% 
undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A." 
10. The personal representative has authority to bring an action to partition real 
property in which the estate has an interest, including the undivided interest in the real property 
described in Exhibit "A," pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703 and 15-3-715(6) and (8). 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2011, 
it/~ ><t:: 
W ~OCARiWRrGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
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GIFT DEED 20421.8 
IN CONSIDERATION oflove and affection, and in addition, in consideration of the aid 
and assistance grantee bas give grantor in the care and maintenance of grantor and the property 
hereinafter descnbed without thought or request for remuneration of any type or kind 
whatsoever, MEL VIN PETERSON, a single person, grantor, does hereby give, grant, alien, 
convey and confinn unto CATHIE PETERSON, a single person, grantee, whose address is 
p.o. r2ax y.401, 7 motl\.L ·~r.in~4) ~~~45-theproperlydescribedasfollows: 
Tax #5, being pait of LOt Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs Townsite and descn"bed as · 
:tbllows: · 
Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2). Moyie Springs Townsite; 
thence West along the North Line of Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 feet to a point; thence 
Southwesterly along Moyie Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; thence South 63 feet to a 
point; thence East 95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5; thence North 125 k to the 
POINT OF BEGINNING. 
RESERVING UNTO GRANTOR A LIFE ESTATE IN SAID PROPERTY. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the said premises with the appurtenances unto the grantee, 
its heirs and assigns forever. And the grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said grantee 
that it is the owner in fee simple of said premises and that they are free from all encwnbrances 
and that it will WARRANT and DEFEND the same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
D,ATEDthis 5~ dayof~,2001. 
 
Melvin Peterson 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS 
County ofBotmdary ) 
.. On. th.is 5_ day of D.ece1'711u.r. 2001, before me, the undersigned Notary Public, personally 
appeared MEL VIN PETERSON, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscn"bed to the 
wi1hin inslrument 8lld acknowledged to me that he/she """"'*<I 1he ...._ ~
\\\Ulllf /// I ¢4p};ff.t. . ;)1.i.k-= 
,,,~,1,J. M. t/; 11,,, Notary cfor :::ID-a..Vl~ 
~'~er;.•••••. 0~~''-" CamnissiooExpires: 3· 13 ·.;;;>CD:;i_ " .. .. , ..... . ..io•&~ • '-:: ..... ,,..,,,.,, ·.• ~ - . -... . _. - . -·- . -. 
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A 
STATE OF IDAHO. } 
County of BoUDdary SS • 
~for J:eCOrd at the request ot r~~N Lou1 E1ern 
on \.Q.' ?.CO 1 at :.I. and recorded in 
Boek I Y Lp of Instruments on page $12'0 
Diane M. Cartwright n , _ . ~ 
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Case No. CV-2007-266 
CLOSING BRIEF 
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, a claimant and 
successor personal representative herein (hereinafter, the "Department"), and submits the 
following written closing argument: 
I. 
GOVERNING LAW 
Medicaid is a means tested public welfare program. It has always been intended to be the 
payer oflast resort. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 
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291, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 1767 (2006). Where long term care services for the elderly are concerned, 
federal law requires the states to recover the assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their 
estates, to help defray the cost of the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). The assets 
to be recovered include the Medicaid recipient's probate estate, plus, at the option of the state, 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title 
or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). Idaho 
has adopted this so-called "expanded definition of estate" almost verbatim in Idaho Code§ 56-
218(4)(b). The court has previously determined that the life estate retained by Melvin Peterson is 
an asset of his estate by virtue of these sections. Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim 
( 6/12/2008). 
The value of the life estate is calculated by tables found in the Department's Rules 
governing Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled ("AABD") codified at IDAPA 16.03.05.837. 
The most current version of these rules can be found online at: 
http://adm.idaho.gov/adminrules/rules/idapa16/0305.pdf. A complete set of all changes made to 
these rules from January, 2001, to the present, is attached to this brief as Appendix "A." While 
the language has changed from time to time, the values given in the tables themselves have not 
changed. The purpose of the rules, to value life estates and remainder interests of Medicaid 
recipients, has also remained unchanged. 1 The Department's rules have the same force and effect 
1 At times, only the life estate table is given, and at other times, such as more recently, there are two tables, one 
for life estates and the other for the remainder interests. The remainder table is simply the inverse (1-x) of the life estate 
table and so can easily be calculated from the life estate table when that is all that is given. 
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3Sct 
as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004). The Department's life 
estate tables were adopted from, and contain the same values, as are in the Social Security 
Program Operations Manual. The most up-to-date version of this manual is found online at: 
https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501140120. These tables are used, just as the 
Department's tables are used, to value life estates and remainder interests of Social Security 
recipients. The Life Estate Remainder Table is also attached to Cathie Peterson's Exhibit 5, 
offered by Cathie Peterson and accepted into evidence without qualification in this matter. 
The value of the life estate interest, therefore, is the ratio given in the life estate tables. 
For a person 83 years of age at death, the ratio is .38642 of the fair market value of the real 
property.2 
II. 
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Department has requested the following findings of fact: 
1. The Decedent, Melvin Peterson, was bor  and died March 3, 2007, 
at the age of 83. 
2. On December 5, 2001, Melvin Peterson, conveyed real property in Moyie Springs, 
Idaho, theretofore owned by him, to Cathie Peterson, by Gift Deed, retaining a life estate. 
3. Melvin Peterson remained seised of the life estate until the time of his death. 
2While this matter has been pending, the real estate market has both risen and fallen. While property should be 
inventoried at its value at the time of death (Idaho Code§ 15-3-706), that value may change for various reasons during 
administration which can either increase or decrease the value of the estate. In this case, it is sufficient to establish the 
value of the life estate as a proportion of the fair market value of the whole, similar to an undivided interest in real 
property. This provides for an appropriate allocation of both the costs of sale - or of maintaining the property - and the 
rents and profits payable from the property. 
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4. The State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, has an allowed claim for 
Medicaid recovery pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218, against the estate of Melvin Peterson, in the 
sum of$171,386.94. 
5. Cathie Peterson remains in possession of the real property. 
To the best of the notes and recollection of the undersigned, Cathie Peterson testified to 
numbers 1, 2, 3, and 5, during her testimony at the hearing. Requested Finding of Fact number 4 
is provided by the court record: Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim, April 
4, 2008. 
III. 
REQUESTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Department has requested the following conclusions of law. Each of these requested 
conclusions is discussed, in turn, below: 
1. This is a probate proceeding governed by the Idaho Probate Code 
and Idaho Code§ 56-218, and the court has in rem jurisdiction over the property 
of the estate and, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-105, has exclusive jurisdiction of 
formal proceedings to determine how decedents ' estates are to be administered, 
expended and distributed 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-105 provides as follows: 
Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for 
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this chapter, and may 
petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within the court's jurisdiction 
including but not limited to those described in this chapter. The court has 
exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how decedents' estates 
subject to the laws of this state are to be administered. expended and distributed. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-105 (underline added). In Connolly v. Probate Court in and/or Kootenai 
County, 25 Idaho 35, 136 P. 205 (1913) the court explained: 
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It is elementary that probate proceeding by which jurisdiction of a probate court is 
asserted over the estate of a decedent for the purpose of administering the same is 
in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and is therefore one as to which all the world 
is charged with notice. 
Connolly, 25 Idaho at_, 136 P. at 207, quoting Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 29 S.Ct. 580 
(1909). Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over the assets of this estate, including those assets 
in the possession of Cathie Peterson, and over the controversy in determining how the assets of 
the estate are to be administered. 
2. The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin 
Peterson, is an asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid 
recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). 
The value of the life estate is determined the moment before death. As stated in the case 
of In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005): 
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at 
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In 
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding "the phrase 'at the 
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's 
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of 
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real 
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)( c ). 
In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Any other interpretation would make the life 
estate language in Idaho Code § 56-218( 4 )(b) a nullity. The court, of course, will not give a 
statute an interpretation which would render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 
P.3d 116, 121 (App. 2001). This court previously determined that the life estate is an asset of 
this estate by its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim (06/12/2008). In doing so, the 
court approved the decisions of the 2nd Judicial District Magistrate Gaskill in the case of Jn re 
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Estate of Grothe, Nez Perce County No. CV 02-02163 (copy attached to Brief in Support of 
Petition to Require Payment of Claim, filed May 5, 2008). 
3. Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson 
the moment before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been 
determined pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market 
value. The life estate factor of.38642 of the fair market value of the real property 
is the appropriate valuation of the estate 's interest in the real property gifted to 
Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001. 
See Life Estate Tables found at IDAPA 16.03.05.837. Cathie Peterson, herself, offered 
the life estate tables into evidence as part of her Exhibit 5, and did not offer any other method of 
calculating the life estate value. 
4. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a 
38.642% undivided interest in the real property. 
Since, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b), the life estate retained by Melvin Peterson 
did not terminate at the time of his death for purposes of Medicaid recovery, the estate is 
effectively the owner of 38.642% undivided interest in the real property. 
5. The personal representative has authority to bring an action to 
partition real property in which the estate has an interest, including the undivided 
interest that was the life estate interest in the subject real property pursuant to 
Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703 and 15-3-715(6) and (8). 
Idaho Code § 15-3-703 establishes the general duties of the personal representative, 
including the ability to sue on behalf of the estate: 
(a) * * *A personal representative is under a duty to settle and 
distribute the estate of the decedent ... as expeditiously and efficiently as is 
consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred 
upon him by this code, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings 
to which he is party for the best interests of successors to the estate. 
* * * 
( c) Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the 
decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at his 
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death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and the 
courts of any other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-703. This authority specifically includes the authority to partition real 
property of the estate: 
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a 
formal proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in section 15-3-902 of this 
code, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested 
persons, may properly: 
* * * 
( 6) Acquire or dispose of an asset, including land in this or another 
state, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale; and manage, develop, 
improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset; 
* * * 
(8) Subdivide, develop or dedicate land to public use; make or obtain 
the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries; or adjust differences in valuation on 
exchange or partition by giving or receiving considerations; or dedicate easements 
to public use without consideration; 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-715 (underline added). 
IV. 
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR GRANTING CATHIE 
PETERSON A CREDIT FOR THE EXPENSES OF 
MAINTAINING THE REAL PROPERTY. 
At the hearing of this matter, Cathie Peterson testified of the expenses she incurred while 
maintaining the real property. These expenses were mostly in the nature of ordinary maintenance 
and upkeep and included replacing the front door and garage door, repairing the furnace and 
replacing the windows. Presumably, she believes she may be entitled to an equitable offset for 
the expenses she has incurred. At the same time, she agreed that she has never paid rent for her 
occupying the real property. She testified that Melvin Peterson went into the nursing home 
shortly after the gift deed was executed in 2001. Therefore, she occupied the home alone until 
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his death in 2007. Cathie Peterson has not demonstrated that she would be entitled to any sort of 
equitable offset in this case. 
It is hornbook law that the holder of a life estate is entitled to the rents and profits of the 
real property during his life: 
The rents received from real estate during the existence of a life estate 
belong to a legal life tenant or constitute income to which an equitable life 
beneficiary of a trust is entitled. The rents from real property are the very interest 
which a life tenant acquires in the property. and in them a remainderman has no 
interest during the existence or duration of the life tenancy. 
AmJur Life§ 147 (Thomson Reuters, 2011) (underline added). In this case, Melvin Peterson 
was the life tenant and entitled to receive rent from Cathie Peterson while she occupied the real 
property during his life. After his death, the estate succeeded to his life estate interest and was 
entitled to receive rent from Cathie Peterson for its proportion of interest in the real property. No 
such rent was ever paid, nor has Cathie Peterson showed that the amounts she paid to maintain 
the property were in excess of what that rent should have been. 
Moreover, Cathie Peterson would not be entitled to repayment of her expenses. The 
measure of her reimbursement right in equity (if it existed at all under the circumstances) would 
be the increase in value of the real property that resulted from her "improvements." See e.g. 
Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974) (measure of damages under the equitable 
doctrine of quasi-contract was not the value of the money and materials supplied, but the 
increased value of the property due to the contribution). Cathie Peterson could not testify that 
her maintenance expenditures had increased the value of the real property. 




The court should enter the findings of facts and conclusions of law requested by the 
Department. The estate should be found to be owner of an undivided 38.642% interest in the real 
property, without any offset for maintenance by Cathie Peterson. 
DATED this 1st day of November, 2011, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd. 
Attorneys at Law 
113 South Second A venue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
John A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
Attorneys at Law 
Old Power House Building 
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
DATED this J_ day of November, 2011. 
~Vk-~ 
CLOSING BRIEF - 9 Y:\MReases\Estate\ wee\ wee Open eases\PetersonMelvin\Pleadings\elosing Brief. wpd 
IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN 
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled 
Docket No. 16-0305-0101 
Temporary and Proposed Rule 
04. Income. Monthly income must not exceed two hundred percent (200%) of the one (1) person 
official poverty line defined by the OMB. (7-1-99) 
05. Resources . The resource limit is four thousand dollars ($4,000). (7-1-99) 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
831. ASSET TRANSFER FOR LESS THAN FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
Starting August 11, 1993, the participant is subject to a penalty if he transfers his income or resources for less than 
fair market value. The asset transfer penalty applies to Medicaid services received October 1, 1993 and later. 
Excluded resources, other than the home and associated property, are not subject to the asset transfer penalty. The 
asset transfer penalty applies to a Medicaid participant in long-term care or HCBS. A participant in long-term care is 
a patient in a nursing facility or a patient in a medical institution, requiring and receiving the level of care provided in 
a nursing facility. ( 4-5-00) 
!U.. Rebuttab!e Presumption. Unless a transfer meets the requirements of Section 840. there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the transfer was made for the purpose of qualizying for Medicaid. The asset transfer 
penalty applies unless the participant shows that the asset transfer would not have affected his eligibility for 
Medicaid. ( 11-1-00)T 
.!l.2.. Contract for Services Provided by a Re!atjye. A contract for personal services to be furnished to 
the participant by a relative is presumed to be made for the purpose of QJJalifying for Medicaid. The asset transfer 
penalty applies unless the participant shows that: {11-1-00)T 
.ili A written contract for personal services was signed before services were delivered. The contract 
must require that payment be made after services are rendered. The contract must be dated and the signatures 
notarized. Either party must be able to terminate the contract: and (11-1-00)T 
Q, The contract must be signed by the participant or a legally authorized representative through a 
power of attorney. legal guardianship or conservatorship. A representative who signs the contract must not be the 
provider of the personal care services under the contract: and (11-1-00)T 
~ Compensation for services rendered must be comparable to rates paid in the open market. 
(11-J-OO)T 
O+l. Transfer Of Income Or Resources. Transfer of income or resources includes reducing or 
eliminating the participant's ownership or control of the asset. ( 4-5-00) 
O~. Transfer Of Income Or Resources By A Spouse. A transfer by the participant's spouse of either 
spouse's income or resources, before eligibility is established, subjects the participant to the asset transfer penalty. 
After the participant's eligibility is established, a transfer by the spouse of the spouse's own income or resources does 
not subject the participant to the asset transfer penalty. (4-5-00) 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
837. LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
Conditions for determining if a life estate m· tm amiuity a1-e lli an asset transfer for less than fair market value are 
listed in Subsectioll9 837.01 thlBtiigh 837.05. The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be 
made for the purpose of qualizying for Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the 
purchase of the annuity would not have affected his eligibility for Medicaid or. the payment from the annuity is not 
greater than necessary to meet the reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. He must also show that 
the annuity meets the conditions in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. (7 1 9$9(11-1-00)T 
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01. Life Estate . A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the 
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the 
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant' s age at the time of transfei: The 1emaimiet· fiolet<31 J<o1· the 
pttt·tieiptmt's age is listed in Table 837. {)}. the followin& table : 
Y,f;?, 
~~"~ ~i~;-:;::;~ .. ~ ~~~ TABLE 837.01 • LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE . 
; 
.Life Ea tat• Ufe Estate .U.Eatad• Llfi.Eatate Age 
~me!Qder ~ 
Age 
Remainder Afle Remalnder I ~ 
Age Remelnder . ' 
0 .02812 1 .01012 2 .00983 3 .00922 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .024!0 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
32 .05.058 33 .05.392 34 .05.750 35 .06132 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 39 .07917 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 43 .10145 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 47 .12863 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 51 .16126 
52 .17031 53 .17972 54 .18946 55 .19954 
56 .20994 57 .22069 58 .23178 59 .24325 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 63 .29304 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 67 .34902 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 71 .41086 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 75 .47851 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 79 .54643 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 83 .61358 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 87 .67738 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 91 .73045 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 95 .77113 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 99 .79514 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 103 .81563 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 107 .86591 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
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(7 I 9>'.)(11-1-00)T 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market 
value. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual interest tests listed 
in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty is the difference between the 
actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month look-back applies. (7-1-99) 
03. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the 
following table. must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table. use the next 
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1l 11.24 14.06 I~- l.lli! lfil. LJ.2. 
1l 10.67 13.40 11!! 1.14 Ll2 
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04. Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least 
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five 
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must 
show single premium annuities are not offered by insurers now, or when the annuity was purchased. Insurers must be 
rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co. (4-5-00) 
05. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of 
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value. (7-1-99) 
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833. ASSET TRANSFER LOOK-BACK. 
The asset transfer penalty applies to transfers in a thirty-six (36) month look-back period. The look-back period is 
sixty (60) months for transfers to or from a trust. (7-1-99) 
01. Look-Back For A Person Entitled To Medicaid . The look-back period begins the month long-
term care or HCBS starts for a person entitled to Medicaid. A person "entitled to Medicaid" is receiving or applying 
for Medicaid when long-term care or HCBS starts. The person would be eligible for the month of application or any 
of the three (3) calendar months before it, if not for the asset transfer penalty. (7-1-99) 
02. Look-Back For A Person Not Entitled To Medicaid . The look-back period begins the month 
before the application month for a person not entitled to Medicaid when long-term care starts. (7-1-99) 
834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the unpaid asset value by the 
statewide average cost ofnursing facility services to a private patient of nursing facility services or HCBS. The cost is 
computed for the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-
term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse. 
(7-1-99) 
835. CALCULATING THE PENALTY PERIOD. 
If the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care, there is no penalty. The penalty period begins 
running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the penalty 
months . Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse gets all the assets back, gets adequate 
consideration for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or not the 
participant is in long-term care. (7-1-99) 
01. Single Penalty Period. A period of restricted coverage ends the last day of the last full month of 
the penalty period. A partial month at the end of a single penalty period is dropped. (7-1-99) 
02. Consecutive Penalty Periods. Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is 
a penalty month. A partial month at the end of consecutive penalty periods is dropped. (7-1-99) 
836. MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY. 
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One penalty period must expire before the next begins. (7-1-99) 
837. LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
Conditions for determining if a life estate is an asset transfer for less than fair market value are listed in Subsection 
837.01 . The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for 
Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the purchase of the annuity would not have 
affected his eligibility for Medicaid or, the payment from the annuity is not greater than necessary to meet the 
reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. He must also show that the annuity meets the conditions in 
Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. (11-1-00)T 
01. Life Estate. A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the 
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the 
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table: 
TABLE 837.01 - LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABL.fi 
Age Ufe &i.te Ufe&tilM Rern1l.ndtr Remainder 
0 .02812 .01012 2 .00983 3 .00922 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
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12 .01671 13 .01802 
16 .02185 17 .02300 
20 .02635 21 .02755 
24 .03159 25 .03322 
28 .03938 29 .04187 
32 .05.058 33 .05.392 
36 .06540 37 .06974 
40 .08429 41 .08970 
44 .! 0779 45 .11442 
48 .13626 49 .14422 
52 .17031 53 .17972 
56 .20994 57 .22069 
60 .25509 61 .26733 
64 .30648 65 .32030 
68 .36390 69 .37914 
72 .42739 73 .44429 
76 .49559 77 .51258 
80 .56341 81 .58033 
84 .63002 85 .64641 
88 .69141 89 .70474 
92 .74229 93 .75308 
96 .77819 97 .78450 
100 .80025 101 .80468 
104 .82144 105 .83038 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
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14 .01934 15 .02063 
18 .02410 19 .02520 
22 .02880 23 .03014 
26 .03505 27 .03710 
30 .04457 31 .04746 
34 .05.750 35 .06132 
38 .07433 39 .07917 
42 .09543 43 .10145 
46 .12137 47 .12863 
50 .15257 51 .16126 
54 .18946 55 .19954 
58 .23178 59 .24325 
62 .27998 63 .29304 
66 .33449 67 .34902 
70 .39478 71 .41086 
74 .46138 75 .47851 
78 .52951 79 .54643 
82 .59705 83 .61358 
86 .66236 87 .67738 
90 .71779 91 .73045 
94 .76272 95 .77113 
98 .79000 99 .79514 
102 .80946 103 .81563 
106 .84512 107 .86591 
l 1 l-l-00) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market 
value. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual interest tests listed 
in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty is the difference between the 
actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month look-back applies. (7-1-99) 
03. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
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0 73 .26 79.26 
10 64.03 69.93 
20 54.41 60.13 
30 45.14 50.43 
40 35.94 40.86 
50 27.13 31.61 
60 19.07 22.99 
61 18.33 22.18 
62 17.60 21.38 
63 16.89 20 .60 
64 16.19 19.82 
65 15.52 19.06 
66 14.86 18.31 
67 14.23 17.58 
68 13 .61 16.85 
69 13.00 16.14 
70 12.41 15.44 
71 11.82 14.75 
72 11.24 14.06 
73 10.67 13.40 
I• 
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74 10.12 12.74 
75 9.58 12.09 
76 9.06 11.46 
77 8.56 10.85 
78 8.07 10.25 
79 7.61 9.67 
80 7.16 9.11 
81 6.72 8.57 
82 6.31 8.04 
83 5.92 7.54 
84 5.55 7.05 
85 5.20 6.59 
86 4.86 6.15 
87 4.55 5.74 
88 4.26 5.34 
89 3.98 4.97 
90 3.73 4.63 
95 2.71 3.26 
100 2.05 2.39 
llO 1.14 1.22 
(11-1-00)T 
04. Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least 
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five 
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must 
show single premium annuities are not offered by insurers now, or when the annuity was purchased. Insurers must be 
rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co. (4-5-00) 
05. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of 
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value. (7-1-99) 
838. TRUSTS AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or 
after August 11 , 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust 
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust. (7-1-99) 
839. TRANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET. 
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant. 
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of 
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible 
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832. MEDICAID PENALTY FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The asset transfer penalty is restricted Medicaid coverage. (7-1-99) 
01. Restricted Coverage. Restricted coverage means Medicaid will not participate in the cost of 
nursing facility services. Medicaid will not participate in a level of care in a medical institution equal to nursing 
facility services. The penalty for a person receiving PCS or community services under the HCBS waiver is 
ineligibility. (7-1-99) 
02. Notice And Exemption. The participant must be notified, in writing, at least ten (10) days before 
an asset transfer penalty is imposed. (7-1-99) 
833. ASSET TRANSFER LOOK-BACK. 
The asset transfer penalty applies to transfers in a thirty-six (36) month look-back period. The look-back period is 
sixty (60) months for transfers to or from a trust. (7-1-99) 
01. Look-Back For A Person Entitled To Medicaid. The look-back period begins the month long-
term care or HCBS starts for a person entitled to Medicaid. A person "entitled to Medicaid" is receiving or applying 
for Medicaid when long-term care or HCBS starts. The person would be eligible for the month of application or any 
of the three (3) calendar months before it, ifnot for the asset transfer penalty. (7-1-99) 
02. Look-Back For A Person Not Entitled To Medicaid. The look-back period begins the month 
before the application month for a person not entitled to Medicaid when long-term care starts. (7-1-99) 
834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the unpaid asset value by the 
statewide average cost of nursing facility services to a private patient of nursing facility services or HCBS. The cost is 
computed for the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-
term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse. 
(7-1-99) 
835. CALCULATING THE PENALTY PERIOD. 
If the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care, there is no penalty. The penalty period begins 
running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (I) of the penalty 
months. Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse gets all the assets back, gets adequate 
consideration for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or not the 
participant is in long-term care. (7-1-99) 
01. Single Penalty Period. A period of restricted coverage ends the last day of the last full month of 
the penalty period. A partial month at the end of a single penalty period is dropped. (7-1-99) 
02. Consecutive Penalty Periods. Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is 
a penalty month. A partial month at the end of consecutive penalty periods is dropped. (7-1-99) 
836. MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY. 
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One penalty period must expire before the next begins. (7-1-99) 
837. LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
Conditions for determining if a life estate is an asset transfer for less than fair market value are listed in Subsection 
837.01. The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for 
Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the purchase of the annuity would not have 
affected his eligibility for Medicaid or, the payment from the annuity is not greater than necessary to meet the 
reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. He must also show that the annuity meets the conditions in 
Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. (3-15-02) 
01. Life Estate. A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the 
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the 
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table: 
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Age Remainder Remainder Remainder ~ Remainder - " l 
0 .02812 1 .01012 2 .00983 3 .00922 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01 802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
32 .05.058 33 .05.392 34 .05.750 35 .06132 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 39 .07917 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 43 .10145 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 47 .12863 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 51 .16126 
52 .17031 53 .17972 54 .18946 55 .19954 
56 .20994 57 .22069 58 .23178 59 .24325 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 63 .29304 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 67 .34902 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 71 .41086 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 75 .47851 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 79 .54643 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 83 .61358 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 87 .67738 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 91 .73045 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 95 .77113 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 99 .79514 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 103 .81563 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 107 .86591 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
(3-15-02) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market 
value. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual interest tests listed 
in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty is the difference between the 
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actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month look-back applies. (7-1-99) 
03. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
1 -· ~~ ·''"". TABLE 837.03 tfl'~ EXPECTANCY l'ABLE -···;,~~~~ 
... --
I I ~ 
r 
'° Years of Life Years of life , Years at Ute Years of Life 




0 73.26 79.26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64.03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27.13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21.38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11.82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
72 11.24 14.06 100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
(3-15-02) 
04. Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least 
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five 
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must 
show single premium annuities are not offered by insurers now, or when the annuity was purchased. Insurers must be 
rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co. ( 4-5-00) 
05. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of 
Page 75 
IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Health & Welfare, Division of Welfare 
IDAPA 16.03.05 - Rules Governing Eligibility for 
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD) 
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value. (7-1-99) 
838. TRUSTS AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or 
after August 11, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust 
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust. (7-1-99) 
839. TRANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET. 
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant. 
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of 
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible 
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and 
spouse. (7-1-99) 
840. PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A participant or spouse who meets a condition in Subsections 840.01 through 840.15 is not subject to the asset 
transfer penalty. (7-1-99) 
spouse. 
01. Home To Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the 
(7-1-99) 
02. Home To Minor Child Or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the 
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind 
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
03. Home To Brother Or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred 
to a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred 
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the 
participant starts long-term care. (7-1-99) 
04. Home To Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son 
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must 
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The 
son or daughter must have provided care to the participant which permitted him to live at home rather than enter long-
term care. (7-1-99) 
05. Benefit Of Spouse. The assets were transferred to the participant's spouse or to another person for 
the sole benefit of the spouse. (7-1-99) 
06. Transfer From Spouse. The assets were transferred from the participant's spouse to another 
person for the sole benefit of the participant's spouse. (7-1-99) 
07. Transfer To Child. The assets were transferred to the participant's child, or to a trust established 
solely for the benefit of the participant's child. The child must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security and 
SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. The child may be any age. (7-1-99) 
08. Transfer To Trust For Person Under Age Sixty-Five. The assets were transferred to a trust for the 
sole benefit of a person under age sixty-five (65). "Sole benefit" means any remainder in the trust after the person's 
death must go to his estate, not to another person. The person must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security 
and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
09. Intent To Get Fair Market Value. The participant or spouse proves he intended to dispose of the 
assets at fair market value or for other adequate consideration. (7-1-99) 
10. 
participant. 
Assets Returned. All assets transferred for less than fair market value have been returned to the 
(7-1-99) 
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asset transfer penalty applies to a Medicaid participant in long-term care or HCBS. A participant in long-term care is 
a patient in a nursing facility or a patient in a medical institution, requiring and receiving the level of care provided in 
a nursing facility. (4 5 00)(7- l-02lT 
01. Rebuttable Presumption. Unless a transfer meets the requirements of Section 840 of these rules, 
H?c1c is a 1'Ch1>1lahlcp1'C8mwptie11 it is presumed that the transfer was made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. 
The asset transfer penalty lli applies.Q unless the participant shows that the asset transfer would not have affected his 
eligibility for Medicaid or the transfer was made for another pumose than quali:tying for Medicaid . 
(3 15 0:2)(7- l-02)T 
02. Contract for Services Provided by a Relative. A contract for personal services to be furnished to 
the participant by a relative is presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. The asset transfer 
penalty applies unless the participant shows that: (3-15-02) 
a. A written contract for personal services was signed before services were delivered. The contract 
must require that payment be made after services are rendered. The contract must be dated and the signatures 
notarized. Either party must be able to terminate the contract; and (3-15-02) 
b. The contract must be signed by the participant or a legally authorized representative through a 
power of attorney, legal guardianship or conservatorship. A representative who signs the contract must not be the 
provider of the personal care services under the contract; and (3-15-02) 
c. Compensation for services rendered must be comparable to rates paid in the open market. 
(3-15-02) 
03. Transfer Of Income Or Resources. Transfer of income or resources includes reducing or 
eliminating the participant's ownership or control of the asset (4-5-00) 
04. Transfer Of Income Or Resources By A Spouse. A transfer by the participant's spouse of either 
spouse's income or resources, before eligibility is established, subjects the participant to the asset transfer penalty. 
After the participant's eligibility is established, a transfer by the spouse of the spouse's own income or resources does 
not subject the participant to the asset transfer penalty. (4-5-00) 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
837. LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
Conditions for determining if a life estate is an asset transfer for less than fair market value are listed in Subsection 
837.01 of this rule. The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be made for the purpose of 
qualifying for Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the purchase of the annuity 
would not have affected his eligibility for Medicaid or, the payment from the annuity is not greater than necessary to 
meet the reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. For the purposes of Section 837. the reasonable 
and ordinary monthly needs are those defined by the maximum community spouse allowance at Section 725 of these 
rules. He The participant must also show that the annuity meets the conditions in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04 of 
~. (3 15 0:2)(7-l-02)T 
01. Life Estate. A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the 
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the 






IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE BULLETIN 
Life Estate 
Remainder 
.01012 2 .00983 3 .00922 
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TABLE 837.01 - LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE .1~ ... 
Age 
Life Estate I Age Ute Estate Age Life Est.ate. I Age Ute Estate Remainder Remainder Remainder Remainder - · -·- ----.. ·-· 4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .Oll78 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
32 .05.058 33 .05.392 34 .05.750 35 .06132 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 39 .07917 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 43 .10145 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 47 .12863 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 51 .16126 
52 .I 7031 53 .I 7972 54 .18946 55 .19954 
56 .20994 57 .22069 58 .23178 59 .24325 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 63 .29304 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 67 .34902 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 71 .41086 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 75 .47851 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 79 .54643 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 83 .61358 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 87 .67738 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 91 .73045 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 95 .77II3 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 99 .79514 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 103 .81563 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 107 .86591 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
(3-15-02) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market 
value to the participant. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual 
interest tests listed in Subsections 837.03 and 837 .04 of this rule. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty 
is the difference between the actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month 
look-back applies. (7 1 99)C7- l-02)T 
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03. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
I ·'" "'J~! TABLE·837 .03 - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABU: -~ .;• ,--i:!J"lr j~: -.... •,;,, :· 
!~-
: 
Yeara of Life Yeara ofUfe Years of Life Years of l:Jfe 
Age Remaining RemalnJng I Age Remaining Remalhlng 
Male Female Male Female 
'• . ~· ···-· -
0 73.26 79 .26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64 .03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27.13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21.38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11 .82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
72 11.24 14.06 100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
(3-15-02) 
04. Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least 
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test if the average yearly rate for the most recent five 
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must 
show 1bfil single premium annuities tue were not offered by insurers tfflW;-ffl' when the annuity was purchased and it 
would not be practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. Insurers must be rated excellent or 
superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co. (4 5 Oli)C7- I-02)T 
05. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of 
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value. (7-1-99) 
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02. L88li Bae!< fat tt .'1e:rs81r JV·Bt Entitled 18 Metiieaiti. The leek hack pcried begins the menth hcferc 
the dpplictttie11 me1ith Jif>r tt pcrse11 11et entitled te },/ediettid when l-e1ig tel'fll care sta1·ts. Transfers On or After 
February 8. 2006. Any asset transferred on or after February 8. 2006. regardless of type. is subject to a look-back 
period of sixty (60) months. The look-back period is counted from the date of the application for long-term care or 
HCBS services or the date of the transfer. whichever is later in time. (7 l 99)(2-8-06)T 
834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the t>rtpttid ttSSet uncompensated 
value of the transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to a private patient§. &jnNrsing 
fc;cility sen;ices er HCB8. The cost is computed for the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If 
the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided 
between the participant and spouse. (7 l 90(2-8-06)T 
835. CALCb'l::zATL''l€APPLYING THE PENALTY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE. 
lfthe ttme'tt1it trtmsjel'f'Cd is less tha11 the cest efmie (1) me11th s cttt'C, there is ne penalty. The penttllyperied hegi1is 
r'ttm1ing the menni nie trtmsfer teek plttce. The menni nic transfer teek plttcc is ceimted as enc (}) ef the pe11ttlty 
l'lfffflths..: Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse gets recovers all the assets, hack, gets ttdeq'ttttte 
emiside1·dtien receives fair market value for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty 
continues whether or not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as 
follows: (7 1 99)(2-8-06)T 
01. 8ingk Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8. 2006. A peried &j 1'Cstrictcd ceve1wge 
ends nie last day offfle lastf'ttll menffl ofthepcnttllypcried. For assets transferred prior to February 8. 2006, there is 
no penalty ifthe amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care. The penalty period begins running 
the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the penalty months. A 
penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins. Each partial month 
before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of tt-Sfflglc consecutive 
penalty period§. is dropped. (7 l 90(2-8-06)T 
02. CBnsec1di~e Penalty Periods for Transfers On or After February 8. 2006. Each ptt1'fittl menni 
hefere the end e.f censecutive penalty pcrieds is tt penalty menni. A partial l'litmth at nie end of censec'ttti"le pe11alty 
paieda is drepped. For assets transferred on or after February 8. 2006. the penalty period begins running the first day 
of the month after the month the transfer took place. or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term 
care services. if not for the transfer. whichever date is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the 
look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after 
the penalty has been served. a new penalty period begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. 
When a penalty period ends after the first day of the month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after 
the penalty period ends. (7 1 99)(2-8-06)T 
836. MULTIPLE PEIV,iLTYPEIUf)l).8 APPUE» C<JNSECl:!TlVELY <RESERVED). 
A penaf.typeried is cemp'tttedfor each tranefa Onepe1ia!typel'ied must expire before the next hcgilis. (7 l 99) 
837. LIFE EST A TEA' Al·r» ANlV.f:llTlE8 AS ASSET TRANSFER8. 
CenditiensJ!f>r detem1it1il1g ifWhen a life estate in real property is retained by an individual. and a remainder interest 
in the property is a11 asset transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value arc listed in 
8'tthsectien 83 7. ()] ef this rule. The purchase crj a1i tt1m'ttit)' is an asset trttnsfe1· #tat is pres1'tmed te he made fer the 
p'ttrpese of q'ttttli:fy·i11g fer Medicaid. The asset H'tmsfer penalty C!.fJplies 'ttnless the participant she1tJS n~e p'tt1'Chase ef 
the annNity weuld net ha}'e etjfeeted his eligibility Jif>r Medicaid er, n~e pdy11ie11tfrem the amivtity is net greater thtt11 
necessary t-e meet the 1easemable a11derdi11ary menf.Wy needs &jthe beneficia1y. 1%1' niepNl'j'Jeses ef&etien 837, the 
i'Casenable and erdi-ntt1'' menthly needs are these defined by the maxim'ttffl eermmmity speuse allewance at 8ectien 
725 ef these rules. The participant m'ttSt alse shew that nie ammity meets ffle cenditie11s in &thscctiens 83 7. ()3 mid 
83 7. ()4 ef this r'ttle of the remainder interest transferred. the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the 
asset transfer penalty as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules. (5 3 ()3)(2-8-06)T 
(J.J.: Life &tttte. A life estate werth less than the 'r'ttfflC offfie ttwnsferred rcalpF8perty is S'tthject te nie 
asset ttwnsfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the fair market value of the real 
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property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the 
following table: 
·::-;;.~ 
<Bl'~' ~ .s, '_ .... - - -~ - .,; 
TNBLE 837.Q.#. ·LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE 
' 
Age 
Life Estate Age Life Estate Age Ufa Estate Age UfeEatate 
Remainder Remainder Remafnder Remainder 
0 .02812 1 .01012 2 .00983 3 .00922 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
32 .05.058 33 .05.392 34 .05.750 35 .06132 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 39 .07917 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 43 .10145 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 47 .12863 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 51 .16126 
52 .17031 53 .17972 54 .18946 55 .19954 
56 .20994 57 .22069 58 .23178 59 .24325 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 63 .29304 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 67 .34902 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 71 .41086 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 75 .47851 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 79 .54643 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 83 .61358 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 87 .67738 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 91 .73045 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 95 .77113 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 99 .79514 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 103 .81563 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 107 .86591 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
(3 15 02)(2-8-06)T 
838. (RE8ERVEJJ) ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER 
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When assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period. it is an asset transfer presumed to be made 
for the purpose of gual ify ing for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant must provide proof that clearly 
establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for Medicaid or avoid recove1y {2-8-06)T 
01. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a countable resource. 
(2-8-06)T 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an fiSfiet fl'f:msfer if it decs 11etpfflvidefai1' l'l!t11'ket 
'Vt1h1e re the p@ tieipt111t. Ta p1 e; ide fi'Jil' 111(;11</tet 1>'t1ltJe, t111 in e' ecttble tt11n1tity l'l!ltSt meet life cxpecftt11cy t111d tt11111ttt.' 
il!tCl'cst tests listed in &bseetie11s 83 7.(}3 tmd 83 7. {) 4 ef this ntle. The wihie fer eale 1tl£tting the t1sset H'd11sferpcnttl-ty 
is the diffc1·enee heAvern the t1et1tt1l t'tlte predueed by the t111n1tity t11uljit·e pCl'eent (5 %) pe1 year. The sixty (6{)) men th 
leek back 8ppUcs annuity that under no circumstance can be sold or traded for value, including the sale of the stream 
of income from the annuity. The purchase of an irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair 
market value to the participant. The sixty (60) month look-back period applies. The irrevocable annuity provides fair 
market value to the participant ifit passes all of the following tests. (5 3 G13)(2-8-06)T 
IM-!. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table~ 838.02.a. compare the face value of 
the annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
·i-:..~'t'ij. TABLE~ llH,Q2111 - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE 
- c~,,.~ ' ~~I 
Years of Life Years of Life ~.r.orure YeartofUfe 
Age Remaining Remaining !I Age Rttrnalnlng Remaining 
1 -
Male Female [L Mal• Female _ _.._ 
0 73.26 79.26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64.03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27.13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21.38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11 .82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
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72 11.24 14.06 
I I 
100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
f3 H lt.2j(2-8-06)T 
B4b,. lnew;e-abk Alfmtity Annual Interest and Insurer Ratim: Test. The annuity must produce annual 
interest of at least five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test if the average yearly rate for 
the most recent five (5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. Thcparticip<Hit can To rebut the five percent (5%) 
interest test:-. He the participant must show that single premium annuities were not offered by insurers when the 
annuity was purchased and it would not be practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. The 
linsurera must be rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm sttch as A.U. Bcat CB. (5 3 03}(2-8-06)T 
£:. Third Party Beneficiary Test. Effective February 8, 2006, the annuity must name the State ofldaho, 
Medicaid Estate Recovery. as follows: (2-8-06)T 
L The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the annuitant under this title; or (2-8-06)T 
ii,. The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled 
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child 
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value. (2-8-06)T 
!!. Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in ecaual amounts during the term of 
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made. (2-8-06)T 
IJ5-:: ReWJettbk AntrHity. The attrrcmier emiettnt ofa rcveeablc annttity is fl 1'C!iett1'Cc. Em4y 9ttl'l'Cnder &j 
a rc'>'ecflble mmuity is net fin fl99Ct trfll'ls-je1· fer le9s thfln fair mfl1·kct "'fllbiC. (7 1 99} 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
841. PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through 
841.14 of these rules. (3-20-04) 
spouse. 
01. Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the 
(7-1-99) 
02. Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the 
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind 
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
03. Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to 
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred 
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the 
participant starts long-term care. (7-1-99) 
04. Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son 
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must 
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The 
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at 
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have provided services as a paid Medicaid 
provider. (3 20 04)(2-8-06)T 
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834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the uncompensated value of the 
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients . The cost is computed for 
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care 
Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse. (3-30-07) 
835. APPLYING THE PENAL TY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE. 
Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse recovers all the assets, receives fair market value at the 
time of the transfer for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or 
not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as follows: (3-30-07) 
01. Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8, 2006. For assets transferred prior to February 
8, 2006, there is no penalty if the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (I) month's care. The penalty period 
begins running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the 
penalty months. A penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins. 
Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of 
consecutive penalty periods is dropped. (3-30-07) 
02. Penalty Period for Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. For assets transferred on or after 
February 8, 2006, the penalty period begins running the first day of the month after the month the transfer took place, 
or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term care services, if not for the transfer, whichever date 
is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of 
calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after the penalty has been served, a new penalty period 
begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. When a penalty period ends after the first day of the 
month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after the penalty period ends. (3-30-07) 
836. MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY. 
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One (I) penalty period must expire before the next begins. (3-30-07) 
837. LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER 
When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual, and a remainder interest in the property is transferred 
during the look-back period for less than the fair market value of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the 
uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these 
rules. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the time 
of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table: 
r~~ 
,.,.....--. ~ r.7,i-::r "'\ O'I'. 'l• 
TABLE 837 - LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE "f~~~'""1 ,.;t.C~ -.=-r·.- ........... .. .. , . .. ~ 
Age 
tJt. Estate 
Age LifeEalate Age Ute Eatat9 Age UfeEstate Remalncter Remainder Remainder Remainder 
0 .02812 1 .01012 2 .00983 3 .00922 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
32 .05.058 33 .05.392 34 .05.750 35 .06132 
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-I ' ·- --,. ':'"' TABLE 837 • LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE ;ii{~'~ .... -.... - -f· · 
! Age Ufe Estate. Age Ufe Estate Age UfeEatate Age Life Estate .,, 
,; Remainder Remainder Remainder Remainder 
::........_. __ ~ ~:-1 ·- .. - _._,_, 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 39 .07917 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 43 .10145 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 47 .12863 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 51 .16126 
52 .17031 53 .17972 54 .18946 55 .19954 
56 .20994 57 .22069 58 .23178 59 .24325 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 63 .29304 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 67 .34902 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 71 .41086 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 75 .47851 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 79 .54643 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 83 .61358 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 87 .67738 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 91 .73045 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 95 .77113 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 99 .79514 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 103 .81563 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 107 .86591 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
(3-30-07) 
838. ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER. 
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset 
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant 
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for 
Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death. In addition, the participant must show the annuity will be 
paid out in the participant's expected life, is irrevocable, earns interest at a reasonable rate of return, and names the 
state as the remainder beneficiary as described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.04 of these rules, unless the 
annuity is permitted under Section 838.05. (3-30-07) 
01. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a countable resource. 
(3-30-07) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an annuity that under no circumstance can be sold 
or traded for value, including the sale of the stream of income from the annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable 
annuity is treated as an asset transfer, unless the requirements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838.04 
of these rules are met. (3-30-07) 
a. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838.02.a. compare the face value of the 
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annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
~~~~~TABLE 8l8.02.a. - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE -
. - -i~ 
g .· 
I ~ ! 
~ . 
Year• of Ufe Year• of Lite Years ofUfe Years of Life 
~ Age RemaJnlng Remaining · i A_ge Remaining Remaining 
Male Female Male Female 
; . 
0 73.26 79.26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64.03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27.13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21.38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11.82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
72 11.24 14.06 100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
(3-30-07) 
b. Annual Interest and Insurer Rating Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least 
five percent (5% ). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test if the average yearly rate for the most recent five 
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. To rebut the five percent (5%) interest test, the participant must show 
that single premium annuities were not offered by insurers when the annuity was purchased and it would not be 
practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. The insurer must be rated excellent or superior by 
an insurance rating firm. (3-30-07) 
03. State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the 
State ofldaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as: (3-30-07) 
a. The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the annuitant under this title; or (3-30-07) 
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b. The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled 
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child 
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value. (3-30-07) 
04. Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of 
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made. (3-30-07) 
05. Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity 
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408(q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds 
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified 
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section 
408A, Internal Revenue Code. (3-30-07) 
839. 1RUSTS AS ASSET 1RANSFERS. 
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or 
after August II, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust 
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust. (7-1-99) 
840. 1RANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET. 
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant. 
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of 
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible 
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and 
spouse. (7-1-99) 
841. PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET 1RANSFERS. 
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through 
841.14 of these rules. (3-20-04) 
spouse. 
01. Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the 
(7-1-99) 
02. Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the 
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind 
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
03. Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to 
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred 
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (I) year immediately before the month the 
participant starts long-term care. (7-1-99) 
04. Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son 
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must 
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The 
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at 
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have provided services as a paid Medicaid 
provider. (3-30-07) 
05. Benefit of Spouse. The assets were transferred to the participant's spouse or to another person for 
the sole benefit of the spouse. (7-1-99) 
06. Transfer From Spouse. The assets were transferred from the participant's spouse to another 
person for the sole benefit of the participant's spouse. (7-1-99) 
07. Transfer to Child. The assets were transferred to the participant's child, or to a trust established 
solely for the benefit of the participant's child. The child must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security and 
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A second vehicle as described in Sections 222 of these rules; 
Life insurance policies; 
Retirement accounts; and 





05. Countable Income. Countable income is calculated using exclusions and disregards as described 
in Sections 300 through 499 547 of these rules. ~
a. An individual's countable income cannot exceed five hundred percent (500%) of the current federal 
poverty guideline for a household ofone (!). (3-30-07) 
b. A couple's countable income cannot exceed five hundred percent (500%) of the current federal 
poverty guideline for a household of two (2). (3-30-07) 
06. Earned Income Test. Gross income is the total of earned and unearned income before exclusions 
or disregards. Each individual's gross earned income must be at least fifteen percent ( 15%) of his total gross income 
to qualify. (3-30-07) 
06. Cost-Sharing. A participant in the Medicaid for Workers with Disabilities coverage group may be 
required to cost-share. If a participant is required to cost-share for Medicaid, the costs are determined under the 
provisions in IDAPA 16.03.18, "Medicaid Cost-Sharing." (3-30-07) 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the net uncompensated value of the 
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for 
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care 
Medicaid, the rest of the period ofrestricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.~ 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
837. LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER. 
01. Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual, 
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value 
of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty 
as described in Sections 831 through 83 5 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply 
the fair market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the 
time of transfer listed in the following table: 
Age 
0 .02812 1 




" ....... . 
~
2 .00983 3 .00~~ 
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-· ·· ~~it/ TABLE 837.Jll. - l.llOli '"r.415 ~EMAlNDER TABLE 
I.IN ..... wfe ie•• I.lie ..... . Aue Remainder Age Remainder Age Remall\der 
" ----·--·- 0:< .. .. .,. 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 
32 .05-:-058 33 .05-:-392 34 .05.750 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 
52 .17031 53 .17972 54 .18946 
56 .20994 57 .. 22069 58 .23178 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
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02. Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real property is transferred by an individual during 
the look-back period for less than fair market value, the value of the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty 
as described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules . To compute the value of the life estate. multiply the fair market 
value of the real property at the time of transfer by the life estate factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer 
listed in the following table: 
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12 .98359 !a .98198 
1§ .97815 17 .97700 
20 .97365 21 .97425 
~ .96841 ~ .96678 
21! .96062 21! .95813 
~ .94942 aa .M.QQ§ 
.a§ .93460 ll .93026 
40 ,filfil !1 .91030 
44 .89221 45 .88558 
~ .86374 49 &i2Z§ 
~ .82969 M .82028 
~ .77006 fil .77391 
fill .74491 fil .73267 
~ .69352 ti .67970 
68 .63610 fil! .62086 
72 .57261 Il .55571 
l§ .§Qill u .48742 
.aQ .43659 .ai .41967 
~ .36998 .a2 .35359 
ll .30859 §j .29526 
92 .25771 ~ .24692 
it§ .22181 fil .21550 
.1l!Q .19975 1!U .19532 
w .17856 lli .16962 
lli .10068 1ll1! .04545 
























































Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset 
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant 
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for 
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Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death . In addition, the participant must show the annuity will be 
paid out in the participant's expected life, is irrevocable, earns interest at a reasonable rate of return, and names the 
state as the remainder beneficiary as described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.04 of these rules, unless the 
annuity is permitted under Section 838.05 . (3-30-07) 
01. Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annui ty is a countable resource. 
(3-30-07) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an annuity that under no circumstance can be sold 
or traded for value, including the sale of the stream of income from the annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable 
annuity is treated as an asset transfer, unless the requirements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838.04 
of these rules are met. (3-30-07) 
a. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838.02.a. compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant 's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
.. --·-- . 1: :i:,,- .,_. -- :.~ 
TABLE 83'.02.a. • LIF~ EXPECTANCY TABLE 
- ·-
' ' Yeara of Life Years of Life 
i .. 
Years Of Ute YearsOfUfe' 
Age Remaining RemalnJng Age Renullnlng Remaining 
.~ 
Male Femaltf Female 
·- .. . 
0 73.26 79.26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64.03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27.13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21.38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11 .82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
72 11 .24 14.06 100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
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(3-30-07) 
b. Annual Interest and Insurer Rating Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least 
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five 
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. To rebut the five percent (5%) interest test, the participant must show 
that single premium annuities were not offered by insurers when the annuity was purchased and it would not be 
practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. The insurer must be rated excellent or superior by 
an insurance rating firm. (3-30-07) 
03. State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the 
State ofldaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as: (3-30-07) 
a. The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the t1nH1;1;ittlnt institutionalized individual under this title; or ~
b. The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled 
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child 
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value. (3-30-07) 
04. Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of 
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made. (3-30-07) 
05. Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity 
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408(q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds 
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified 
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section 
408A, Internal Revenue Code. (3-30-07) 
(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS) 
841. PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through 
841.14 offhere this rule~. ~
spouse. 
01. Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the 
(7-1-99) 
02. Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the 
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind 
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
03. Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to 
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred 
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the 
participant starts long-term care. (7-1-99) 
04. Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son 
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21 ). The son or daughter must 
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The 
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at 
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have fFffliJided received payment from Medicaid 
for home and community based services ~ a paid Medict1idpt'<7l'ide1· provided to the participant. 
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(3-30-07) 
834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period ofrestricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the net uncompensated value of the 
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for 
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care 
Medicaid, the rest of the period ofrestricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse. (4-2-08) 
835. APPLYING THE PENALTY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE. 
Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse recovers all the assets, receives fair market value at the 
time of the transfer for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or 
not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as follows: (3-30-07) 
01. Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8, 2006. For assets transferred prior to February 
8, 2006, there is no penalty ifthe amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care. The penalty period 
begins running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the 
penalty months. A penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins. 
Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of 
consecutive penalty periods is dropped. (3-30-07) 
02. Penalty Period for Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. For assets transferred on or after 
February 8, 2006, the penalty period begins running the first day of the month after the month the transfer took place, 
or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term care services, if not for the transfer, whichever date 
is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of 
calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after the penalty has been served, a new penalty period 
begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. When a penalty period ends after the first day of the 
month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after the penalty period ends. (3-30-07) 
836. MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY. 
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One (1) penalty period must expire before the next begins. (3-30-07) 
837. LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER. 
01. Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual, 
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value 
of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty 
as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply 
the fair market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the 
time of transfer listed in the following table: 
0 .02812 1 .01012 2 .00983 3 .00992 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
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32 .05058 33 
36 .06540 37 
40 .08429 41 
44 .10779 45 
48 .13626 49 
52 .17031 53 
56 .20994 57 
60 .25509 61 
64 .30648 65 
68 .36390 69 
72 .42739 73 
76 .49559 77 
80 .56341 81 
84 .63002 85 
88 .69141 89 
92 .74229 93 
96 .77819 97 
100 .80025 101 
104 .82144 105 
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34 .05750 35 .06132 
38 .07433 39 .07917 
42 .09543 43 .10145 
46 .12137 47 .12863 
50 .15257 51 .16126 
54 .18946 55 .19954 
58 .23178 59 .24325 
62 .27998 63 .29304 
66 .33449 67 .34902 
70 .39478 71 .41086 
74 .46138 75 .47851 
78 .52951 79 .54643 
82 .59705 83 .61358 
86 .66236 87 .67738 
90 .71779 91 .73045 
94 .76272 95 .77113 
98 .79000 99 .79514 
102 .80946 103 .81563 
106 .84512 107 .86591 
(4-2-08) 
02. Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real property is transferred by an individual during 
the look-back period for less than fair market value, the value of the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty 
as described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market 
value of the real property at the time of transfer by the life estate factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer 
listed in the following table: 
0 .97188 1 .98988 2 .99017 3 .99008 
4 .98981 5 .98938 6 .98884 7 .98822 
8 .98748 9 .98663 10 .98565 11 .98453 
12 .98359 13 .98198 14 .98066 15 .97937 
16 .97815 17 .97700 18 .97590 19 .97480 
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20 .97365 21 
24 .96841 25 
28 .96062 29 
32 .94942 33 
36 .93460 37 
40 .91571 41 
44 .89221 45 
48 .86374 49 
52 .82969 53 
56 .77006 57 
60 .74491 61 
64 .69352 65 
68 .63610 69 
72 .57261 73 
76 .50441 77 
80 .43659 81 
84 .36998 85 
88 .30859 89 
92 .25771 93 
96 .22181 97 
100 .19975 101 
104 .17856 105 
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22 .97120 23 .96986 
26 .96495 27 .96290 
30 .95543 31 .95254 
34 .94250 35 .93868 
38 .92567 39 .92083 
42 .90457 43 .89855 
46 .87863 47 .87137 
50 .83743 51 .83674 
54 .81054 55 .80046 
58 .76822 59 .75675 
62 .72002 63 .70696 
66 .66551 67 .65098 
70 .60522 71 .58914 
74 .53862 75 .52149 
78 .47049 79 .45357 
82 .40295 83 .38642 
86 .33764 87 .32262 
90 .28221 91 .26955 
94 .23728 95 .22887 
98 .21000 99 .20486 
102 .19054 103 .18437 
106 .15488 107 .13409 
(4-2-08) 
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset 
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant 
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for 
Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death. Proof is met if the participant shows the annuity meets 
the requirements described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.05 of this rule. (4-2-08) 
01. Revocable Annuity. A revocable annuity is an annuity that can be assigned. The surrender amount 
of a revocable annuity is a countable resource. (4-2-08) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable, non-assignable annuity is treated as an 
asset transfer, unless the requirements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838.04 of this rule are met. 
(4-2-08) 
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a. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838 .02.a. compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant 's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
I' . '')+;'~;~,[~Ji"' ' ,f'.lli'''TABLE 838.02.a. ·LIFE EXPECTANCYTA8L.E ·;?,~~-;~; . _ 
I 
.., 
YeanofUfe Year.a of Life YQrsofLife Years of Ute 
Age Remaining Remaining I Age Remaining Remalnlng 
~·-· Male Female Male Female I -~ •L. .:_ 
0 73.26 79.26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64.03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27.13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21 .38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11.82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
72 11.24 14.06 100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
(3-30-07) 
b. Annual Interest Test. Any annuity is presumed to produce interest, at minimum, that is equal to 
the treasury rate. (4-2-08) 
03. State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the 
State ofldaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as: (3-30-07) 
a. The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance 
paid on behalf of the institutionalized individual under this title; or ( 4-2-08) 
Page 87 IAC 2008 
IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Department of Health and Welfare 
IDAPA 16.03.05 - Rules Governing Eligibility for 
Aid to the Aged, Blind, & Disabled (AABD) 
b. The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled 
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child 
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value. (3-30-07) 
04. Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of 
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made. (3-30-07) 
05. Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity 
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b ), or 408( q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds 
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified 
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section 
408A, Internal Revenue Code. (3-30-07) 
839. TRUSTS AS ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or 
after August 11, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust 
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust. (7-1-99) 
840. TRANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET. 
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant. 
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of 
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible 
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and 
spouse. (7-1-99) 
841. PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through 
841.14 of this rule. (4-2-08) 
spouse. 
01. Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the 
(7-1-99) 
02. Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the 
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind 
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
03. Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to 
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred 
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one ( 1) year immediately before the month the 
participant starts long-term care. (7-1-99) 
04. Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son 
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must 
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The 
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at 
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have received payment from Medicaid for home 
and community based services provided to the participant. (4-2-08) 
05. Benefit of Spouse. The assets were transferred to the participant's spouse or to another person for 
the sole benefit of the spouse. (7-1-99) 
06. Transfer From Spouse. The assets were transferred from the participant's spouse to another 
person for the sole benefit of the participant's spouse. (7-1-99) 
07. Transfer to Child. The assets were transferred to the participant's child, or to a trust established 
solely for the benefit of the participant's child. The child must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security and 
SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. The child may be any age. (7-1-99) 
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look-back period is thirty-six (36) months, unless the transfer is to or from a trust. If the transfer is to or from a trust, 
the look-back period is sixty (60) months. If the person is entitled to Medicaid or HCBS services, the look-back 
period is counted from the month long-term care or HCBS services began, or would have begun, were it not for a 
penalty. If the person is not entitled to Medicaid, the look-back period is counted from the month prior to the month 
the application was submitted. (3-30-07) 
02. Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. Any asset transferred on or after February 8, 2006, 
regardless of type, is subject to a look-back period of sixty (60) months. The look-back period is counted from the 
date of the application for long-term care or HCBS services or the date of the transfer, whichever is later in time. 
(3-30-07) 
834. PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS. 
The period ofrestricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the net uncompensated value of the 
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for 
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care 
Medicaid, the rest of the period ofrestricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse. (4-2-08) 
835. APPLYING THE PENALTY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE. 
Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse recovers all the assets, receives fair market value at the 
time of the transfer for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or 
not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as follows: (3-30-07) 
01. Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8, 2006. For assets transferred prior to February 
8, 2006, there is no penalty if the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care. The penalty period 
begins running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the 
penalty months. A penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins. 
Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of 
consecutive penalty periods is dropped. (3-30-07) 
02. Penalty Period for Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. For assets transferred on or after 
February 8, 2006, the penalty period begins running the first day of the month after the month the transfer took place, 
or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term care services, if not for the transfer, whichever date 
is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of 
calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after the penalty has been served, a new penalty period 
begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. When a penalty period ends after the first day of the 
month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after the penalty period ends. (3-30-07) 
836. MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY. 
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One (1) penalty period must expire before the next begins. (3-30-07) 
837. LIFE ESTA TE AS ASSET TRANSFER 
01. Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual, 
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value 
of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty 
as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules . To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply 
the fair market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the 
time of transfer listed in the following table: 
TABLE 837.01 • Rl:MAlNl:>ER TABU! 
Remainder Remainder 
.01012 2 .00983 3 .00992 
4 .01019 5 .01062 6 .01116 7 .01178 
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.. . ~ [J..:.~;;Jc.:. TABLE 837.01- REMAINDERTABLE 
£- - ·- - ~· .: ..i. ,t;,.,-.i,...~ • 
, . ;$~;~. ~-'. .. 
Age Remainder Age Remainder Age Remainder Age Remainder 
8 .01252 9 .01337 10 .01435 11 .01547 
12 .01671 13 .01802 14 .01934 15 .02063 
16 .02185 17 .02300 18 .02410 19 .02520 
20 .02635 21 .02755 22 .02880 23 .03014 
24 .03159 25 .03322 26 .03505 27 .03710 
28 .03938 29 .04187 30 .04457 31 .04746 
32 .05058 33 .05392 34 .05750 35 .06132 
36 .06540 37 .06974 38 .07433 39 .07917 
40 .08429 41 .08970 42 .09543 43 .10145 
44 .10779 45 .11442 46 .12137 47 .12863 
48 .13626 49 .14422 50 .15257 51 .16126 
52 .17031 53 .17972 54 .18946 55 .19954 
56 .20994 57 .22069 58 .23178 59 .24325 
60 .25509 61 .26733 62 .27998 63 .29304 
64 .30648 65 .32030 66 .33449 67 .34902 
68 .36390 69 .37914 70 .39478 71 .41086 
72 .42739 73 .44429 74 .46138 75 .47851 
76 .49559 77 .51258 78 .52951 79 .54643 
80 .56341 81 .58033 82 .59705 83 .61358 
84 .63002 85 .64641 86 .66236 87 .67738 
88 .69141 89 .70474 90 .71779 91 .73045 
92 .74229 93 .75308 94 .76272 95 .77113 
96 .77819 97 .78450 98 .79000 99 .79514 
100 .80025 101 .80468 102 .80946 103 .81563 
104 .82144 105 .83038 106 .84512 107 .86591 
108 .89932 109 .95455 
(4-2-08) 
02. Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real property is transferred by an individual during 
the look-back period for less than fair market value, the value of the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty 
as described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market 
value of the real property at the time of transfer by the life estate factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer 
listed in the following table: 
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0 .97188 1 
4 .98981 5 
8 .98748 9 
12 .98359 13 
16 .97815 17 
20 .97365 21 
24 .96841 25 
28 .96062 29 
32 .94942 33 
36 .93460 37 
40 .91571 41 
44 .89221 45 
48 .86374 49 
52 .82969 53 
56 .77006 57 
60 .74491 61 
64 .69352 65 
68 .63610 69 
72 .57261 73 
76 .50441 77 
80 .43659 81 
84 .36998 85 
88 .30859 89 
92 .25771 93 
96 .22181 97 
100 .19975 101 
104 .17856 105 
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2 .99017 3 .99008 
6 .98884 7 .98822 
10 .98565 11 .98453 
14 .98066 15 .97937 
18 .97590 19 .97480 
22 .97120 23 .96986 
26 .96495 27 .96290 
30 .95543 31 .95254 
34 .94250 35 .93868 
38 .92567 39 .92083 
42 .90457 43 .89855 
46 .87863 47 .87137 
50 .83743 51 .83674 
54 .81054 55 .80046 
58 .76822 59 .75675 
62 .72002 63 .70696 
66 .66551 67 .65098 
70 .60522 71 .58914 
74 .53862 75 .52149 
78 .47049 79 .45357 
82 .40295 83 .38642 
86 .33764 87 .32262 
90 .28221 91 .26955 
94 .23728 95 .22887 
98 .21000 99 .20486 
102 .19054 103 .18437 
106 .15488 107 .13409 
(4-2-08) 
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset 
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant 
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for 
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Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death. Proof is met if the participant shows the annuity meets 
the requirements described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.05 of this rule. (4-2-08) 
01. Revocable Annuity. A revocable annuity is an annuity that can be assigned . The surrender amount 
of a revocable annuity is a countable resource. ( 4-2-08) 
02. Irrevocable Annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable, non-assignable annuity is treated as an 
asset transfer, unless the requ irements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838 .04 of this rule are met. 
(4-2-08) 
a. Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the 
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838.02.a. compare the face value of the 
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the 
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next 
lower age. 
Wtk ~~, .,~ - - «'.1~ _.,_ -TABLE 838.02.a. - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE .. 
Years of, Ufe Years of Life Years.of Ufe Years of Life 
!. Age Remaining Remaining Age Remlt_nlng Remaining 
Male Female Mate Female 
-"-- . ) .. . - -
0 73.26 79.26 74 10.12 12.74 
10 64.03 69.93 75 9.58 12.09 
20 54.41 60.13 76 9.06 11.46 
30 45.14 50.43 77 8.56 10.85 
40 35.94 40.86 78 8.07 10.25 
50 27 .13 31.61 79 7.61 9.67 
60 19.07 22.99 80 7.16 9.11 
61 18.33 22.18 81 6.72 8.57 
62 17.60 21.38 82 6.31 8.04 
63 16.89 20.60 83 5.92 7.54 
64 16.19 19.82 84 5.55 7.05 
65 15.52 19.06 85 5.20 6.59 
66 14.86 18.31 86 4.86 6.15 
67 14.23 17.58 87 4.55 5.74 
68 13.61 16.85 88 4.26 5.34 
69 13.00 16.14 89 3.98 4.97 
70 12.41 15.44 90 3.73 4.63 
71 11.82 14.75 95 2.71 3.26 
72 11 .24 14.06 100 2.05 2.39 
73 10.67 13.40 110 1.14 1.22 
(3 -30-07) 
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b. 
the treasury rate. 
Annual Interest Test. Any annuity is presumed to produce interest, at minimum, that is equal to 
(4-2-08) 
03. State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the 
State of Idaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as: (3-30-07) 
a. The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance 
paid on behalfofthe institutionalized individual under this title; or (4-2-08) 
b. The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled 
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child 
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value. (3-30-07) 
04. Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of 
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made. (3-30-07) 
05. Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity 
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408(q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds 
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified 
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section 
408A, Internal Revenue Code. (3-30-07) 
839. 1RUSTS AS ASSET 1RANSFERS. 
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or 
after August 11, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust 
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust. (7-1-99) 
840. 1RANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET. 
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant. 
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of 
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible 
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and 
spouse. (7-1-99) 
841. PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET 1RANSFERS. 
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through 
841.14 of this rule. (4-2-08) 
spouse. 
01. Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the 
(7-1-99) 
02. Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the 
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind 
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. (7-1-99) 
03. Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to 
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred 
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the 
participant starts long-term care. (7-1-99) 
04. Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son 
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21 ). The son or daughter must 
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The 
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at 
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have received payment from Medicaid for home 
and community based services provided to the participant. (4-2-08) 
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